Philosophy Research Seminar - Jessica Brown

3-5pm, Wednesday 23 October

Join us in the Machicado Suite for the weekly Philosophy Research Seminar, where Jessica Brown joins us from St Andrews!

Profiling, Doxastic Wrongs and Encroachment

A number of authors have recently argued that certain intuitively problematic beliefs lack a key epistemic status, e.g. justification or knowledge, by appeal to moral encroachment. The relevant classes of problematic beliefs include beliefs which intuitively wrong someone as well as profiling beliefs. This would be an attractive result given how problematic the relevant beliefs seem. In addition, given certain connections between a belief’s epistemic standing and the propriety of acting on that belief, we might hope to show that subjects are not in a good enough epistemic position to act on the relevant beliefs. In this paper I examine whether these hopes are borne out.

All welcome!