RIP Seminar, Wednesday 29 November

Stephen Ingram (University of Manchester)

Realism, Anti-Realism, and Arbitrariness in Ethics

The notion of arbitrariness has an interesting role in metaethical debate, for both realists and (non-nihilistic) anti-realists have been charged with failing to capture the non-arbitrariness of moral choice. This paper aims to examine the notion of arbitrariness in depth, in order to see whether and how we can move the debate forward. I consider different interpretations of arbitrariness and settle on what I call ‘The Stability Interpretation.’ I explain how realists and anti-realists can both accept this interpretation when it is understood in broad terms, but that they tie it to different intuitions. After clarifying how realists and anti-realists often speak at cross-purposes when discussing the non-arbitrariness of moral choice, I outline and evaluate strategies we might use in trying to move things forward.