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Wages and Unemployment: The Impact of Trade and Technology Under Different Labour Market Paradigms

by

Olivier Bontout and Sébastien Jean

**Centre for Research on Globalisation and Labour Markets, School of Economics,
University of Nottingham**

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The Authors

Olivier Bontout is economist at the DREES, Paris, Sébastien Jean is economist at the CEPII, Paris.

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to assess and compare the impact of trade and technology shocks under different labour market paradigms. We use a computable general equilibrium model, compatible with the new trade theories, and we assume alternatively that wages are flexible, that relative wages are rigid, and that wages are bargained (WS-PS model). We find that the more rigid the wage structure is, the less favourable the effect on welfare is and the less important the evolution of income inequalities are. For unskilled labour, the labour market functioning boils down to a trade-off between real wages and employment.

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3. A Stylised General Equilibrium Model with Several Labour Market Functionings
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1 Introduction

Possibly because of the special attention devoted to the case of the United States, the impact of trade and technology on the labour market is, most of the time, studied in a context of flexible wages. This assumption may be questioned for the United States, but most of all it is obviously unsuited for the numerous countries where the concern is more about unemployment. It then seems necessary to adapt the traditional analysis in order to take into account different paradigms of the labour market. In any case, the initial problem is a negative shock on the relative demand for unskilled labour. But it is not obvious how this shock may translate into the labour market, when its settings are different. In particular, can we consider that the different types of deepening inequalities (in terms of wages in the United States, in terms of unemployment in continental Europe) are the consequences of the same shocks? May we conclude that the functioning of the labour market could operate a trade-off between wage inequalities (or levels) and employment? And in this case, what are the underlying orders of magnitude?

Brecher (1974) provides some insights relating to the transposition of the factor proportion theory to the case of a minimum-wage economy. He shows that some traditional results (like for example the positive effect on welfare) do not hold in this context. Using a similar approach, Krugman (1995) deals with the transposition of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem to the "European case", which he represents by assuming that relative wages are rigid. His very simple, stylised model suggests that the impact of trade with NEIs could be very different in this case, compared with the traditional, flexible wage case. We consider that a more systematic and realistic study in this direction would be useful.

We first discuss the nature of the impact under different labour market settings, and choose what seems to us to be the best way to represent the (continental) European labour markets, namely a WS-PS model. We then describe the structure of a CGE model designed to study this problem, which takes into account different labour market paradigms. Simulations give orders of magnitude for the impact of North-South and North-North trade as well as skill-biased technical progress, in the context of several labour market settings. We also deal with the impact of a skill upgrading of the labour force. The possibility of a trade-off between wage inequality and unemployment is discussed and the sensitivity of the results is analysed.

2 Asymmetrical Shocks and Labour Market Functioning

Both trade and skill-biased technical progress may provoke an asymmetrical shock to the labour market, with a negative effect on the relative demand for unskilled labour. However, their consequences may vary according to the functioning of the labour market.

When wages are flexible, the shock is fully absorbed by a lowering of the relative wages for unskilled workers. And in a context of long-term equilibrium, where cyclical and frictional unemployment are absent, unskilled labour remains fully employed. This hypothesis of flexible wages is widely adopted, for the sake of simplicity. In the case of the United States, it probably stems from the idea that increasing wage inequalities are the main problem. In most European countries, however, the concern is more about employment than about wages: structural unemployment has risen sharply among unskilled labour without large movements in relative wages.

If we are to study the impact of these asymmetrical, exogenous shocks on European labour markets in a plausible way, we need to consider another paradigm for the labour market. Actually, this does not concern the demand for labour, which emanates from firms' profit maximisation program. Here, the problem lies in the representation of labour supply and wage setting. In the classical case, labour supply is perfectly inelastic (that is, exogenously given), and wages have to adapt in order to ensure full employment. To fit more closely to the European case, we have to consider, on the contrary, that wages are fixed according to a given rule, and that employment adapts, or that both are determined together.

Since unemployment hurts mainly unskilled labour but far less skilled workers, we will concentrate on the case of the former, and keep the hypothesis of flexible wages for skilled labour. In other words, we will assume for the sake of simplicity, hereafter that there is no unemployment for skilled workers.

2.1 *Rigid relative wages*

A first possibility is to assume that relative wages remain constant, as Krugman (1995). This is not a very satisfying assumption from the theoretical point of view, unless we suppose that unskilled wages are indexed on skilled wages. There is no evidence for this to be the case at the micro-level, although the evolution of the minimum wage often depends on the general evolution of wages (as in France for example). However, this hypothesis has

the great advantage to be a simple way to track the evolutions experienced at the macro-level: relative wages have experienced very little variation for two decades, in continental Europe^[S1].

Suppose now that the labour market experiences an asymmetrical shock, with a negative impact on the demand for unskilled labour, but a positive impact on the demand for skilled workers. When the real wage for skilled labour is flexible, it increases, in response to this positive shock (see Figure 1). As a consequence, the real wage for unskilled labour also increases, whereas the shock on the corresponding demand is negative. The outcome in terms of employment is then highly negative for unskilled labour, as pointed out by Krugman.

2.2 *Bargaining model*

A less extreme hypothesis is to assume, as for example Mercenier (1992), that the real wage for unskilled labour is rigid downward. However, the justification for such a rigidity is not straightforward. Another possibility is to base the modelling on the theory of efficiency wages. But this does not seem the best way to characterise the differences between American and European labour markets.

A salient feature of continental European labour markets is the power of unions and the relative centralisation of wage bargaining, to varying degrees, depending on the country. An interesting and more realistic way to model the labour market, and to distinguish it from the American case, is to take into account this bargaining process explicitly. This can be achieved through a WS-PS model, which describes formally the bargaining between unions and firms (see for example Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991, for a general presentation, and Bean, 1994, or Cahuc and Zylberberg, 1996 and 1997, for recent surveys). The bargaining process leads to the wage schedule of a single firm and then by aggregation to the wage schedule of the whole economy. This "wage setting schedule" (WS) provides the different couples of the real wage and unemployment rate that are coherent with the bargaining of wages. Like in the traditional case, the "price employment schedule" (PS) stems price setting, and it reflects the demands of labour expressed by firms. These two conditions determine an equilibrium in the labour market. For the sake of comparability, we will assume the labour force to be constant. These curves can then be represented with reference to real wages and employment, as in Figure 2.

When the demand for unskilled labour suffers an exogenous negative shock, the outcome in such a context can be thought of as intermediary between the one obtained with flexible wages and that of rigid relative wages. The adjustment is shared between wages and employment. Each of these variables experiences a decrease, but its magnitude is inferior to that supported when it is the only adjustment variable.

2.3 *The induced impact on welfare and on labour demand*

The comparison of outcomes under these different labour market settings suggests that they correspond mainly to different trade-offs between employment and wages in the adjustment process consecutive to a negative shock on the relative demand for unskilled labour. For a given labour demand curve, the more rigid the adjustment on wages, the more negative the outcome in terms of employment.

However, an important aspect underlying labour market developments is the induced variation of welfare. The impossibility of ensuring the full employment of unskilled workers has consequences comparable to a lowering of the unskilled labour endowment. As pointed out by Brecher (1974) in the context of a two-goods, two-factors model, the "transformation curve" for a minimum-wage country partly corresponds to a Rybczynski line. As a consequence, free-trade can be inferior for such a country to autarchy. In a very similar model, Krugman (1995) shows that an increase in trade with NIEs has a negative impact on national real income, *i.e.* on welfare, when relative wages are rigid. This is not necessarily the case when goods differentiation, imperfect competition and economies of scale are taken into account. Still, the more rigid the adjustment of wages, the less favourable the variation of welfare. Thus, for a given *ex-ante*, negative shock on the demand for unskilled labour, the *ex-post* shift in the unskilled labour demand curve will be lowest in the case of flexible wages, and highest when relative wages are rigid. Other cases are intermediary, with a higher *ex-post* shift in a rigid real wage model than in a WS-PS model.

Eventually, the differences in labour market settings induce two kinds of effects:¹ an *ex-ante* trade-off between employment and wages, and a global effect on real income, which modifies the derived labour demand curve. The quantitative assessment of the effect of labour market regulations on unemployment and wage inequality in a context of such asymmetrical exogenous shocks is thus complex. It cannot be achieved through a mere labour market analysis, which would obscure the indirect effect on labour demand. It has to be studied using a completer approach, embedding a labour market analysis in a general equilibrium framework. This is our objective in what follows. We will try in particular to assess whether indeed the differences in labour market settings can induce a trade-off between unemployment and wage inequalities. Most of all, we will focus on the quantitative evaluation of these differences.

3 A Stylised General Equilibrium Model with Several Labour Market Functionings

The computable general equilibrium (CGE) model presented in this section has been conceived with the objective of providing an analysis of the impact of trade (be it North-South or North-North) and technology on the labour market. It is in many respects similar to those developed by Gasiorok, Smith and Venables (1992) and Mercenier (1992) for the assessment of European economic integration, as well as to the one proposed by Cortes and Jean (1996) for dealing with the emergence of low-labour-cost countries. It is not only compatible with the factor proportion theory, but also with the so-called "new trade theories", as it incorporates horizontal product differentiation, monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale. We give here a very brief description of the main elements of the model. However, we will pay more attention to the labour market modelling, which is central to the questions addressed here. [SJ2]

¹ Rodrik (1997) emphasizes that trade may also modify labour market functioning, by making the demand for labour more price-sensitive. He also stresses that trade pressure might weaken the position of unions in wage bargaining. Naylor (1998) also shows that economic integration may modify wage bargaining, but he argues that a more competitive product market does not necessarily imply a more competitive labour market. We do not take into account such effects here.

3.1 *General framework*

We consider two areas, producing three goods with two factors. In order to study the consequences not just of North-South trade but also of North-North trade, the two areas can alternatively be a Northern one (Europe) together with a Southern one (the emerging economies²), or two Northern areas (say America and Europe). A distinct, stylised database is used for each of these two cases, relying on reasonable rough estimates of the different variables. When dealing with the North-South case, Europe's GDP is taken at the initial equilibrium to be five times more important than the emerging economies' GDP,³ and the Northern area is more specialised in the production of skill-intensive goods. When dealing with the North-North case, the two areas are assumed to be perfectly identical except for labour market settings.

Two production factors are distinguished: unskilled labour and an aggregate of skilled labour and capital. The relative complementarity between skilled labour and capital has been largely documented. For the sake of simplicity, we assume this complementarity to be perfect. Each economy is broken down into two industrial sectors, producing tradable goods, and a third, non-tradable sector, corresponding roughly to services. The first sector is unskilled-intensive while the second one is skill-intensive. The share of unskilled labour in value added is 50% for the first industry, as opposed to 25% in the second. This share is 20% in the non-tradable sector, which means that the service industry is supposed to be more skilled-intensive than both industrial sectors. The factor intensities used are thus fairly contrasted; this stems from the idea that in the available data, the apparent disparity in factor intensities is underestimated because of aggregation bias. As we focus on long run equilibria, we always assume trade to be balanced. Neither area is fully specialised at the initial equilibrium, but trade is rather inter-industry in nature in the North-South case, while it is intra-industry in the North-North case.

² We wish to simulate important relative growth of the Southern area. That is why we restrain it to the emerging countries, which indeed are prone to grow far faster than the rest of the world.

³ For details on benchmark databases, see Annex 1.

3.2 *The demand side*

Final consumption and intermediate consumption are modelled in the same way. For each of them, the demand function is supposed to be homothetic, and representative consumer behaviour is modelled in two stages. The first level describes the distribution of demand between industries. It is represented through a CES utility function, with an elasticity of substitution σ_I equal to 0.5. The share of an industry in total expenditure hence increases with its relative price.

The consumer then chooses between the different varieties of each good, whatever their geographical origin. This choice is represented through Dixit-Stiglitz functions, and the varieties from a given country are symmetrical. However, the elasticity of substitution is supposed to be higher in the unskilled-labour intensive industry ($\sigma_{2,1} = 8$) than in the skill-intensive industry ($\sigma_{2,2} = 4$). This also means that substitution between domestic and imported goods when relative prices change is easier for unskilled-intensive goods.

3.3 *The supply side*

The production function involves intermediate consumptions and the two types of production factors. It is a nesting of two functions. Firstly, intermediate goods and the aggregate of production factors are assumed to be perfectly complementary, as reflected by the use of a Leontief function: their substitutability is weak, and the shocks we are interested in are not really prone to change the distribution between value added and the consumption of intermediate goods. At this level we take into account the presence of fixed costs, inducing economies of scale, in both industrial sectors. These fixed costs correspond to 15% of the initial output in the first industry and to 30% in the second one. The production in the third industry is assumed to have constant returns to scale.

The combination of production factors is then represented as a CES function of unskilled labour and of the skilled-capital aggregate. We set the elasticity of substitution between these two factors at 0.5. This value may seem fairly low, as surveys like those by Freeman (1986) and Hamermesh (1986, 1993) suggest that the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labour and skilled labour or capital lies between 0.5 and 1.5, with an average inferior to unity. However, Wood (1994, 1995) argues that commonly-used values are over-estimated, mainly because they are calculated using a very high level of aggregation for

sectoral data. Consequently, the variations measured in factor intensities not only correspond to changes within-firms, but also to structural effects linked to changes in product-mix. Only the first effect should be taken into account here. The study of Legendre and Le Maître (1997) based on panel data for France confirms that taking into account interfirm heterogeneity leads to lowering the estimations of capital-labour substitutability, and estimates by Steiner and Wagner (1997) with disaggregated data for Germany point in the same direction.

The services industry is assumed to be perfectly competitive, while both industrial sectors are in monopolistic competition. Firms compete *à la* Cournot, and their mark-up ratio is defined by:⁴

$$p_i \left(1 - \frac{1}{EP_i}\right) = Cm_i \quad (1)$$

Where p_i is the selling price and Cm_i the marginal cost of firm i . The firm's perceived price-elasticity EP_i depends on its market share (s_i) as follows:

$$\frac{1}{EP_i} = \frac{1}{\sigma} + \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right)s_i \quad (2)$$

Where σ is the elasticity of substitution among varieties in the industry.⁵

We consider two different types of market-structure dynamics. Following the taxonomy introduced by Sutton (1991), and used by Schmalensee (1992) and Oliveira-Martins (1993), the first sector is assumed to be "fragmented"; this means that the number of firms varies when the size of the industry varies. The number of firms is set by a zero-profit condition. This corresponds to a sector in which concentration and entry barriers are rather weak. In contrast, the second sector is assumed to be "segmented", which means that the size of firms increases when their market grows. Formally, we assume that the number of firms is

⁴ We assume zero conjectural variations, and we do not take into account any Ford effect.

⁵ For more details on Equation (2), see Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1992), or Cortes and Jean (1996).

fixed in this industry, implying that profits are not necessarily zero. Concentration and entry barriers are rather high in such industries.

In addition, we wish to take into account the fact that trade is a vector of competitive pressure. Be it through defensive innovation, through decreasing X-inefficiencies, through technological catch-up or through firm selection, an increase in trade intensity may modify the production function of the representative firm of each industry, spurring productivity and inducing skill-upgrading. Empirical evidence supporting this link has been found by Hine and Wright (1995) as well as by Cortes and Jean (1997). In order to include it in the model, we use here the empirical results from the latter. They had shown that a one point increase in the import penetration rate in a given industry induces a 1.3% increase in labour productivity in this industry if imports come from the South and a 0.7% increase if they come from the North. They also found an effect on labour skill: a one point increase in the import penetration rate induces a 0.4% increase in the skilled to unskilled ratio in the industry concerned. Formally, this effect is modelled through an endogenous impact of the import penetration rate on the parameters of the production function of the representative firm, industry by industry.

3.4 Labour market modelling

For the two first paradigms mentioned in Section I concerning the unskilled-labour market, the modelling itself is rather simple. When wages are perfectly flexible, the adjustment is met through changes in real rewards, under the constraint of full employment. Only the closing of the unskilled labour market changes under the hypothesis of constant relative wages: their wages are constrained by the indexation on the skilled's one, and their employment adjusts. These two paradigms appear as rather peculiar ways of describing the functioning of the labour market since, for each of them, only one variable bears the whole of the adjustment. This is no longer the case when an explicit model of wage bargaining is introduced. This is achieved here through a WS-PS model, where the wage setting is the result of a bargaining process between firms and unions. The main elements of the model used here can be summarised as follows (see Annex 3 for more detail). Broadly speaking, we follow the model proposed by Cahuc and Zylberberg (1997), using only a static representation of the steady-state equilibrium.

The bargaining sets only unskilled wages. It is represented as a non co-operative Nash-equilibrium. During the bargaining, the hypothesis is made that firms keep the right to manage, *i.e.* that they set their demand for labour once wages are set.⁶ Like for example Manning (1991) and Cahuc and Zylberberg (1996, 1997), we also assume that bargaining occurs as if the production function were a Cobb-Douglas one. This almost simplifies the derivation of the wage schedule.

The objective of each firm in the bargaining is to maximise its profits in the short run (*i.e.* during the period concerned by the bargaining), that is when capital is constant. This profit is zero if the bargaining fails, as a strike is supposed to prevent the firm from producing in such a case. The objective of unions is assumed to be expressed only in terms of wages:⁷ they maximise the difference, for the period concerned by the bargaining, between the utility of workers when bargaining succeeds (V_j^e) and the utility when bargaining fails (V^r). The latter is the utility workers can expect outside the firm. It depends on the average wage in the economy, on unemployment subsidies and on the probability of finding a job. The analytical result depends on the type of production function chosen and also on the type of utility function used to describe the behaviour of unions. Generally speaking, it is possible to derive a relationship between the utility obtained from the bargained wage in the firm and the utility that can be expected elsewhere. It takes the following form here:

$$V_j^e - V^r = \frac{\gamma(1-\alpha)}{\underbrace{(1-\gamma)\alpha}_{M < 1}} w_j \quad (3)$$

Where γ is the power of unions in the negotiation, α is the share of unskilled labour in total value added and w_j is the bargained wage set within the firm.

⁶ As introduced by Nickell and Andrews (1983). Actually bargaining could also be effective on variables other than wages, like on employment, as in Mc Donald and Solow (1981) and Manning (1987).

⁷ This objective function for unions is the same as in Cahuc and Zylberberg (1996, 1997), but unions could also have other objectives, like employment (see for example Manning, 1991, 1993). The assumption that unions have only a wage objective implies that they only care about the situation of insiders.

The difference between the level of utility when bargaining succeeds and when it fails is thus a constant mark-up M on the bargained wage. This relationship implicitly sets the wage in each firm as a result of the bargaining between the firm and the union. By aggregation, this enables the wage equation for the whole economy to be derived. For the sake of simplicity, the equilibrium is considered to be symmetrical (the wage bargained is identical in all firms) and the unemployment rate is assumed to be endogenous, using a stock equation on the labour market. The final wage equation gives then a general relationship between wages and unemployment, with a negative slope:

$$\frac{w}{p} = \Gamma \frac{u}{u - \phi} \quad (4)$$

Where parameters Γ and ϕ depend on variables specific to the labour market, like probabilities of finding and losing a job, as well as unemployment subsidies. This description is static, but the flows relationships used are derived from hypotheses of steady-state equilibrium. In an intertemporal model, Cahuc and Zylberberg (1997) show that a similar equation can be obtained by considering the corresponding steady-state equilibrium.

The price schedule reflects the labour demand by firms, set by their objective of profit maximisation. The aggregated labour demand is represented by the price schedule (PS). Finally, the WS-PS model describes the equilibrium of the labour market. Values for the different parameters of the wage schedule are chosen on the basis of econometric studies and surveys, like Card (1995). The reference value for the slope of the WS curve is taken from L'Horty and Sobczak (1997) estimates of a WS-PS model on French data with the identification restriction proposed by Manning (1993).⁸ They found that the elasticity of real wages (in logarithms) to the rate of unemployment (in level) is 2. The unemployment rate among unskilled workers is initially set at 5%. For reasons of global coherence, the probability to loose a job has to be calibrated (see Annex 3 for more detail).

We consider this WS-PS model to be really adapted only for European labour markets. That is why we only use it for the Northern area when using the North-South (Europe-Emerging

⁸ This restriction consists in assuming it is possible to identify a wage equation without taking into account productivity variables.

countries) database, and only for the first area when using the North-North (Europe-United States) database. In this latter case, we always assume that wages are flexible in the United States.

4 Assessing the Impact of Trade and Technology under Different Labour Market Paradigms

The model described above makes it possible to compare the impact of several shocks, with different labour market functionings. Of course, we will focus mainly on the variations of relative wages and employment between skilled and unskilled labour. Once the detailed results of various simulations have been described, we carry out a sensitivity analysis. But it is necessary, first, to precise the definition of the shocks.

4.1 Definition of the shocks

Our objective is to assess the main causes put forward for explaining the increase in wages and/or employment inequalities between skilled and unskilled labour in most industrialised countries. According to the recent literature, skill-biased technical change and increasing trade are the most likely candidates.

As far as technical change is concerned, the shock simulated is a 10% increase in the productivity incorporated to unskilled labour. This means that we assume that the same output as previously can be obtained, *ceteris paribus*, with 10% less unskilled workers. This shock is supposed to occur in all Northern areas, but not in the Southern one. In this context, the results are fairly similar when simulated with the North-South and with the North-North database. In practice, we will only present the results with the North-North database, for this technological shock.

As far as trade is concerned, the increase in North-South trade is frequently put forward as a potentially important cause of rising inequalities. In order to study the impact of an increase in North-South trade, we simulate a reference shock which corresponds to a doubling in the size of the southern area compared to the northern one⁹ (we assume that factor endowments

⁹ This corresponds for example to a South area growing at a 5% higher rate than the Northern area during 14 years.

are doubled in the emerging economies). [S3] This increase in the relative size of the emerging economies is coupled with a 10% lowering of the tariff-equivalent of trade barriers for each industry and each good except for the first industry, where we assume a 30% lowering of trade barriers for Northern imports from the South. Indeed, with the removal of the Multi-Fiber Arrangements, the effect on the tariff-equivalent of non-tariff barriers should be more important for the exports from emerging economies in unskilled-intensive industrial sectors, which are the most strongly constrained, in particular by quotas. Note that we do not simulate any product-upgrading for the South: we focus on an emergence shock, and do not study the hypothesis of a catching-up process.

In a somewhat unusual way, the influence of North-North trade is also introduced in the analysis. Intra-industry trade is generally considered to induce little effect on labour markets. It has no effect on industry specialisation and it creates little adjustment costs. However, as noted above, we take into account here the trade-induced effect on labour productivity and labour skill. Under these conditions, North-North trade may also have a significant impact. The shock simulated corresponds to a 20% lowering in tariff barriers between both zones and for both industrial sectors.

The results are presented separately for each type of shock, but different simulations not reported here showed that the overall impact, when different shocks are combined, is very close to being additive.

4.2 *Base results*

It is no surprise that the different shocks simulated induce an increase in inequalities, be it through wages or employment (this is precisely the reason why we are interested in their assessment), and we will not develop the explanations of the underlying mechanisms too much, as these are fairly well known. [S4] Our main point of interest is to study and to assess quantitatively how these impacts depend on the nature of the functioning of the labour market. In order to make the interpretation of the results easier, we also calculate a Gini coefficient to characterise in a synthetic way the evolution of income inequalities in the labour force. This coefficient is calculated taking into account the existence of a replacement ratio for the unemployed (whose value was set at 50% in the model of bargaining), which is supposed to be paid by a proportional tax on factor revenues. We first assess the impact of technology and trade shocks, and study how they vary according to the

labour market functioning. We then analyse how their impact may be balanced by a skill upgrading.

4.3 *Impact of a biased technical change*

Leamer (1996) emphasises that, in the case of a small country with free-trade, "the factor bias of technical change is entirely irrelevant" (p. 23) for explaining wage inequalities, as it corresponds to a Rybczynski effect, which modifies trade specialisation without changing relative wages. However, we here are rather talking about skill-biased technical progress which is widespread, at least among developed countries. Moreover, neither Europe nor the United States can be considered as being a "small country". In addition, we are considering differentiated goods, for which substitution elasticities are finite.

In this context, skill-biased technical change does modify relative wages. Its *ex-ante* impact is to reduce the demand for unskilled labour. However, this effect is partly balanced by each producer, in response to the increase in marginal productivity of unskilled labour. The productivity gains also induce a fall in prices, and therefore a significant welfare gain. This fall in prices is all the more important given that the production is unskilled-intensive. Thus, the relative price of industry 1 decreases, with a positive impact on its absolute and relative demand, hence a positive impact on the relative demand for unskilled labour. Eventually, the positive indirect effects do not compensate the negative *ex-ante* impact on the demand for unskilled labour (the results are shown in Table 1). The substitutions (both between production factors and between industries) are too weak to make this possible.¹⁰ This shock has a fairly strong negative impact on the real wages and/or employment of unskilled labour, and in all cases the real wage bill for unskilled workers decreases. In contrast, the real reward for capital and skilled labour increases. As a consequence, income inequalities always rise, as evidenced by the increase in the Gini coefficient.

¹⁰ This result could be inverted with higher elasticities, and in particular with an elasticity of substitution between production factors superior to one. However, we explained above why such values seem to us to be unrealistic in the present context.

4.4 North-South and North-North trade shocks

In the initial equilibrium, North-South trade specialisation is strongly linked to relative factor endowments. Under these conditions, the effects of an increase in North-South trade are well known, through the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Here, the trade increase also induces an endogenous effect on labour productivity and labour skill. This fosters the negative impact on the relative demand for unskilled labour. Finally, this shock also implies a sharp decrease in the real wage bill for unskilled labour, and an increase in income inequalities, whatever the functioning of the labour market. Let us stress that the results obtained are fairly important (see Table 1); under rigid relative wages, for example, this increase in North-South trade, which results in a 5.7 percentage points increase in the penetration ratio of Southern imports in Northern manufacturing sectors, induces a 4.3% decrease in unskilled employment.

An increase in North-North trade has of course a positive effect on welfare. But in contrast with the traditional analysis, it also induces a rise in income inequalities, whatever the labour market paradigm. This is due to the trade-induced change in production functions, for two reasons. First, these endogenous productivity gains are skill-biased, as reflected by the positive impact on average labour skill. Second, they are industry-biased, because they only occur in the industrial sectors, which are on average unskilled-intensive compared to the service industry. However, contrary to the previous cases, the real wage bill for unskilled labour increases. And the rise in inequalities appears fairly weak when compared to the increase in total welfare.

Table 1: The impact of technology and trade shocks in the Northern area, under different labour market functionings

Shock	Variable	Flexible wages	WS-PS	Rigid relative
Skill-biased technical progress	Unskilled real wages	- 5.2%	- 2.5%	+ 2.5%
	Skilled, capital real wages	+ 5.1%	+ 4.2%	+ 2.5%
	Unskilled employment	---	- 1.8%	- 4.9%
	Welfare	+ 2.9%	+ 2.4%	+ 1.4%
	Gini coefficient variation	+ 2.5	+ 2.0	+ 1.2
Growth of North-South Trade	Unskilled real wages	- 3.9%	- 1.9%	+ 2.8%
	Skilled, capital real wages	+ 5.0%	+ 4.3%	+ 2.8%
	Unskilled employment	---	- 1.3%	- 4.3%
	Welfare	+ 3.7%	+ 3.3%	+ 2.4%
	Gini coefficient variation	+ 2.1	+ 1.7	+ 1.0
Growth of North-North Trade	Unskilled real wages	+ 0.7%	+ 0.4%	+ 3.1%
	Skilled, capital real wages	+ 3.9%	+ 4.0%	+ 3.1%
	Unskilled employment	---	+ 0.2%	- 1.6%
	Welfare	+ 2.6%	+ 2.7%	+ 2.2%
	Gini coefficient variation	+ 0.8	+ 0.8	+ 0.4

Note: Results in the Northern area, all figures are variations in %, except Gini coefficient variations, in points. The initial value of the Gini coefficient is 17.2 in the context of flexible wages or rigid relative wages, and 18.4 in the WS-PS model (for which the unemployment rate is initially set at 5%).

4.5 Trade-offs under different labour market paradigms

Now, our main objective is to study more thoroughly the variations of impacts with respect to labour market settings. Note first that the scenario of growth in North-North trade under the WS-PS model is the only exception to many of the rules put forward hereafter. The shock induces in this case an increase in unskilled employment. This is possible because some unemployment is supposed to exist initially (in the benchmark) in the WS-PS model, but such an outcome is impossible with flexible wages, as unskilled labour is assumed to be fully employed initially. Consequently, evolutions appear more favourable in the former scenario than in the latter.

For the other cases, we know *a priori* that the wage setting in the WS-PS model is more strongly constrained (with respect to market forces) than in the flexible wages case, but less than in the rigid relative wages case. Consequently, in response to these shocks involving

negative pressures on the relative demand for unskilled labour, the outcome for the relative wages as well as for the real wages for unskilled labour is less negative with the WS-PS model, and even more with rigid relative wages. The reverse is true for both skilled, real wages and for unskilled employment.

In this context, the sign of the evolutions of overall inequalities is not straightforward: unskilled workers experience an increase in their relative wages, but a decrease in employment. However, with the hypothesis made here about unemployment subsidies, income inequalities (as measured by the Gini coefficient) appear to decrease when wage setting are more constrained.

Another interesting point is the evolution of welfare. Not surprisingly, the case of flexible wages always appears as the most favourable in this respect and the rigid relative case is always the least favourable. Note, nevertheless, that the welfare variation is never negative, contrary to the results obtained, under perfect competition and with homogenous goods, as a consequence of North-South trade (Brecher, 1974; Krugman, 1995).

Thus, the differences in the functioning of the labour market induce a double trade-off, between unskilled relative wages and unskilled employment on the one hand, and between welfare and income inequalities on the other hand. This is clearly illustrated by Figure 3. The Figure also shows that the terms of these trade-offs hardly differ from one shock to another, and that the results under the WS-PS model are close to being a weighted average of both others. As a general summary, a labour market setting which reduces the negative impact on unskilled relative wages by two percentage points induces a one per cent fall in unskilled employment. This is accompanied by welfare gains that are 0.3 percentage point lower, while the increase in the Gini coefficient is $\frac{1}{4}$ of a percentage point lower.

4.6 Skill upgrading

This study of the different reactions under these various labour market paradigms would not be complete without paying attention to the impact of an exogenous variation in average labour skill, even though this very complex problem can only be treated here in an oversimplified way. Skill upgrading is a major evolution experienced during the last decades. But it is also one of the most evident economic policy responses to increasing inequalities. With respect to the latter aspect, it is worth wondering whether the magnitude

of the effort necessary to cancel the negative effects of a given exogenous shock is dependent on the labour market functioning.

Suppose for example that an economy suffers both skill-biased technical change and an increase in North-South trade (*i.e.* a combination of the first two shocks studied above). The impact on welfare and the labour market is given by the results detailed above in Table 1 (which are fairly additive), and it is characterised by an increase in welfare, together with rising inequalities. Let us now look at the possibility of unskilled workers becoming skilled.¹¹

Both in a context of flexible wages and of rigid relative wages, the skill-upgrading necessary to cancel the previous effect on inequalities is the same: it corresponds to the case where 5.4% of the initial endowment in unskilled labour becomes skilled (welfare increases by 8.3% in both cases). This equivalence between both models is logical since the constraint of rigid relative wages is no longer binding when the effect on inequalities is cancelled. Nonetheless, the effect of the same skill-upgrading in a context of bargained wages (WS-PS model) is different. The negative effect on unskilled relative wage is not totally cancelled (it still decreases by 2.7%), but unskilled employment increases and the unemployment rate among unskilled workers decreases by 1.2 points with respect to its initial level. Welfare increases by 8.6%. With the improvement in the general economic situation, wage bargaining becomes less constraining on employment: the difference between the bargained wage and the wage level corresponding to full employment is then lower.

The representation of skill upgrading is extremely simple here, with only two skill described in a static framework without any education cost. However, these simulations show that skill upgrading is a powerful instrument to reduce an increase in inequalities, and this is even more obvious in a bargaining model, where a non-zero, initial unemployment rate is taken into account.

¹¹ We do not take into account here the cost of education. The real wages for skilled workers is assumed to be twice as high as the unskilled one.

4.7 Sensitivity analyses

For the WS-PS model, we investigated how results depend on the slope of the WS curve. The corresponding results are not detailed here, but they are not surprising: a different slope leads to a different distribution of the impact between wages and employment. The greater the slope, the closer the results are to those with flexible wages.

The results are fairly robust with respect to the values of the elasticities of substitution between industries and varieties (see Annex 2, Tables A.5 and A.6). When the substitutability between varieties is higher, the impact of North-South trade is slightly more important, as the penetration of imports from the South is easier, but the impact of skill-biased technical change remains fairly constant. Globally, orders of magnitude remain unchanged, as do the relative responses for the different labour market functionings.

In contrast, substitution between production factors plays a crucial role here, as it is an important way to absorb the asymmetry of shocks. The main results for an elasticity of substitution of 0.2, 0.5 or 0.8 are summarised in Figures 4 and 5. The higher the substitutability between production factors is, the more sensitive their relative demands are with respect to their relative wages. Thus, almost by definition, the adjustment through relative wages is easy and powerful when substitutability between production factors is strong. Its "leverage effect" is strong: a small variation in relative wages is enough to absorb an important shock to relative demands. Consequently, the results in a context of flexible wages are very sensitive to the value of this parameter.

But this elasticity also matters when relative wages are rigid. In particular, skill-biased technical progress induces a rise in the marginal productivity of unskilled labour compared to the other factor. As a result, once the *ex-ante* decrease in unskilled labour demand due to the change in its average productivity is taken into account, the relative demand for unskilled labour increases within each industry; but this increase is more important when the elasticity of substitution between factors is higher. This mechanism still plays a role for trade shocks, as trade variations induce an endogenous, skill-biased effect on production functions. In all cases, however, these remain second order effects (see Annex 2, Table A.4, for detailed results). As a result, the slope of the line representing the trade-off between relative wages and unskilled employment in Figure 4 is higher when the elasticity of substitution between production factors is higher. In other words, a given constraint on

relative wages has a relatively stronger negative effect on employment in this latter case of high substitutability.

This extreme sensitivity of results under flexible wages is also obvious when dealing with welfare and inequalities (Figure 5). While the outcome in terms of welfare experiences small variations when the substitutability between production factors varies, the evolution of the Gini coefficient is strongly modified. The relative effect of a change in the labour market paradigm on welfare and on inequalities changes sharply, the latter being far more sensitive in a context of low substitutability between factors. Note, nevertheless, that the three simulations with the WS-PS model for which unskilled employment is increased should be interpreted with care, as noted previously, because this increase in employment is not possible with both the other forms of modelling, for which there is initially no unemployment.

Lastly, it is worth noting that the outcome of wage bargaining seems to adapt to the sensitivity of adjustment variables. As we noted, the employment cost of a given correction in relative wages is lower in a context of weak substitutability between production factors. In the WS-PS framework, the adjustment is then more oriented toward employment. Compared to the base case, the negative effect on unskilled employment is multiplied by three and a half (-5.7% vs. -1.6%), while the impact on the real wage decreases (-9.6% vs. -10.6%). In contrast, when the substitutability is high, that is when the adjustment through wages is more efficient and "less costly", the bulk of the adjustment is borne by wages.

5 Conclusion

The aim of this paper is to investigate how the impact of trade and technology on the labour market depends on the nature of the functioning of the labour market. To provide realistic orders of magnitude, we use a stylised computable general equilibrium model. This model is compatible with the theoretical framework of new trade theories, as it accounts for product differentiation, monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale. It also takes into account the trade-induced improvement in labour productivity and labour skill within industries; consequently, the impact of North-North trade is included in the analysis.

We focus on three distinct paradigms: flexible wages, rigid relative wages and bargained wages (in a WS-PS model). This latter case appears as an intermediary situation between

both others, which correspond respectively to perfect flexibility and perfect rigidity of the wage structure. These differences in labour market adjustments induce significantly different impacts on welfare and inequalities. The CGE model makes it possible to account for these different mechanisms and to provide quantitative assessments in each case.

Not surprisingly, we find that the more rigid the structure of relative wages is, the less favourable the effect on welfare is (provided that our aggregate welfare measure is neutral with respect to inequality). In contrast, the increase in income inequalities, as reflected by the evolution of the Gini coefficient, is lower with a more rigid wage structure. As far as unskilled labour is concerned, the labour market functioning boils down to a trade-off between relative (or real) wages levels and employment. We also find that the less substitutable the production factors are, the lower the employment-cost of a given correction in relative wages is.

In all cases, skill upgrading of the labour force appears to be a powerful instrument to reduce the increases in inequality. The magnitude of the upgrading necessary to compensate a given asymmetrical shock is the same with flexible wages and with rigid, relative wages. However, the effect of skill upgrading is even more positive in the WS-PS model, as it relaxes the constraint imposed by the wage bargaining.

Finally, this study makes it possible to propose a reasonable comparative assessment for the main possible sources of deepening inequalities in countries with very different labour market functionings. An interesting direction for further research could be to use this framework in order to try to account for the labour market evolution in different countries during the last two or three decades. This would make it possible to evaluate how well such a framework of analysis fits with past evolution and, if it does this correctly, what the quantitative contribution of each possible cause is.

Table A.3: Input-output table of Northern areas in the North-North database

Sectors	Production	M	Resources	Intermediate consumption Table	1	2	3	Intermediate Consumption	Final Consumption	X	Uses	Penetration rate(%)	
1	2120	70	2190	1	138	138	230	506	506	1614	70	2190	33%
2	2120	230	2350	2	345	345	461	1150	1150	970	230	2350	10.8%
3	5760	0	5760	3	886	886	1613	3404	3404	2356	0	5760	0.0%
Total	10000	300	10300	total C	1378	1378	2304	5060	5060	4940	300	10300	6.1%

	1	2	3	
VA	742	742	3456	4940
LQK	371	557	2765	3692
LNQ	371	186	691	1248
Production	2120	2120	5760	10000

Share of factors in VA		
1	2	3
50%	75%	80%
50%	25%	20%

Sectors	Production	VA
1	21%	15.0%
2	21%	15.0%
3	58%	70.0%
total	100%	

Share of VA in production		
1	2	3
35%	35%	60%

Global share of factors in VA	
LQK	
	74.7%
LNQ	
	25.3%

ANNEX 2: Sensitivity of labour market adjustments to elasticities of substitution between factors, industries and varieties (detailed results)

Table A.4: Sensitivity to the elasticity of substitution between factors

<i>Value of the elasticity of substitution</i>		Flexible wages		WS-PS		Rigid relative wages	
		<i>0.2</i>	<i>0.8</i>	<i>0.2</i>	<i>0.8</i>	<i>0.2</i>	<i>0.8</i>
Biased Technical Progress	Unskilled wages	- 24.4%	+ 0.3%	- 4.9%	+ 0.2%	+ 2.3%	+ 2.5%
	Skilled, capital wages	+ 11.3%	+ 3.4%	+ 4.7%	+ 3.4%	+ 2.3%	+ 2.5%
	Unskilled employment	---	---	- 5.7%	+ 0.1%	- 7.6%	-2.3%
	Welfare	+ 2.6%	+ 2.6%	+ 1.1%	+ 3.0%	+ 0.6%	+ 2.2%
	Variation of the Gini coefficient	+ 9.0	+ 0.7	+ 3.5	+ 0.7	+ 1.8	+ 0.6
Growth of North - South Trade	Unskilled wages	- 16.8%	- 1.2%	- 4.0%	- 0.8%	+ 3.6%	+ 2.6%
	Skilled, capital wages	+ 10.3%	+ 3.9%	+ 6.1%	+ 3.8%	+ 3.6%	+ 2.6%
	Unskilled employment	---	---	- 3.8%	- 0.4%	- 5.8%	-3.9%
	Terms of trade	- 8.5%	- 10.3%	- 9.0%	- 10.3%	- 9.3%	- 10.5%
	Welfare	+ 4.3%	+ 3.5%	+ 3.4%	+ 3.4%	+ 2.8%	+ 2.4%
	Variation of the Gini coefficient	+ 6.7	+ 1.2	+ 3.2	+ 1.2	+ 1.4	+ 1.0
Growth of North - North Trade	Unskilled wages	- 5.0%	+ 1.9%	- 1.6%	+ 1.3%	+ 3.2%	+ 3.1%
	Skilled, capital wages	+ 6.1%	+ 3.5%	+ 4.9%	+ 3.7%	+ 3.2%	+ 3.1%
	Unskilled employment	---	---	- 1.0%	+ 0.6%	- 2.3%	- 1.2%
	Terms of trade	0%	0%	0%	0%	- 0.2%	0%
	Welfare	+ 2.8%	+ 2.6%	+ 2.6%	+ 2.8%	+ 2.2%	+ 2.2%
	Variation of the Gini coefficient	+ 2.7	+ 0.4	+ 1.7	+ 0.4	+ 0.6	+ 0.3

Note: Results in the Northern zone, all figures are variations in %, except the Gini coefficient in points.

Table A.5: Sensitivity to the elasticity of substitution between industries

<i>Value of the elasticity of substitution</i>		Flexible wages		WS-PS		Rigid relative wages	
		0.2	0.8	0.2	0.8	0.2	0.8
Biased Technical Progress	Unskilled wages	- 5.4%	- 4.9%	- 2.6%	- 2.4%	+ 2.4%	+ 2.5%
	Skilled, capital wages	+ 5.2%	+ 5.1%	+ 4.2%	+ 4.2%	+ 2.4%	+ 2.5%
	Unskilled employment	---	---	- 1.9%	- 1.7%	- 5.0%	- 4.8%
	Welfare	+ 2.8%	+ 2.9%	+ 2.3%	+ 2.4%	+ 1.4%	+ 1.4%
	Variation of the Gini coefficient	+ 2.6	+ 2.4	+ 2.0	+ 1.9	+ 1.2	+ 1.2
Growth of North - South Trade	Unskilled wages	- 4.4%	- 3.2%	- 2.2%	- 1.7%	+ 2.6%	+ 2.9%
	Skilled, capital wages	+ 5.0%	+ 5.0%	+ 4.2%	+ 4.4%	+ 2.6%	+ 2.9%
	Unskilled employment	---	---	- 1.5%	- 1.1%	- 4.5%	- 4.0%
	Terms of trade	- 10.0%	- 10.0%	- 10.1%	- 10.1%	- 10.3%	- 10.3%
	Welfare	+ 3.5%	+ 3.8%	+ 3.1%	+ 3.5%	+ 2.2%	+ 2.6%
Variation of the Gini coefficient	+ 2.3	+ 2.0	+ 1.8	+ 1.7	+ 1.1	+ 1.0	
Growth of North - North Trade	Unskilled wages	+ 0.3%	+ 1.1%	+ 0.2%	+ 0.6%	+ 3.0%	+ 3.2%
	Skilled, capital wages	+ 4.0%	+ 3.9%	+ 4.0%	+ 4.1%	+ 3.0%	+ 3.2%
	Unskilled employment	---	---	+ 0.1%	+ 0.3%	- 1.8%	- 1.4%
	Terms of trade	0%	0%	0%	0%	- 0.1%	- 0.1%
	Welfare	+ 2.4%	+ 2.9%	+ 2.4%	+ 3.0%	+ 1.9%	+ 2.5%
Variation of the Gini coefficient	+ 0.9	+ 0.7	+ 0.9	+ 0.8	+ 0.4	+ 0.3	

Note: Results in the Northern zone, all figures are variations in %, except the Gini coefficient in points.

Table A.6: Sensitivity to the elasticity of substitution between varieties

<i>Value of the elasticity of substitution</i>		Flexible wages		WS-PS		Rigid relative wages	
		7 and 3.5	8 and 16	7 and 3.5	8 and 16	7 and 3.5	8 and 16
Biased Technical Progress	Unskilled wages	- 5.1%	- 5.2%	- 2.5%	- 2.5%	+ 2.5%	+ 2.4%
	Skilled, capital wages	+ 5.2%	+ 5.1%	+ 4.2%	+ 4.1%	+ 2.5%	+ 2.4%
	Unskilled employment	---	---	- 1.8%	- 1.8%	- 4.9%	- 4.9%
	Welfare	+ 2.9%	+ 2.8%	+ 2.4%	+ 2.3%	+ 1.4%	+ 1.4%
	Variation of the Gini coefficient	+ 2.5	+ 2.5	+ 2.0	+ 2.0	+ 1.2	+ 1.2
Growth of North - South Trade	Unskilled wages	- 3.6%	- 5.3%	- 1.8%	- 2.6%	+ 2.6%	+ 4.6%
	Skilled, capital wages	+ 4.7%	+ 7.8%	+ 4.1%	+ 6.9%	+ 2.6%	+ 4.6%
	Unskilled employment	---	---	- 1.2%	- 1.9%	- 4.0%	- 6.3%
	Welfare	+ 3.5%	+ 5.2%	+ 3.2%	+ 4.7%	+ 2.4%	+ 3.5%
	Variation of the Gini coefficient	+ 2.0	+ 3.1	+ 1.7	+ 2.6	+ 1.0	+ 1.5
Growth of North - North Trade	Unskilled wages	+ 0.7%	- 0.2%	+ 0.4%	- 0.1%	+ 2.6%	+ 6.6%
	Skilled, capital wages	+ 3.3%	+ 8.8%	+ 3.4%	+ 8.8%	+ 2.6%	+ 6.6%
	Unskilled employment	---	---	+ 0.2%	- 0.1%	- 1.3%	- 4.3%
	Welfare	+ 2.4%	+ 5.0%	+ 2.4%	+ 4.9%	+ 2.0%	+ 3.8%
	Variation of the Gini coefficient	+ 0.6	+ 2.1	+ 0.7	+ 2.0	+ 0.3	+ 1.0

Note: Results in the Northern zone, all figures are variations in %, except the Gini coefficient in points.

ANNEX 3: The WS-PS model

This annex describes briefly how the WS curve used in the model is obtained. The modelling is made first in an intertemporal approach: description of the bargaining between the firm and the union (which provides the mark-up), then of the wage curve of the firm and of the aggregate wage curve. The wage curve is besides obtained as in Cahuc et Zylberberg (1997). The characterisation of the steady-state equilibrium provides then the long-term wage curve used in the model.

Bargaining between the firm and the union

Intertemporal utility function of workers and unemployed (wages are always expressed in real terms) are as follows :

$$V_{e,j}^t = w_j^t + \beta \left\{ q(a_{t+1}V_e^{t+1} + (1-a_{t+1})V_u^{t+1}) + (1-q)V_{e,j}^{t+1} \right\} \quad \text{and}$$

$$V_u^t = z^t + \beta \left\{ a_{t+1}V_e^{t+1} + (1-a_{t+1})V_u^{t+1} \right\}$$

where j refers to the firm, V_u^t is the intertemporal utility of a worker employed at time t , V_e^t is the intertemporal utility of an unemployed at time t , q is the probability to lose a job, $a(t)$ the probability to find a job, w is the real wage, z are unemployment subsidies and β is the discount factor. We also assume that the bargaining occurs as if the production function was

a Cobb-Douglas one, that is $Y = K^{1-\alpha} L^\alpha$. Then : $L = K \left(\frac{w}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}}$ and

Short Term Profit = $(1-\alpha)K \left(\frac{w}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}$. The Nash program is then :

$$\underset{w_{j,t}}{\text{Max}} \left(w_{j,t} \right)^{\frac{\alpha(1-\gamma)}{\alpha-1}} \left(V_{e,j}^t - V_r^t \right)^\gamma$$

where $V_r^t = a_t V_e^t + (1-a_t)V_r^t$

With $\mu = \frac{\gamma(1-\alpha)}{\alpha(1-\gamma)} < 1$, the first order condition is then:

$$(V_{e,j}^t - V_r^t) = \mu w_{j,t} \quad (1)$$

Wage curve of the firm

The following relationship is obtained after a few calculations :

$$(V_{e,j}^t - V_u^t) = (V_{e,j}^t - V_r^t) + a_t (V_e^t - V_u^t)$$

which can also be written : $(V_{e,j}^t - V_u^t) = \mu \left(w_{j,t} + \frac{a_t}{1-a_t} w_t \right)$ (2)

The expressions of utilities, combined the result of the bargaining (1), give:

$$(V_{e,j}^t - V_u^t) = w_{j,t} - z_t + \beta(1-q)\mu w_{j,t+1} \quad (3)$$

With (2) et (3), this make it possible to obtain wage curve of the firm:

$$w_{j,t} = \frac{z_t}{1-\mu} + \frac{\mu}{1-\mu} + \left[\frac{a_t}{1-a_t} w_t + \beta(1-q)w_{j,t+1} \right] \quad (4)$$

The aggregated wage curve

At the symmetrical equilibrium, every wage bargained in a firm is identical to the current wage in the economy:

$$w_t = \frac{z_t}{1-\mu} + \frac{\mu}{1-\mu} + \left[\frac{a_t}{1-a_t} w_t + \beta(1-q)w_{t+1} \right]$$

which can be written: $\beta(1-q) \frac{w_{t+1}}{w_t} = \frac{1}{1-a_t} - \frac{1}{\mu} \left(1 - \frac{z_t}{w_t} \right)$ (5)

With (5) and an equation expressing the equilibrium of flows on the labour market, it is possible to obtain the aggregated wage curve :

$$\beta(1-q)\frac{w_{t+1}}{w_t} = \frac{(1-q)u_{t-1} + q}{u_t} - \frac{1}{\mu} \left(1 - \frac{z_t}{w_t}\right) \quad (6)$$

The long-term wage curve

The long-term wage curve corresponds to the steady-state equilibrium, assuming a zero growth rate in order to fit with our static representation. From (6), it can be written as follows:

$$\beta(1-q) = \frac{(1-q)u + q}{u} - \frac{1}{\mu} \left(1 - \frac{z}{w}\right) \quad (7)$$

And then :

$$\frac{w}{z} = \frac{u}{u - \underbrace{\left[\frac{\mu q}{1 - \mu(1-\beta)(1-q)} \right]}_{\theta}} \left[\frac{1}{\underbrace{1 - \mu(1-\beta)(1-q)}_{\Gamma}} \right] = \Gamma \frac{u}{u - \theta}$$

With $w_{current} = w_{initial} \cdot w$ and $z / w_{initial} = b = 50\%$, the following expression of the long-term wage curve can be obtained:

$$w = b\Gamma \frac{u}{u - \theta} \quad (8)$$

Calibration of the long-term wage curve

Two initial conditions are imposed, one concerning the level and the other the slope of the WS curve. All parameters are taken from empirical studies except the probability to lose a job (which calculated).

All these parameters given, it determines as a first initial condition the value of a scale parameter A :

$$w = A\Gamma \frac{u}{u - \theta}$$

From $1 = A\Gamma \frac{u}{u - \theta}$ (wages are considered equal to unity at the initial equilibrium), it gives

$$A = \frac{u_0 - \theta}{u_0\Gamma}, \text{ where the initial unemployment rate is 5\% .}$$

The second initial is a condition on the slope of the curve (noted a). At the initial equilibrium, it has to correspond to the value estimated by L'Horty et Sobczak (1996) :

$$a = \frac{\theta}{u_0(u_0 - \theta)} = 2$$

This gives $\theta = \frac{au_0^2}{(1+au_0)}$ which, given the analytic expression of θ , determines the value of

q :

$$q = \left[\frac{(1-\beta) - \frac{(1+au_0)}{au_0^2}}{(1-\beta) - \frac{1}{\mu}} \right]^{-1}$$


The calibration provides a value of 3% for q (the probability to lose a job). Other parameters take the following values : $\beta = 0,95$; $\alpha = 0,7$; $\gamma = 0,25$; $a = 2$.

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Figure 1: Adjustment to an asymmetric shock in a context of rigid relative wages



Note: The figure displays *ex-ante* effects.

Figure 2: Impact of a negative shock on labour demand in a WS-PS model.





Figure 3: Trade-offs under different labour market paradigms




Note: All variations in %, except for the Gini coefficient in points. Circles refer to results with the flexible wages model, triangles correspond to rigid relative wages and diamonds to the WS-PS model.

Figure 4: Sensitivity of impacts on relative wages and unskilled employment to the elasticity of substitution between factors,



Note: Impact of shocks, as defined in III.A Circles refer to results with the flexible wages model, triangles correspond to rigid relative wages and diamonds to the WS-PS model. The bold line joins points corresponding to the base case (elasticity of substitution between factors ϵ of 0.5), the dotted line joins points corresponding to $\epsilon = 0.2$ and the standard line joins points corresponding to $\epsilon = 0.8$. The scale is the same in the three figures.

**Figure 5: Sensitivity to the elasticity of substitution between factors,
Welfare and Gini coefficient**



Note: Impact of shocks, as defined in III.A. Circles correspond to flexible wages, triangles to rigid relative wages and diamonds to the WS-PS model. The thick line joins points corresponding to the base case ($\epsilon = 0.5$), the dotted line joins points corresponding to $\epsilon = 0.2$ and the standard line joins points corresponding to $\epsilon = 0.8$.

3^[S1] Donner chiffres.

5^[S2] Note supprimée : The model used here is also described in Jean et Bontout (1998), except for the labour market modelling.

13^[S3] As far as the effects in the North are concerned, this is equivalent to a doubling of total factor productivity in the South.

13^[S4] EER : garder la note ? For a more detailed discussion on this point, under flexible wages, see for example Jean and Bontout (1998).

22^[S5] Pb dans ce tableau ?

30^[S6] Actualiser (TEJ).