School of Law

The "Internal Market Bill" and its consequences

The last instalment of the Brexit saga is the UK Government’s “Internal Market Bill” which has created significant friction between the UK and the EU in the ongoing negotiations, setting the scene for an eleventh hour “no deal” Brexit cliffhanger. Why the friction? Because by the UK Government’s own admission the Bill violates “in a specific and limited way” the Withdrawal Agreement concluded between the UK and the EU. More precisely it disregards the part of the UK-EU withdrawal agreement that keeps Northern Ireland closely "aligned" with EU rules for at least four additional years after the end of the transitional period, i.e. four years after 31 December 2020. 

The inevitable cliffhanger might turnout to be marginally positive. This is not because the UK Government will prevail in the "chicken game " with the EU driving the latter to unthinkable compromises (such as the abolition of the Irish Protocol), but because the Government stance may lead the markets to react dynamically before the disorderly exit.

As I have suggested previously Brexit’s conundrum will only be solved when "Iphigenia reaches the altar of her sacrifice." Only then will those - often the most vulnerable - who currently dismiss the “no-deal” warnings as scaremongering will have a taste of what disorderly Brexit actually means. But for this to happen, more "tangible" signals are needed from the markets. During Theresa May’s Premiership, which always aimed at a smooth transition and despite some visible warning signs, the markets’ reaction from the point of view of the everyday experience has been considered by many as mild.

The problem is that the consequences of a disorderly Brexit will be experienced after the actual exit (i.e. the end of the transition period) when it would be probably too late for “Iphigenia”. This is where the possible positive contribution of moves like the introduction of the “Internal Market Bill” lies: Such spasmodic, unprecedented and sometimes constitutionally extreme exploits - like last year’s prorogation of Parliament - give the impression to the markets that a “no deal” outcome is more likely. This increases the probability that markets would then react more intensely and thus more didactically.

Those who thought that Brexit would disappear in the COVID-19 commotion are in for a surprise. This is because unlike COVID-19 there is, nor can be, a “vaccine” that solves the Irish Gordian Knot in a way that meets the pronouncements and preferences of prominent Brexiteers. In other words there is no solution that can accommodate all the following three conditions: a) To allow the UK to conclude its own trade deals with third countries b) To ensure that there be no land border on the island of Ireland in compliance with the Good Friday Agreement and c) To ensure that there be no customs sea border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. The attempt of the Government to replicate Alexander the Great’s solution to the original Gordian Knot, through the introduction of the Internal Market Bill, risks cutting another important knot that endured for three hundred years, the unity of the UK itself.

Dr Aris Georgopoulos is Assistant Professor in European and Public Law in the School of Law

 https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/alumni/newseventsandfeatures/news/news-items/2020-news/brexit-where-are-we-now.aspx 

Posted on Monday 19th October 2020

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