Philosophy Research Seminar - Daniel Deasy

Daniel Deasy (University College Dublin)

A-theories Post-Prior

Arthur Prior (1914-1969) defended the theses that (1) things begin and cease to be (i.e. to exist) over time; (2) there are metaphysically fundamental tense operators; (3) there are temporary propositions; and (4) the present time is metaphysically distinguished from all other times in virtue of being present. In the philosophy of time, B-theorists reject theses (1) – (4), and most A-theorists accept all of them (with the exception of a small minority who reject thesis (1)). However, in recent years, there has been a growing interest among A-theorists in developing theories that imply the falsehood of theses (2) or (4) as well as thesis (1). In this paper, I examine two such theories due to Cameron (2015) and Skow (2015). I argue that A-theorists ought to reject both theories, on the grounds that they also imply the falsehood of thesis (3) – and thesis (3) should be non-negotiable for A-theorists.