Daniel Seidmann

Contact

• workRoom B34 Sir Clive Granger Building
  University Park
  Nottingham
  NG7 2RD
  UK
• work0115 84 66737
• fax0115 95 14159
• daniel.seidmann@nottingham.ac.uk

Biography

Daniel has taught at Nottingham since 2003, having previously been employed by LSE, Trinity College Dublin, and Newcastle University. His research covers various topics in noncooperative game theory such as multilateral bargaining, committee voting, and signalling.

Professor Seidmann's complete CV can be downloaded here in pdf format. Daniel's Facewall page.

Research Summary

Protecting Buyers from Fine Print [pdf file]

Protecting Buyers from Fine Print: Online Appendix [pdf file]

Selected Publications

• GIOVANNONI, F. and SEIDMANN, D. J., 2013. Corruption and power in democracies Social Choice and Welfare.
• SEIDMANN, D.J., 2011. A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees Social Choice and Welfare. 36(1), 49-74
• SEIDMANN, D.J., 2009. Preferential trading arrangements as strategic positioning Journal of International Economics. 79(1), 143-159
• SEIDMANN, D.J., 2008. Optimal quotas in private committees Economic Journal. 118(525), 16-36

• View all publications

• DANIEL J. SEIDMANN, 2016. Protecting buyers from fine print European Economic Review. 89, 42-54
• VINCENT ANESI and DANIEL SEIDMANN, 2015. Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default Review of Economic Studies. 82(3), 825-867
• VINCENT ANESI and DANIEL SEIDMANN, 2014. Bargaining over an Endogenous Agenda Theoretical Economics. 9, 445-492
• GIOVANNONI, F. and SEIDMANN, D. J., 2013. Corruption and power in democracies Social Choice and Welfare.
• SEIDMANN, D.J., 2011. A theory of voting patterns and performance in private and public committees Social Choice and Welfare. 36(1), 49-74
• SEIDMANN, D.J., 2009. Preferential trading arrangements as strategic positioning Journal of International Economics. 79(1), 143-159
• SEIDMANN, D.J., 2008. Optimal quotas in private committees Economic Journal. 118(525), 16-36
• SEIDMANN, D.J., 2008. Perverse committee appointments may foster divide and rule Journal of Public Economics. 92(3-4), 448-455
• GIOVANNONI, F. and SEIDMANN, D., 2007. Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence Games and Economic Behavior. 59(2), 296-315
• SEIDMANN, D.J., WINTER, E. and PAVLOV E., 2007. The formateurs' role in government formation Economic Theory. 31(3), 427-445
• BAR-ILAN, A. and SEIDMANN, D.J., 2006. Endogenous contract structure and monetary policy European Economic Review. 50(4), 1043-1060
• SEIDMANN, D.J., 2005. The effects of a right to silence Review of Economic Studies. 72(2), 593-614
• SEIDMANN, D. J. and STEIN, A., 2000. The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Harvard Law Review. VOL 114(PART 2), 430-510