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FOREWORD

In reviewing the development of approaches to the study of pragmatics over the last fifteen years, we can distinguish two main strands of activity. Firstly, approaches which aim to provide overarching and general theories of linguistic pragmatics (e.g. Grice 1975; Gazdar 1979; Sperber & Wilson 1986) and secondly, approaches which aim at a detailed description of the pragmatics of a particular delimited area of language use (e.g. Bates 1976; Brown & Levinson 1978; Owen 1984; Wachtel 1980). In general, the first type of work uses introspective data generated by its writers to illustrate theoretical points, while the second uses naturally occurring data, both spoken and written, or elicitation data. The studies in this volume represent a spectrum of current work of the second type. At the same time, their debt to theoretical frameworks derived from approaches of the first type is quite evident. Owen on anyway and Channell on vague language look to Grice, but also to Conversation Analysis; Nair tests Grice's maxims with reference to lying; Hunston undertakes discourse analysis on scientific writing, while Lumsden investigates the complexity of constraints on the use of there is.

This strong relationship between general overall theories and detailed description demonstrates the sound methodological and philosophical underpinnings of linguistic pragmatics. What we see is a classic Popperian cycle of broad hypothesis formation (work of the first type) following by testing against appropriate data (work of the second type) which, in turn, leads to refinement of the original hypotheses (Popper, 1963). Equally, pragmatics is shown to be a young science in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn, 1962) by the continued presence of competing paradigms - most obviously Speech Act theory versus Gricean implicature-based theory, and Discourse Analysis versus the ethnomethodologically oriented Conversation Analysis.

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VAGUENESS AS A CONVERSATIONAL STRATEGY

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1. Introduction

Vague language has attracted attention primarily for the theoretical problems it poses for semantics and pragmatics in the description of its meaning. Hence it has appeared to be somewhat esoteric and marginal. Perusal of even a small amount of conversation data makes it obvious, however, that expressions of vagueness are pervasive. Adequate description of vague language must therefore be a central concern, especially for the researcher concerned with the description of naturally occurring data.

This paper describes some of the ways vague language is used in conversations. It looks at the conversational effects which arise from the use of certain vague expressions and the conversational goals which speakers use them to achieve.

A general definition of vague language was offered by C. S. Peirce:

'A proposition is vague where there are possible states of things concerning which it is intrinsically uncertain whether, had they been contemplated by the speaker, he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition. By intrinsically uncertain we mean not uncertain in consequence of any ignorance of the interpreter, but because the speaker's habits of language were indeterminate; so that one day he would regard the proposition as excluding, another as admitting, those states of things.' (1902:748)

This will be adopted as a working definition herein (a detailed discussion of the definition of vague language can be found in Channell, 1983).

Two types of vague expressions are featured (there are of course many other ways of being vague, some of which are described in Channell, 1983). Firstly, number approximations, for example about ten, approximately ten, (a)round ten, ten or so, ten or twelve. These number approximations consist of an APPROXIMATOR (about etc.) and an EXEMPLAR NUMBER. They are understood by hearers as designating a continuous sequence of numbers (=INTERVAL) which contains the exemplar number. So, for example, 'about fifteen people' was judged by 100 per cent of informants in an elicitation test, as designating an interval

symmetrical about 15, with a mean length of 4.65 whole numbers, i.e. 13 to 17. The perceived extent of the interval cannot be precisely determined in any given case (cf Peirce's definition) and is influenced by such factors as the size of the exemplar number, how many significant figures it contains, purpose of the estimate, type of item being quantified, and situation of use of the approximation. (For details of the elicitation test, and a fuller description, see Channell, 1980).

The second type is vague category identifiers, for example, oranges and things (like that), oranges and that, oranges or something/anything (like that), which consist of an EXEMPLAR (here, oranges) and a TAG (and things, etc.). These are understood as designating an associational category of which the exemplar is perceived as a good example (in the sense of Rosch, 1975). The precise extension of the category is fuzzy, in the sense that there is a high degree of agreement about some members and a low one about others. Hence, 39 informants asked in a test about the meaning of oranges or something named the following (in descending order of frequency): apples (27 mentions); pears (18); bananas (12); grapes (8); tangerines (8). Items such as nuts and quince had only one mention. (For results of this informant test and a full description of vague category identifiers, see Channell, in prep.). In the same way as for Number Approximations, linguistic context and situation of utterance play a part in determining the category which is understood by hearers.

The approach taken is broadly in the spirit of the work on conversational interaction known as CONVERSATION ANALYSIS (hereinafter CA), as summarised for example in Wootton, 1981:

In approaching interaction, then, it is the problems confronting participants which are of interest in CA, and the systematic procedures and designs through which such problems are displayed and resolved. There is no prior analytic "theory" of interaction being applied (:103)

One difference between my work and CA is that I look at written examples as well as spoken, especially written examples which seek, for particular effects, to imitate or be associated with spoken discourse. These are useful because they show up those aspects of spoken discourse which language users judge to particularly identify its 'spokenness'.

I begin by looking in some detail at two different extracts which serve to introduce the complexity of the effects under observation and some of the categories proposed to handle it. I then add further categories and examples, with more detailed description. Finally, I link the categories together and suggest a unified approach to conversational uses of vague language.

EXAMPLE 1.

An extract from a skin care advertisement

After this, an application of Vichy Tonic Lotion seeks out and removes the last traces of the Cleansing Milk, leaving your skin clean, soft and refreshed.

More clean, soft and refreshed, perhaps, than it has ever been.

As your introduction to their way of skin care, Vichy would like you to receive this pack of their Cleansing Milk and Tonic Lotion for £3.

This does save you eighty or so pence. But it is as nothing to the kindness you will be showing your skin.



In Example 1, taken from an advertisement, it is not really possible to observe what communicative effects are understood by its readers. But it is possible, as a reader oneself, to list what they might be. We may presume that Vichy know the retail prices of the products referred to. Brands of this up-market type do not normally allow shops to vary the prices of their products. Therefore they know exactly how much 'you' are saving. The copywriter must have deliberately included an approximation to achieve one, or several, particular effects, for example:

1. The actual number is lower, say 77p. Rounding up to 80, and approximating, implicates to the naive, or hasty, a greater saving than is really the case. (This is similar to the price tag ploy: 'only £4.99').
2. For the purpose of the advertisement, the actual saving is not very important. This approximation gives as much information as is necessary, and the exact figure would not give the reader information he needs, it would be redundant. The relative unimportance of the sum of money involved is confirmed by the content of the next sentence.
3. It is for self-protection. Retail prices do vary, so savings will be different in different shops. The advertiser ensures he is telling the truth ('legal, honest, decent and truthful') by using an approximation.
4. It sets a tone of chatty informality - phatic communion between advertiser and reader. Test informants who were asked about the use of vagueness (in semi-formal group discussions conducted at the conclusion of the informant tests mentioned above) suggested that tags are not used in formal types of writing, or in more formal conversations (one example was 'not in an interview'). The copywriter is trying to render the effect of informal conversation. Any, or maybe all, of these effects could be understood by readers of this advertisement.

Example 2 [Tutorial discussion on innateness of language capacity in humans]

A: What about this business about

[

E: (laughs)

[

it doesn't matter how intelligent the individual is - they all manage to achieve the same "level of linguistic competence

E: do they

D: A level anyway

A: well everyone achieves intelligibility

[

E: yeah yeah okay - within a set group

-----I mean you-----

{

A: there's been a lot of work done to show that there's no difference in sophistication between one language variety and another

E: I'm talking about you know sort of acceptable middle class language and (.) sort of working class language you know Bernstein and mm you know sort of elaborated code and things like that

C: well that's more environment isn't it

{

E: yeah

{

C: it's the way you

you're-----

{

D: most people achieve competence

{

E: yeah yeah a lot of the time . (.) a lot of the time it's linked to intelligence as well

{

A: but is it

E: at least it is in schools - if you can SOUND more intelligent by the way you speak you are categorised as being intelligent

A: well yes but never mind about CATEGorised as being more intelligent - you AREN'T more intelligent are you

B: but what do you mean by intelligent

C: its a very good question

E: yeah by middle class based intelligence tests

[continues]

Speaker E precedes her vague exemplar and tag ('elaborated code and things like that') with considerable hesitation - a pause, two sort ofs, two you knows and an 'mm'. These are read off by hearers as indications that (among other things) she is not sure what she's talking about. The subsequent turns all feel able to treat what she's said as wrong, and they are permitted to do this in part by her unsureness. Speakers D and A, and B, all disagree with her. Duncan and Fiske (1977) in their work on turn-taking, think that expressions like or something facilitate hearer interruption, but they do not show enough data to test this assignment. I would say that my data do not show this, what they do show in some instances is increased possibility for hearer disagreement/criticism.

Later in the same discussion, E makes explicit that (a) she does not know or understand the subject matter of the talk very well, and (b) that she does not command with any certainty the language necessary for the topic of discussion, as we can see from the following extract.

[later in same discussion, talking about an article by Putnam]

E: I'll tell you what I found difficult in this - all these different symbols - I didn't know what they meant

A: where

E: in this Putnam thing

C: {

B: {

E: that I class as being sigma - the sum of

A: [reading] a highly restrictive sigma class of grammars -
|I don't think you need to worry about that

E: but I did - I mean I just sort of worried about it

[. . . continues with details of losing first page, worrying etc]

A: you mean this bit at the beginning where he says [reading] we should assume that the speaker has a built-in function which assigns weights to grammars G1 G2 and G3 /E:mm hhh/ to a certain class sigma of transformational grammars

E: {
and immediately I thought [loud] don't understand this put it down (laugh)

A: I hope you went on reading that because it becomes MUCH clearer after that

E: no - I get terrified

[continues with details of nervousness amid general laughter]

On this basis, I suggest that one use of vagueness is to enable speakers to talk about subjects they are not very knowledgeable about, or subjects where they do not know the necessary vocabulary.

On this last point, elaborated code and things like that directs hearers to access a category. It may well be that there is no clear superordinate term for this category. If there is one, E did not know it, so her vagueness may show her finding a way of talking about something she does not quite have the vocabulary to express.

There is a way in which E works around what she means to say, using lexis relevant to her point. It is interesting that speaker C does not appear to be bothered by the multiple uncertainties in what E has said. She refers back to it with a definite that. The subsequent turns show that all the speakers believe that what is being talked about is different language varieties and their relationship to measures of intelligence.

There is another point about what E says. She uses, as noted, a lot of markers of vagueness. Yet there is evidence that she does not feel that uncertain about what she is saying. Notice her refusing to give up the turn to either C or D. As she continues there is less and less vagueness. Leaving aside the sort of's for a moment, it seems she could have rather successfully defined a category (?or two) - middle class language and working class language, without the vagueness, and without her very unclear 'elaborated code and things like that'. It is also the case, as noted, that her hearers react to what she says as definite. So perhaps this vagueness is for something else.

Notice that the purpose of E's turn in which the vague tag occurs is to disagree with what A has said about everyone achieving competence. We can see that A (who is the tutor) takes an assertive role in changing the direction of the conversation (by her question on a new topic, and in asking a direct question to the tutorial group (and, as usual with teachers, one to which she already knows several answers; cf. Coulthard, 1977:104 for this observation)). Given A's assertive behaviour, E's vagueness may be a marker of deference to someone established as superior in the context of this discussion, (cf. Schenkein, 1978, 'Identity Negotiations in Conversation'). E is clearly quite determined to get her point out. She resists all interruptions, including A's very firm attempt to cut her off ('there's been a lot of work done...') and other interruptions. Yet she must continue to mark deference to A, even while disagreeing with her.

In these two examples, a diversity of conversational effects has been observed. I would like to now firm up these observations by looking at further examples which will serve to substantiate the categories suggested, and also to add some others.

2. Giving the right amount of information

We saw in the Vichy example that one possible use of vague additives is to tailor an utterance such that the right amount of information is given.

Grice (1975) noticed that speakers appear to tailor their contributions in particular ways, and he formulated two important rules of conversation which go together to make up what he called the Maxim of Quantity:

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required (:45)

The examples in this section show these rules being used, and show that vague expressions are a device which speakers use to tailor their contributions such that they give the right amount of information for the purpose of the conversation.

Grice notes that his second maxim is disputable - 'it might be said that to be over-informative is not a transgression of the CP but merely a waste of time'. I think the evidence from data is that the second maxim of quantity is indeed a rule of conversation, the transgressing of which produces, as predicted by the Grice account, particular implicatures. Some informants recognised this consciously. When I asked the informants in the number approximation test about the use of approximations, one of them said:

I think it's more used because it doesn't convey more information than if you knew the exact figure - if you say to someone "it cost five hundred or so pounds" - if they know it cost five hundred and thirty nine it's not going to get them any further

Clearly, though, we must add 'for the purpose of that conversation', because there are obviously occasions when knowing it was exactly £539 would be necessary, for example, in a banking or accounting context. Sadock (1977) and Wachtel (1980), in their writing on number approximations, both notice that approximations can be used to vary the amount of information given. Crystal and Davy (1975:111-114) observe that vagueness is quite appropriate in some conversations. I asked one of the test subjects why a speaker would not give the exact amount, even if s/he knew it; he said, 'because in casual conversation like that you don't go into details like that'. We have seen this as one possible effect involved in the advertising copy 'eighty or so pence'.

A less complex example is

[geraniums] [B]

Theres a room downstairs you see which is only one floor
and gets really cold and I lost two or three with the frost

In this example, so few geraniums are in question that a hearer may well conclude that S must know how many s/he lost. Notice that being told the exact number will not contribute anything of useful interest to H: S could equally have said some or a few. S has avoided being precise, in view of the purpose of the conversation, and its possible informal setting.

[paper at LAGB reporting informant work]

Weve got about five or six of them but I'm only going to talk about three of them today

Clearly, a linguist engaged in phonetics research must know how many informants he has. But it is not relevant to the audience to know this for the purpose of the paper he is about to give. The information which is important to them is that they are going to be told about three informants. Tailoring the amount of information by using an approximation in direct contrast with an exact number ('three'), may have the effect of focussing attention towards, or foregrounding, what is considered most important in the utterance. Using an approximation here, communicates something like 'don't pay too much attention to this, it's not very important'.

In order to observe the converse, use of precision in contexts which demand it, I looked at data from three BBC Radio 4 programmes on financial topics: Money Box, The Financial World Tonight, and It's a Bargain. There were overall very few examples of any kind of vagueness. There was a noticeable absence of vague tags - one occurrence of and the like in an interview. It might be thought that this was because vagueness is unacceptable altogether on Radio 4. However, this is not the case, since vague expressions did occur in one particular context: that of making predictions about the future, and I shall discuss some examples in the section below on Knowledge Gaps (4). Two extracts will show the salience of precision for the purposes of financial programmes. The first is from The Financial World Tonight, stock market report:

and on the immediate issue Dalgety gained six to two eighty after those figures (.) otherwise FIRM best describes the way the market traded with the F T index up three point eight at four hundred and eighty nine point three - gains among leading shares ranged from two to four pence (.) like Beecham up three at one hundred and eighty - blue circle up four at three hundred and eighty six and Grand Met up four at one hundred and sixty six. [C]

Here the changes in share prices must be provided exactly for those who listen to them.

The second extract is from It's a Bargain, a programme with a very different purpose from that of The Financial World Tonight, since it is to tell listeners the usual prices of consumer goods at the bottom end of the market, and perhaps thus also with, socially, a very different target audience.

The BBC guide price works out at one hundred and ninety nine pounds (.) cheaper than guide price we discovered two models at a hundred and seventy five pounds [...] cheaper still we found a cooker with a small oven and push button ignition to the hot plate only (.) and this was the Valor Corvette (.) it's on special offer from North Thames Gas at a hundred and sixty two pounds and seven pence - but from the Comet Discount Shops it's a hundred and fifty four pounds ninety EXCLUDING their delivery charge which is two pounds seventy five. [C]

In this context precise prices are given.

In these two cases, it certainly does 'get your further' to be told the exact numbers. These comparisons show (a) that the amount of information given (i.e. the degree of precision) is dictated by the perceived purposes of the interaction and (b) that vague expressions are used where less precision is judged to be required.

3. Lexical Gaps

One conversational goal which speakers use vagueness to achieve is to get across a meaning where they do not have at their disposal the necessary words or expressions which they need to associate with the concepts they are forming. Notice that to be convinced by this account, you have to accept that there is a level of cognitive activity/representation which precedes words and is independent of them (for a reasoned exposition of this view, see e.g. Fodor, 1976). I would think that these data offer substantial evidence that people can and often do think about concepts which they cannot really talk about, i.e. that there is a pre-lexical/pre-language cognitive level.

A clear example of a speaker with a word-finding problem is the following, taken from my transcription of the same students as in Example 2, and me, in a tutorial earlier in the same term:

B: that it is very hard is really interesting where you've got virtually every word you've got somebody stopping somewhere

E: cos it doesn't flow /B: yeah/ (.) its difficult to
sort of say it in sounds /A: uh hu/ its sort of
difficult to sort of

A: on the other hand its still very few people

It is plausible (at least) to suggest that the word the speaker would have been happy to use was articulate. She either did not know this word, or under the strain of trying to express ideas about unfamiliar topics in a tutorial, she had forgotten it. Such examples arise both where someone does not know the necessary word, and where they have forgotten it, since in both cases, for the purpose of the utterance in hand, the speaker lacks knowledge of the word.

Another example, later in the same tutorial is:

A: ...if we're trying to find out how they take it in which is what as you say this thing was trying to do then I think that shows that the syntactic element is important in structuring - in helping you to decode what you've got more important than the semantic - well the thing is they're interlinked - you can't separate them out

C: but there's also things like when you're talking and you take information in when you - when you're talking its just words that you pick up - its not whole strings of sentences and verbs and things - its just the sort of main meaning

E: yeah right

C: [because people don't talk in sentences

E: [if somebody tells you a full story then you don't remember every word they said but you do remember the general gist of it /mm/

Here, the expression which the participants cannot use, but need, I think, is syntactic structure. A had introduced this earlier, and had used 'syntactic element' in her turn preceding C's, but it is clear that at this stage, neither of the tutees has mastered the use of the word syntax.

A related but different situation in which use of vagueness arises is where the language in question does not have the lexical items necessary for precise expression. An example from later in the same tutorial discussion is:

C: but lots of big sort of important numbers that you have to ring and things I'm sure they're made into a kind of pattern that you can remember them by - say your friend's

telephone number because they give you something like two three five seven eight or something like that which is much easier to remember than - and - I know - I'm sure they do it into patterns so that you can remember them

Here, firstly, 'ring and things' does not have any obvious lexical superordinate. C succeeds in referring to her set of 'ringing activities', by using a vague expression. Her subsequent use is the same: 'something like two three five seven eight or something like that'. There is not any readily available superordinate to refer to the category. She clarifies in her final point by using patterns, and this is taken up by subsequent speakers who refer to: 'patterns', 'next number', 'double four double two double four which is a sort of pattern'.

Again, some test subjects were aware of this. In discussion after the test, one said that vague tags were used 'if you're thinking of something and you don't know the words for it'. Others said:

You might not have had the time to think of the exact thing you wanted to say (.) if you say something like it or say or something like that then people /mm.mmm/

B: and sometimes you don't know (.) like that Bernstein one I mean (.) I don't know (.) I would have said something that I knew about him and then

C: [get yourself out of it

B: get myself out of it by saying...

Finally, they suggested that such vague tags would not be used in writing because,

you've got more time to think, so you can pick one that (.) a word that really does represent the things you want to say

Hence, vagueness is a ploy speakers use when they cannot find the words they need.

Word-finding difficulty, and lexical lack in the language have been identified as two situations where a speaker might use a vague expression. However, they are, from the point of view of a speaker producing an utterance, the same, in the sense that either way, s/he does not have the necessary word(s) available. More importantly, from the point of view of the hearer's understanding, they are probably the same, since in both circumstances, hearers must go through the inferential procedure of identifying an appropriate associational category from the exemplar given. At the same time, at the level of conversational

effect, they may be different. In the situation of unequal knowledge of the topic of discussion, for example, that which is usually found in a tutorial, the tutor takes the tutees' use of vague category identifiers instead of the appropriate technical terms as a confirmation that they do not know as much about the topic or know its vocabulary as well as she does. The situation where no word exists for some concept could not be interpreted in that way.

4. Knowledge Gaps

As I mentioned in relation to Extract 1, an observable ploy for a speaker who lacks specific knowledge is to use vagueness. A clear example of this is:

[percentage of university students coming from working class backgrounds]

B: I can't remember what the figures are but its something around the twenty per cent mark and it's never changed

where B's admission of memory failure ('I can't remember') provides clear evidence that his vagueness is obligatory - he does not know the exact figure.

Examples in this category illustrate the working of what Grice (1975) formulated as the Maxim of Quality - part of which is the rule:

'2 Do not say that for which you lack sufficient evidence ' (:46)

In another similar example, a speaker giving a talk referred to a visit to a country abroad as having taken place 'about ten or so years ago'. When questioned afterwards, he said it was 'about 1969, I would have to look it up', thus confirming that he actually did not know when it had occurred.

In a written report on student accommodation in York, the following appeared:

I have assembled a list of student addresses in York from the registration cards in the Undergraduate Office. The Students' Union did not collect housing information in the usual way this year (NUS card returns) and although the registration questionnaire was designed to fill the gap, the poor response rather nullified the attempt. Around 600 students found private rented accommodation in York and district this October - a loss of around 45 units from last year. In reality this loss was a little less. There are always some addresses which escape listing at the first attempt [A]

The writer makes explicit that his data collection was imperfect, and thus uses vague quantities so as not to make exact statements which he does not have evidence for. There is about this an element of self-protection - of wanting to avoid later being shown to have said or written something which is not true. We shall look at other examples of this in 5 below.

Displacement

Speakers use vague expressions to express their degree of (un)certainty. Two situations in which speakers must lack definite knowledge is where they are talking about the past or about the future. In the case of the past, complete evidence may be lacking. An example which shows this is taken from The Guardian:

[article in The Guardian (29.8.81) about the death penalty in the 18th century]

The records, though far from complete, showed that about 61 people died on the block

This is curious. My reading would be that the records stated that 61 people died. But the writer knows (and says) that they are incomplete, so he uses an approximator to take account of the unrecorded deaths. He also, I think, wants to cover himself against the possibility of being wrong.

Vagueness is often used when making predictions about the future. This can be seen in a pre-budget edition of the programme Money Box in which possible changes in the tax system were discussed:

[The Stock Exchange propose abolishing Contract Stamp Duty]

that would cost the Chancellor about two million pounds a year or as they put it - seventeen and a half minutes of government expenditure

[it also proposes altering the 2% Transfer Stamp Duty; Deputy Chairman of the Stock Exchange:]

rather than have a duty which will become more and more evaded or avoided in the future because of the ways round it it is better to make it a bearable amount and therefore we're suggesting one per cent for everybody

Presenter: And Peter Wills reckons that change will cost around a hundred and fifty million pounds [C]

Notice the necessity for the exact figure 'one per cent' in contrast to the approximation for the uncertain future consequences of the reduction.

A final example from the same programme:

[building societies propose abolishing stamp duty on house purchase]

Interviewer: Any idea how much that would cost

Spokesman: the cost in this year would be about two hundred and twenty million pounds

Again, test subjects provided independent evidence that lack of knowledge is a reason for using vagueness. On number approximations, one said:

Usually if you have a figure like that it's because you've heard it somewhere or seen it somewhere and it's a very precise figure to start off with but you're just repeating it without the exactitude cos you can't remember all of it

Discussing the tag test, the university student subjects told me:

its when you're trying to express yourself (.) you're really thinking about what you're trying to say (.) you say or something like that

you know (.) I think its when you (.) sometimes you don't know really what you're talking about /you use them/ but if you know what you're talking about, you know exactly what you want to say and you won't use them

This is borne out by the low frequency of vague expressions in the three financial programmes recorded. People taking part in such programmes do so because they do know what they are talking about, and therefore they do not use vague expressions.

5. Self-Protection

I suggested in relation to the Vichy advertisement that vagueness may be used as a safeguard against being later shown to be wrong. This was seen also in the report on student accommodation quoted in 4 above.

Examples of this strike a very odd chord when it is fairly clear that the speaker knows the information exactly and it is appropriate for the purpose of the conversation to give it exactly. Here are some of these.

[House-hunting telephone call to Estate Agent]

B: How many houses are there in the street?

C: There are [reads from printed details] approximately four houses in the street

In this case, the estate agent will have made a survey of the area and will know how many houses there are, i.e. four. This approximator carries a message something like 'we've counted four houses, but if you go along and see an extra one, or think that number 18, technically in the next street, is really in this one, then we are not wrong, because we said 'approximately'.

[BBC Radio 4 news: Police spokesman making statement about hijackers at Stanstead]

I can tell you that approximately eleven people are helping us with our enquiries [C]

The non-round number suggests strongly that this is not really an approximation (because approximators are most often combined with round numbers: see Wachtel (1980), and Channell (1980) for description). The speaker knows that eleven people are involved. His official position inclines him, however, to extreme caution, hence the approximator.

The third example I am including here shows a number of factors at work:

[Chemist interviewed on You and Yours, BBC Radio 4, (12.2.81), about not charging the NHS prescription charge for an item if the retail price is lower]

During that day in fact we had three prescriptions for throat lozenges which I think the retail price was about 41 pence and a tube of cream for arthritis which was about 58 pence and on all three occasions I said to the patient concerned - there's no point in your paying a pound - I will charge you the correct retail price. [C]

I believe this speaker remembered the prices exactly. But he wanted to guard against the possibility of a faulty memory. In addition, he was probably affected by the stress of being interviewed for the radio which made him, perhaps, more uncertain, and this may also have led to his using vague expressions.

My last example of self-protection is from the university tutorial group:

C: One of the secretaries was saying there was a film or something.

A: oh yeah

D: really

C: last thursday we were all down in Z017 and the lecture was actually in Vanbrugh so I went down to the secretary and said where is everyone and she got out

this book and looked at it and said its in Vanbrugh but some weeks there's a film being shown and I said well I do psychology and linguistics is just an elective - but I was intrigued by the film - can you have films in linguistics

A: oh yes we have lots of films

C: REALLY [disbelief]

The speaker knows quite well that the secretary said there was a film. He makes it definite in the preface to his final question. Why tag the first occurrence of film? He is seeking information, he is not sure, and he does not want to be wrong. Also, however, account must be taken of the unequal tutor/tutee relationship. There may be some deference here. I discuss this in the next section.

6. Deference

In discussing Example 2, I suggested that one reason for use of vagueness was the speaker expressing deference to the tutor at the same time as disagreeing with her. Vagueness can be used for this and related social reasons.

Weiser (1974) noticed that utterances may be constructed so as to be deliberately ambiguous between at least two speech acts, so as to leave a hearer the option of taking up one speech act or another. One of her examples is:

I'm curious to know what went on at the hearing

which can legitimately be treated by its hearer, she says, as a request for information, or as a statement. As such, it leaves the speaker a bolt-hole: 'I wasn't demanding that you divulge confidential information, I was just expressing curiosity'. I think vague additives are used for the same sort of politeness reasons, for example, in this offer, couched as a question:

[A has given up alcohol, speaker knows this]

B: Would you like a drink - an orange juice or something

In this sort of context, a speaker using this formulation is usually understood as offering an alcoholic drink. This speaker is interpreted rather as assuming that A will want a non-alcoholic drink - he deliberately cancels the preferred reading of 'would you like a drink?' with his exemplar + tag. This is understood as referring to the category of non-alcoholic social drinks (orange juice being a good example), and he politely offers the addressee options within that category.

Another example, this time of a request, is taken from one of the tutorial discussions:

Could we, when you give us our essays back - and give us titles - could we sort of meet or something - because (.)
I mean - there might be things we want to ask

We have already seen a possible example of deference between tutee and tutor. We have also seen the tutees' tendency to use a lot of uncertainty markers. Here, the tutee makes a direct request to the tutor, but is heard as mitigating its directness by leaving the tutor various options.

In the next example, the speaker says something which is open to interpretation as being rather critical, so he mitigates it by using a vague tag:

B: I'm a third year physicist
C: I don't know anything about physics at all
B: well neither do I
C: I never even did them at school
B: not at all -ever
C: well I
[
B: general science
C: I did them for a term - so I know something about them -
I did chemistry - did biology
B: mmm do you feel that this is a vast hole in your
education or anything
C: no [D]

These few examples show how vague language is used to make conversational turns convey politeness in appropriate ways.

7. Informality and atmosphere

I noted with reference to the Vichy advertisement that vague language is associated with informal conversational settings. Some of the test subjects told me the same thing. One said:

If you're just having a conversation - with one's friends
you'd probably use them - but if you're in the classroom
- you wouldn't

and another suggested:

you change according to who you're talking to

The following is an extract from a conversation between two close friends (both men):

[buying Christmas trees]

- B: oh uh I was up at Blackheath in the morning to buy a Christmas tree
- C: you/did you actually buy one
- B: yes - got one
- C: well has it got roots
- B: no it hasn't - no
- C: how much was it
- B: erm quid fifty - about five foot tall
- C: that's not bad - we went down to Henry's and had a look at them but er ummm not particularly impressive - none of them had roots
- B: -----more at this place I went to at Blackheath was very good
- C: whereabouts is that
- B: er just opposite the station
- C: oh
- B: just a cross the road
- C: across the road
- B: across the road from the station - yeah
- C: it's it's normally a plant shop is it
- B: well call it green grocery and things yeah
- C: oh yes yeah
- B: there there's another shop in Blackheath village that was selling really scrawny ones five or six quid a time
- C: yeah well Blackheath I can believe it [B]

Among other indicators, lexical choices signal this as informal (quid, actually, not bad, yeah). Three vague expressions occur in close succession. Clearly the presence of vague expressions here is dictated also by the Conversational Maxims: quantity - it is not necessary to know exactly how tall the tree was, or what the shop sold, and quality - the speakers probably did not measure the height of the trees, perhaps do not remember the price of the trees and do not know for sure what kind of shop it was. Informality is one factor which dictates what the right amount of information is in a given case.

7. Conclusions

In this paper, I have presented a range of conversational uses of vague expressions (however, I have certainly not looked at all possible uses). These are varied both in the types of discourses from which they come, and in the effects which could be observed. At the same time, there is an important unifying feature, which is that in every case an element of uncertainty is present for at least some participant in the conversation. Where vague language is used to reduce the amount of information given, hearers are uncertain by virtue of being in receipt of less than the full facts. If the hearer of the Christmas tree height were asked how tall the tree was, which his friend had bought, he would have to say that he did not know exactly. Of course, hearers are usually not aware of a lack of precise information, because, as I have argued, the information given is sufficient for the purposes of the particular conversation in which they are taking part. If a speaker is unsure of their subject, or cannot find the right words, and uses a vague expression as a result, uncertainty is communicated to hearers. Hearers in turn are presented not with something precise, but with a series of options. In the case that the speaker does not use the exact word or expression to name a category, but replaces it with a vague Category Identifier, hearers must be uncertain to some degree of the extension of the category the speaker intends. The same applies to the use of an approximation for a quantity. In self-protection uses, speakers are perceived as uncertain of their authority, and this is apparent to hearers, who pick up on such cues as presence of a non-Round Number (if it is an approximation). In the deference and politeness examples, hearers are provided with the opportunity to act upon the speakers' utterances in different ways, and so have uncertainty passed on to them, at least until they make a choice.

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Notation

[] situational comment
A:, B: speakers (speaker A is me)
[links simultaneous speech or sound
CAPITALS emphasis (realised in particular prosodic ways)
---- indecipherable sound
(.) untimed short pause
other punctuation is inserted for ease of reading

Sources of data

A written data, source given
B data collected by Marion Owen
C radio recordings
D Clark, 1981

All other data (except where noted) from conversations observed by the author.

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TEXT IN WORLD AND WORLD IN TEXT:
GOALS AND MODELS OF SCIENTIFIC WRITING

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1. Introduction

Writers on scientific discourse have long pointed out both that science texts have an internal structure (Hutchins, 1977; Gopnik, 1972) and that the texts themselves help to structure the world of scientific knowledge (Latour & Woolgar, 1979). In this paper I wish to interpret some examples of scientific writing in the light of goal-centred models of action and of discourse production (de Beaugrande, 1980; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). These models point out that texts are encoded in an attempt to achieve particular goals and that they are understood in this light, the hearer/reader interpreting the text by making assumptions of pragmatically reasonable goals. I shall argue, firstly, that many scientific texts have a goal-oriented structure. In other words, the facts presented in the text are presented as achieving the scientist's goals. Secondly, I shall suggest that evidence can be found in scientific texts for these texts being in themselves goal-achieving. That is, that the texts themselves are related to the higher-level professional goals of the scientist.

A diagrammatic representation of the model used in this paper is presented in Fig. 1. According to this model, a formulated goal may be realised directly (route a) or by overcoming some hindrance or problem (route b). The routes are recursive; that is, a goal may require several steps, with a problem occurring at any stage. This goal-centred model therefore incorporates the notions of problem-solving, a concept which has been used to describe texts of various types (Hoey, 1979, 1983), as well as certain heuristic exercises requiring the production of texts for their completion (Cowan et al. 1984). In the terms used here, if an activity is described as problem-solving, this is because attention is focused on route b, Goal 1 being left implicit and unstated.

A second concern of this paper, which will not, however, be fully developed here, is the link between goals and evaluation. Briefly, goals provide the criteria according to which events and actions are evaluated. In evaluating his/her goals as having been achieved, the scientist evaluates the work as successful.




Fig. 1

My data are papers from the journal The American Naturalist. A list of those cited here, together with the abbreviated titles used, may be found at the end of the paper.

2. Goal-achievement in Scientific Texts

As the model proposed in this paper is a descendant of the Problem-Response pattern (Hoey 1979, 1983), it is perhaps necessary to explain why the latter was not simply adopted without modification.

Initial attempts to apply the Problem-Response pattern to scientific text show that it is very useful. Scientific papers in general begin with a statement of problem. Where the research is applied, as in the testing of a new substance or technique, the problem is usually the inadequacy of previous substances or techniques (e.g. Hoey, 1979). In other types of research, the problem may be lack of knowledge, expressed as a question or as a need (compare Swales' Move 3, described below; 1981 (ed)). A typical example of such a statement of a problem is the following:

Example 1

Since these conditions affect patch selection independently, we need explicit tests of the hypothesis that prey can balance patch choice when the need to forage and the need to avoid predators are in conflict. (PRFM, 1.7)

The Problem-Response model seems, however, to be inadequate in two respects. Firstly, where the first paragraph of a text can be labelled 'problem' and the remainder of the text 'response', such labelling is unhelpfully lacking in detail. Secondly, problems referred to in the middle of a text are frequently not stated but are inferrable from the description of the steps taken to avoid them. From Example 2, for instance, we may deduce that for the fish not to be able to swim from one compartment to another would be a problem. It is, however, a problem that has never existed, in that no other researcher has attempted the same experiment but with sealed compartments, and it is, therefore, rather artificial.

Example 2

Each [artificial stream] is 14.4m x 0.4m, screened at both ends and partitioned by wooden dividers into 12 equal-sized compartments that permit fish to swim unimpeded from compartment to compartment. (PRFM IV.4)

In other words, the Problem-Response model depends upon an alternation between negative evaluation (problem) and positive evaluation (response). What happens in many scientific papers is that following an initial statement of problem the bulk of

the paper is a succession of positively-evaluated actions, which either must be labelled, unhelpfully, detail of Response to the main problem or must be interpreted as the responses to artificial minor problems.

In order to retain the explicative power of the Problem-Response pattern whilst expanding it to cover the examples mentioned above, I propose a model for scientific text based on the same schema as Fig. 1. The elements of structure in the goal-centred model are as follows:

1. Goal. The text typically presents a main goal, the achievement of which demands the achievement of one or more minor goals.

Example 3

Here we will elaborate a prediction of the balancing hypothesis. (PRFM I.8).

2. Step. Something which is the requirement of a goal, or which is undertaken in order to achieve a goal, is a step. Where a step is itself a complex activity, its performance may in turn become a goal. Goal and step often occur in the same sentence, as in Example 4.

Example 4

We used two artificial streams, 12 compartments in each, to establish the four experimental conditions. (PRFM V.1).
where goal = to establish the four experimental conditions
step = use two artificial streams, 12 compartments in each

3. Problem.

Although the model set out in Fig. 1 allows for the element 'Problem', there are no examples in my data. The initial problem in most scientific research papers, lack of knowledge or the need to explain a particular phenomenon, is here re-interpreted as a signal of Goal (see below). As discussed above, intuitively it seems that certain details given in the texts are in answer to unstated objections or problems which would hinder the achievement of goals such as accuracy (see Section 5). In Example 5, for instance, the size of the alga pre-empts a problem of identification.

Example 5

Parts of the seed and the alga to which it attached are visible up to one year after it first becomes attached. Thus, I can determine the alga to which a seed attached even after the seedling has produced roots and a rhizome. (FSM III.5-6).

4. +Achieved. Any goal may be evaluated as +achieved.
Example 6 illustrates evaluation of -achievement.

Example 6

Our results do not support the prediction of the balancing hypothesis. (PRFM XII.1).

If the steps to a goal are evaluated as +achieved, it must be assumed that the goal itself is also achieved, although this may not be stated.

Having given a broad idea of the elements involved in this model, it remains to describe more specifically how they may be identified. Any list of identifying signals must at this stage be tentative, as the amount of data is small and its range restricted. I shall, therefore, give a list of signal types, with examples.

1. Signals of Goal

Prospective self-reference is a signal of goal. The goal may be that of the writer producing the text or that of the scientist conducting the experiment (see Section 3 below for discussion). Example 7 contains one of each type of goal.

Example 7

Here we will (1) elaborate a prediction of the balancing hypothesis and (2) test the prediction using minnows in a seminatural stream. (PRFM I.8)

Other signals of goal are most easily dealt with in conjunction with signals of step.

2. Signals of Goal and Step

In the following, G = goal; S = step

Type - purpose

Examples: S (in order) to G

S so that G

S so as to G

S for G

Example 8

To ascertain the mechanism by which a middle successional species is replaced by surfgrass, I compared the recruitment of surfgrass in control (unmanipulated) plots and plots from which the alga R larix had been removed. (FSM V.1)

Type: function

Examples: S is used for G
S helps to G
S contributes to G
function of S is G

Example 9

Although prehensile tails have different functions in different taxa, in general they are used for either support or locomotion. (TFS III.4)

Type: need

Examples: S provide G
G require S
S allow G
G can be done with S

Example 10

An empirical test of the above prediction requires a minimum of four experimental conditions. (PRFM II.7a)

Type: method

Examples: G by s-ing
G involves S

Example 11

Thus, testing the prediction involves demonstrating the following... (PRFM II.3a)

(3) Signals of Goal-achievement

(i) Where a step is solely sufficient for the achievement of a goal, performance of the step is equivalent to achievement of the goal.

Example 12

Thus, Milinski & Heller's design provided the four conditions required for testing the balancing hypothesis. (PRFM XVI.6).

(ii) Verbs such as show, demonstrate, support, conclude, followed by repetition of a goal indicate that the goal has been achieved. Introduction of a negative changes the evaluation to -achieved. For an illustration, see Example 6.

(iii) Just as repetition can signal the achievement of a goal, lexical contrast such as that in Example 13 signals -achievement.

Example 13

Recall that the prediction of the balancing hypothesis is that an interaction between the food and predator exists. A chi-square contingency table analysis on the data in Table 2 shows that the main effects of food and predator are independent. (PRFM XI.2-3)

3. Some Complicating Factors

The schema set out in Fig. 1 appears uncomplicated, and indeed very simple diagrammatic representations of the structure of texts in terms of goal can be made. Fig. 2 shows one such representation. This apparent simplicity, however, masks serious complications, some of which are discussed in this section.

(1) Participants

The discussion so far has implied that each text has a homogeneous set of goals, which are the goals of a single participant, the scientist writing the text. This, however, is not the case. It is possible in any of the scientific texts under investigation to identify several participants, each with its own set of goals.


The most important distinction to be made is between the scientist(s) carrying out the experiment and the writer(s) of the paper. Even though in most cases these are in fact the same people, each role has its own distinct goals. In citing Example 7 above, I commented that here the two roles are confused. The first goal is the writer's; in other words, it describes what will happen in the text. The second goal belongs to the experimenter. It refers to steps taken during the experiment.

Other participants vary with the texts. In Example 14, for instance, forest-dwelling animals are described as having survival-related goals.

Example 14

The prehensile tails of arboreal frugivores, folivores and omnivores...are used both for support while the animals feed on branch tips or inaccessible locations and as an aid in locomotion, particularly on unstable supports and while descending (refs). (TFS III.6)

Papers in, for example, civil engineering might have, as minor participants in this way, the users of a particular structure (Florence Davies, personal communication). Whereas the goals of these minor participants may form part of interesting sub-texts, they are irrelevant to the main perspective of the text. For example, it is irrelevant to the scientist whether prehensile tails are beneficial or otherwise (Example 14). This is important



→ = is a step in achieving

Roman numerals = order of presentation in text

Fig. 2 Simplified representation of the goal-structure of PRFM

as it suggests that readers ignore signals of goal if they pertain to other than the major participants: the writer and the scientist. In Example 1, for instance, although the word need occurs three times, it affects the structure of the text only when the agent is we.

Returning to the writer-experimenter distinction, it may be argued that, whereas the experimental portion of the text is clearly goal-oriented, the writer's 'stated goals' are no more than indications of how the argument is to be structured. Examples like Example 15, it may be said, are purely descriptive; they do not set up a goal to be achieved.

Example 15

Here I report the results of an investigation of secondary succession in two parts: (1) experimental evidence of obligate facilitation in the recruitment of a dominant plant, and (2) observations describing the importance of different middle successional species to this recruitment (FSM I.10)

Implicit in this argument is the assumption that a goal must incorporate possibility of failure or -achievement. According to this criterion, reporting cannot be a goal. I would argue, however, that to persuade the reader that certain measurements constitute experimental evidence of obligate facilitation or proof of importance is an enterprise open to failure, and may thus be interpreted as a goal.

It is, however, impossible for the writer to evaluate such a text-goal as + or - achieved in terms other than those in which the goal was originally formulated. This is because it is the reader, not the writer, who actually makes the final evaluation. It is as a result of this that a goal, such as that formulated in Example 16, may be evaluated as +achieved through repetition (Example 17).

Example 16

Here we present data that demonstrate what appear to be significant differences in the forest structure of the three tropical regions. (TFS II.5)

Example 17

In sum, the available evidence strongly suggests intercontinental differences in forest structure over and above the site-specific variation. (TFS XIV.18)

(2) Implied Goals

In analysing texts according to this model, I have on several

occasions posited the existence of goals which are not stated in the text. This presents a problem for analysis and yet is crucial to the argument I shall present in Section 5. I shall here give some examples of how such inferences are made.

(i) Where two opposing hypotheses explaining a phenomenon are tested, it is inferred that the goal is to find the most satisfactory explanation for the phenomenon. For example, in PRFM, the first part of the text describes an attempt to validate the 'balancing hypothesis' of patch selection. When that attempt fails, an alternative hypothesis is proposed. The inferred superordinate goal is 'Find a model for patch selection'.

(ii) Where stages in an experimental procedure are described, it is inferred that the goal is to perform the experiment and obtain results.

(iii) Where the work of other writers is cited as having gaps or shortcomings, it is inferred that the writer's goal is to fill those gaps, as in Example 18.

Example 18

Despite the importance and the age of the concept of succession, studies which definitively distinguish between these alternatives are relatively rare. (FSM I.4)

(iv) Where a detail of description is included along with a counter-to-expectation signal (Tannen, 1979), it is inferred that this is a step towards an unstated goal, as in Example 19, where the goal might be formulated as to be accurate.

Example 19

I have systematically searched over 200m² including crevices and both organic and inorganic substrates. (FSM V.12)

4. The Goals of Science

Some of the implicit goals mentioned above are not specific to any one paper but might be said to constitute the higher (or more general) goals of science. Approaches to the analysis of the goals of science have basically been of two types: one approach concentrates on what constitutes a philosophically acceptable theory: one which is falsifiable (Popper, 1957), one which explains anomalies (e.g. Kuhn, discussed in Losee, 1980), or one which accounts for more phenomena than the previous one (Lakatos, 1970). By contrast, social scientists (e.g. Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Knorr-Cetina, 1981), view the scientist primarily as an individual whose work is influenced and shaped by the community of which s/he is a member. Knorr-Cetina (1981), for example, describes the various professional and personal goals which help to motivate a researcher.

The two sets of goals mentioned above may be labelled, if a little cynically, the 'legitimate' and the 'illegitimate'. Legitimate goals are those such as 'to explain an anomaly' which can be formulated explicitly in academic papers. Illegitimate goals, such as 'to justify my consultancy with a particular company' (Knorr-Cetina, 1981), may be admitted freely in conversation, but could never appear in a written report of the research. The two sets are not, of course, mutually exclusive. A scientist may have as goals both to produce a 'good' theory and to, say, obtain a research grant. I would argue, however, that only evidence for the first goal will appear in a research paper.

As noted in Section 3, the scientist, as well as being a theoretician and practitioner, is also a writer. The writer's goals can also be analysed in terms of the two approaches outlined above. However, the two sets of goals differ in the explicitness of their realisation in texts. It would be inadmissible (illegitimate), for example, to write that a particular line of investigation had been followed in order to ensure publication, even though publications are the commodities of the scientific world and, therefore, a driving force behind scientists' work (Latour & Woolgar, 1979). It is doubtful where to place the goal of persuading the reader. On the one hand, 'the facts' are supposed to speak for themselves (Latour & Woolgar, 1979). The goal of persuasion is, however, more observable in scientific writing (e.g. Bazerman, 1984; Yearley, 1981) than, say, that of obtaining research grant money. This is because the sub-goals of persuasion have legitimate as well as illegitimate counterparts. It is illegitimate, for example, to persuade by creating an impression of objectivity, but legitimate to have the goal of being objective. The writer, therefore, in evaluating legitimate goals as having been achieved, can achieve the illegitimate ones.

5. Text and World

What emerges, then, is the scientific paper as a literary work (Gusfield, 1976) whose narrators are similar, but not identical, to the writers of the paper. The world in which the text places itself is a stylised representation of the real one. In the stylised world of the scientist, only legitimate goals can be overt. This section will, therefore, ignore the illegitimate goals, but will include the goal of persuasion as legitimate.

Of the legitimate goals, however, not all are normally explicitly formulated in the text. Experimental goals can be stated explicitly and at the end of the paper an explicit assessment can be made as to how far those goals have been achieved. The writer does not state, however, that his/her goal is to persuade the reader, neither is that goal assessed as achieved or otherwise. Nor are the criteria by which the reader will judge the text, criteria related to the higher goals of science, stated explicitly.

The assertion that the writer evaluates aspects of his/her text as steps towards the achievement of unstated goals, receives corroboration in the work of Swales (1981, 1984) on the Introduction sections of research articles. Swales refers to the writer's goals as being those of persuasion and justifying publication. The sub-goals by which these are achieved may be summarised briefly as: show that the work is an integral part of an established field (cf. also Bazerman, 1981); and/or show that the work is worth doing because it is new (cf. also van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). The four moves that Swales identifies in Introductions are not, then, a motiveless pattern, but, as he notes, the means towards a communicative end. Several of the goals I identify below correspond closely to Swales' moves. As might be expected, these are the ones that normally appear in the Introduction section of a paper, while the other goals are more often inferred from other sections or from the paper as a whole. The goals may be formulated as follows:

- (1) Write within a scientific genre. The study of genre is, of course, a large and complex area. It is sufficient for our purposes here to acknowledge that the layout and style of a paper will identify it as belonging to the area of 'real science' and, therefore, worthy of serious consideration by scientists. It also establishes the criteria by which the text will be evaluated, by implying other relevant goals, such as accuracy. A text beginning 'Once Upon a Time' would not be judged according to accuracy and would not have this as a goal.
- (2) Give information that is significant. This goal corresponds to Swales' Move 1. As noted by Swales, writers typically evaluate their work as 'central' or 'important', that is, worth writing about.
- (3) Relate your work to that of others. This corresponds to Swales' Move 2. Reference to and comparison with the work of other scientists sets the text within a definable field.
- (4) Give information that is new. This corresponds to Swales' Move 3. The Introduction section to a paper frequently justifies the work by stating that it has not been done before (see Example 18, reproduced below).

Example 18

Despite the importance and the age of the concept of succession, studies which definitively distinguish between these alternatives are relatively rare.
(FSM I.4)

- (5) Link your procedure to a theory of scientific methodology. Mulkey & Gilbert (1981) found that Popper's theory of

falsification was used by some scientists in justification of their work. My point is that a sentence such as Example 20 need not be explicitly made relevant to the text because it is understood as fulfilling an unstated goal.

Example 20

One prediction from our hypothesis is that the distribution of gliding membranes and prehensile tails in marsupials of the Australian family Phalangeridae will be similarly correlated with vegetation structure (TFS XV.2)

- (6) Be accurate. What exactly constitutes accuracy varies from discipline to discipline. Where details and comparisons are given without explicit justification as in Examples 19 and 21, it may be assumed that an unstated standard of accuracy is being met.

Example 19

I have systematically searched over 200m² including crevices and both organic and inorganic substrates. (FSM V.12)

Example 21

Unlike most commercial preparations, which disintegrate rapidly, it breaks down very slowly over a period of several hours. (PRFM VI.5)

- (7) Be precise about limits of certainty and generality. As Bazerman (personal communication) notes, scientific writers are under pressure to make as general a statement as they can substantiate. Because of this, the conclusions to papers frequently discuss at some length precisely how generally or with what certainty a statement can be made.

Example 22

I suggest facilitation is most likely to occur in harsh environments that limit recruitment. It is unclear how many other natural systems will exhibit these characteristics. (FSM XIX.3-4)

The hedges in this example are not mere protection against criticism, but an attempt to achieve a goal.

A text, then, can be viewed as participating in two systems. It has an internal structure, which in science texts can be explicated by a goal-achievement pattern. It is also part of a broader social- or belief- system, which can also be seen to be goal-directed. (See Fig. 3).




Fig. 3 The Relation Between World and Text

6. Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted to show how a scientific text presents itself as a component of the 'real world', and how the world is represented in such a text. Comparison between my observations, based on the texts alone, and those made by social scientists investigating laboratory work (e.g. Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Latour & Woolgar, 1979), suggests that the world of the text is a simplified one. Moreover, this simplification involves a re-working of the diversity of everyday life into a goal-oriented pattern.

I have discussed two aspects of this patterned representation. Firstly, the scientist as writer presents him/herself as scientific theorist and practitioner, working towards the achievement of specific goals. The events in the experimental process are viewed in this light. Furthermore, other participants in the text are presented as having goals of their own, which may have a bearing upon, or be irrelevant to, the scientist's. Secondly, it is apparent that in writing the text the scientist hopes to achieve other goals, such as acceptance by the scientific community. These goals are not stated in the text, but the more admissible of them may be deduced as they are necessary for the interpretation of certain parts of the text.

The goal-achievement model I have presented is essentially an evaluative one. I assume that consistency in evaluative standpoint is one of the conditions for coherence in discourse. The establishment or assumption of goals against which events and so on may be measured, is a way of achieving such consistency. In other words, a goal establishes a criterion according to which evaluations are made.

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THE DEFINITENESS EFFECT AND PREDICATION

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The term existential sentence (ES) is used here, following Milsark (1974), to refer to a particular syntactic form, namely, a sentence containing unstressed there as a pleonastic subject. The following examples show the difference in naturalness between existential sentences in which the focus NP is indefinite, and those in which it is definite:

- (1) a There was a new wreck discovered
 b ?There was the Amsterdam discovered

- (2) a Last night there were some policemen attacked
 b ?Last night there were our policemen attacked

- (3) a There is a lady from Worthing swimming the Channel
 both ways
 b ?There is my aunt swimming the Channel both ways

The term Definiteness Effect (DE) refers to the tendency for ES to be judged more natural when the focus NP is indefinite. The sentences in (1)-(3) can be compared with those in (4):

- (4) a There's the University of Stoke
 b There is my aunt from Worthing

Examples such as these have been treated as a special type of ES, occurring in a particular context and characterized by distinctive intonation. (4)a can convey the suggestion that the University of Stoke should be considered for some purpose under discussion, while (4)b could be a reply to a question such as 'Do you know any strong swimmers?'. Interpretations of this kind, which I will refer to as enumerative uses of ES, have attracted attention because of the absence of the DE which is present in (1)-(3).

The term DE is employed by Safir (1985), who attempts to provide a largely syntactic account of the restriction. In what follows I will not be pursuing this kind of an account, but will be following more the spirit of Milsark's work. In particular, I will suggest that in order to give an adequate explanation of the DE, it is necessary to clarify the relationship between enumerative and non-enumerative understandings of ES. At the same time, the treatment of the DE proposed here depends crucially on certain syntactic facts about ES. After considering these

questions, I make the claim that the DE is not a unitary phenomenon, but has two different aspects. It reflects in part a restriction on the occurrence of predication within ES in examples such as (1)-(3), while the status of (4)a and b is considered to be a more direct consequence of their literal meaning.

1. Enumerative and non-enumerative understandings

Consider first of all whether the distinction between enumerative and non-enumerative understandings corresponds to an ambiguity at a semantic level. This is perhaps a plausible suggestion. On the one hand, a sentence with ES form can be used to assert whether or not something exists; on the other hand, a sentence with similar form may be used to convey the applicability of something for some purpose or other. For instance, (1a)-(3a) can be used to assert the existence of various events, while (5) can be used to assert the existence of the University of York in perpetuity:

(5) There will always be the University of York

On the other hand, (4a) and (4b) can be understood enumeratively, as already discussed. Breivik (1981:15-16) seems to go some way towards an approach in terms of ambiguity, in that he suggests that in enumerative ES the expression there's functions as a presentative formula or signal. He suggests that there's is 'more or less synonymous with "Don't let's forget", "I could mention", etc.'.

Consider this proposal first with respect to ES with an indefinite focus NP. A powerful objection to taking enumerative understandings as separate readings of ES is that when these examples receive an enumerative understanding the sentences also clearly convey their existential force. In fact, there appears to be no clear-cut distinction that would suggest an ambiguity between readings:

(6) a How can we get to town?
b There's a bicycle in the garage, or there's a car round the back

At the same time, these sentences illustrate the effect of context in determining the way an enumerative understanding is imposed upon the meaning of a sentence. This in itself suggests a strong case for handling the phenomenon in terms of implicature. Such a proposal receives further support from the fact that this aspect of the interpretation of ES is explicitly cancellable:

(7) a How can we get to town?
b There's a bicycle in the garage, but I'm not suggesting that we use it
c There's a car round the back, but it has no wheels

Having considered ES with indefinite focus NPs, it is now necessary to ask whether this line of argument carries over to ES containing a definite focus NP. The evidence from (4)a and

b may make it seem more plausible to claim for these cases that there is indeed a clear-cut contrast between two readings. However, the situation turns out to be rather more complex, as the following examples show. In anticipation of the syntactic discussion below, I will assume that (8)a can be assigned at least two analyses, as indicated in (8)b and c:

- (8) a There is the car in the garage
 b there is [_{NP} the car][_{PP} in the garage]
 c there is [_{NP} the car in the garage]

(8)c is intended to represent a reading in which the PP is a relative modifier of the car, so that all the material following the verb constitutes an NP. (8)b represents a reading in which the material following be is not a single NP, but whether or not this material forms a single clausal constituent is not crucial for present concerns.

If (8)a is analyzed as (8)b it conveys the same proposition as (9):

- (9) The car is in the garage

but (8)a will not be fully acceptable because of the DE. However, regardless of whether or not it attains full acceptability, its interpretation in context can be handled in the same way as ES with indefinite foci, as in (6)b, or sentences which do not display ES form, such as (9). In other words, all these sentences can be used to convey a suggestion relating to a preceding utterance, including the partially acceptable string corresponding to (8)b. The reading that we are concerned with here is the one which is analogous to (10):

- (10) ?There is John's car in the garage

Consider now the reading when (8)a is analyzed as (8)c. In this case, the sentence has a very clear enumerative interpretation and this type of example would appear to be the strongest candidate for a successful demonstration of an ambiguity between enumerative and non-enumerative senses. It is necessary to show therefore that, in these cases also, the sentences retain a literal existential interpretation along with an enumerative one. One piece of evidence that suggests that they may do so comes from the interpretation of negative sentences:

- (11) a What can I have to drink?
 b There's the beer we brought with us

(11)b is interpreted as a suggestion that the beer is relevant for the purposes stated in (11)a. However, if the sentence in (11)b is subsequently denied using a sentence such as (11)c,

the interpretation is not that the beer is not relevant for the purposes mentioned. It is understood as questioning the existence of the beer:

- (11) c There isn't (the beer we brought with us).
Bill was organizing things.

This is, therefore, consistent with the claim that sentences of the form there be the X do embody a literal existential assertion. Furthermore, it appears that in sentences such as (11)b the enumerative aspect of the interpretation is susceptible to cancellation, just as was found in considering the examples containing indefinite NPs:

- (12) There's the beer we brought with us, but I'm not suggesting that you would consider drinking anything alcoholic

The evidence that has been presented suggests that a univocal treatment should be given to enumerative and non-enumerative ES at a semantic level. It further suggests that enumerative ES should be incorporated within the mainstream of an account of the DE in ES and not regarded as exceptions on the basis of idiomatic status.

2. Justification of the syntactic treatment proposed

We require an adequate explanation for the existence of the DE, and at the same time, its relaxation in environments such as (11)b. The account proposed below relies on the syntactic distinction between (8)b and c as possible analyses of the string in (8)a. Some accounts of the syntax of ES have proposed an NP analysis of the material following be, that is, a single NP consisting of a head NP and an optional relative modifier. Williams (1984) proposes one version of an NP analysis which applies to a wide range of ES, though not necessarily for ES with locative phrases. The present argument is not compatible with an NP analysis, and it is, therefore, necessary to indicate some of the evidence that an NP analysis is inadequate.

Firstly, a crucial test of an NP analysis is to demonstrate that the post-verbal elements in ES can also occur as subjects. Consider the following examples from this point of view:

- (13) a There was a man attacked
b ?A man attacked staggered towards me
- (14) a ?There was the man attacked
b The man attacked staggered towards me
- (15) a ?There was John Jones attacked
b *John Jones attacked staggered towards me

There is a difference in acceptability between (13)a and b: the second is affected by a general restriction on indefinite heads with complementless post-modifiers, but the first escapes this restriction. Compare also (14)b and (15)b: only (15)b is ill-formed, reflecting the restriction on relative modification of proper names. Notice, however, that there is no similar contrast between (14)a and (15)a. Neither is fully acceptable because of the presence of a definite NP, but it would seem that a proper name is no worse than any other definite NP.

Secondly, the following data from Pollard (1984:123) also cast doubt on the adequacy of an NP analysis:

- (16) a There is a unicorn available
- b *How many unicorns available are there?
- c How many unicorns are there available?

Pollard points out that given an NP analysis, the contrast between (16)b and (16)c would require extraposition of the modifier available to be obligatory in this environment, namely existential wh-questions.

Thirdly, consider the following sentences, which are variants of a type of example which Milsark (1974:45-6) discusses in some detail:

- (17) a During the demonstration there was a live fox
 drowned in a tub of water
- b Jack pulled out a live fox drowned in a tub of water

(17)a contains an element of semantic redundancy, but it is not a contradiction. (17)b, on the other hand, does seem to express a contradiction. This difference is a problem for an NP analysis, but can be readily accounted for if the material following the verb in (17)a is not analyzed as a single NP.

These arguments suggest that an NP analysis of ES is not by itself adequate, and that we need to allow complements of be of the form (18)a and either (18)b or c:

- (18) a there be NP
- b there be NP XP
- c there be [_{sc} NP XP]

As indicated earlier, it is not crucial whether the complement of be has the structure of a small clause, as in (18)c rather than (18)b. What is important is to distinguish structurally between NP complements and complex NP XP complements, for this will allow us to see that the DE does not apply in the same manner across these different structures.

3. Explanation of the DE

Milsark (1974:126) suggests that the DE reflects a general restriction on well-formedness of logical forms. Definites are analyzed as similar to universally quantified NPs, while indefinite quantifier words such as some, a, several, are treated as expressions of cardinality. If there is corresponds to existential quantification, the combination of there is and an NP with a definite determiner will correspond to double quantification of a single NP at a level of logical form. Consider now the explanation of why structures like (8)c should escape the effects of the DE:

(8) c there is [_{NP} the car in the garage]

One way of explaining the absence of the DE in these cases, would be to claim that the sentences are at some deeper level indefinite in their focus NP. For instance, Milsark (1974:127) accounts for so-called 'list' interpretations in his discussion of the following example:

(19) Nobody around here is worth talking to...
 Well, there's John, the duck salesman

He suggests that existence is not predicated of the definite NP, in this case, John the duck salesman, but of a 'hypothetical set projected from the NP', that is, the whole of the list of which the individual denoted by the NP is a member. It is, therefore, possible to say that the status of the actual focus NP with respect to definiteness should make no difference to the acceptability of the sentence.

There seem to be certain difficulties with a formulation in these terms. Firstly, it has consequences in terms of the level at which the DE is held to operate, in that it seems to require a pragmatic rather than a semantic definiteness restriction as Milsark had otherwise proposed. Secondly, in (19) the set involved in the list is determined by the preceding context, and is the set of people in the locality who are worth talking to, so it is not clear what is meant by 'projection' from the focus NP. There is also a third difficulty, in that this account does not directly address the question of why relaxation of the DE affects enumerative interpretations with the structure there be the X, but not other structures illustrated in (18). Particular attention is paid to this final point in the alternative analysis proposed below.

4. An alternative account of the DE

Dahl (1974) has suggested that sentences may receive at least two kinds of analysis. One kind of analysis involves a division of a sentence into a topic and a comment on that topic, and may

be termed Predication. Notice that the term 'topic' is used to pick out an expression rather than the object which is being talked about and which such an expression may refer to. The other kind of analysis that may be provided for a sentence involves no such division between a topic and a comment. It provides a description of an event or situation, and may be termed Neutral Description. Various factors, and, in particular, the form of the subject and predicate expressions, influence the analysis that a sentence receives. Consider the following example from this point of view:

- (20) a What happened next?
b A cat was run over

(20)b is not interpreted as being about a cat. For instance, it would not be natural to juxtapose (20)b as a reply to questions such as 'what happened to a cat?' or 'tell me about a cat', whereas similar questions about an individual 'John' could occur naturally with (21):

- (21) John is intelligent

(21) differs from (20)b in that John has the property of definiteness required for topichood that a cat lacks, and therefore only (21) can receive a Predication analysis. It may also be argued that in this case the predicate expression intelligent selects a predication analysis. Notice that property-assigning predicates such as intelligent do not occur freely except with definite subjects:

- (22) a A man is intelligent
b A man is reliable

The sentences in (22) favour a generic rather than an indefinite interpretation of the determiner. This behaviour is predictable if we allow that these predicate expressions can be used to apply a property to a topic, in other words, occur in Predications.

I now want to go beyond this and suggest that irrespective of the nature of the predicate expression, sentences with definite subjects strongly favour analysis as Predications in that their subjects are topics. Consider now an example of a state rather than property assigning predicate:

- (23) John is drunk

In this case, the conditions of appropriate use of the definite NP require that the existence of the individual John is either common ground or can be inferred by the addressee given the context of utterance. In these circumstances, the hearer will infer that the sentence is about the individual referred

to by the subject expression, regardless of the nature of the predicate expression.

This close association between definite subject as topic status receives support from recent work by Burton-Roberts (1984). Burton-Roberts considers pairs such as the following:

- (24) a Who is a dandy?
b MAX is a dandy

It would commonly be held that in (24)b MAX was the focus and not the topic of the sentence. However, Burton-Roberts sets out to argue that the correspondence between subject and topic status is such that, even in the discourse context provided by (24), MAX is still topic of (24)b. Part of the argument is based on the assumption that the close association between subject and topic means that if there is a sentence with a non-subject topic, there will be a way of expressing the same proposition with equivalent pragmatic force but with the topic in subject position. He is, therefore, able to argue that if (24)b is not about Max, but rather the set of dandies, we would expect (25) to provide felicitous replies to (24)a, which they fail to do.

- (25) a A dandy is Max
b A dandy is what Max is

In fact, we only find a different distribution of topic in the highly specific context of what Burton-Roberts calls 'non-descriptive definition', in which an example is provided in reply to a request for a definition:

- (26) a What is a dandy?
b MAX is a dandy

In this case, we find that (25)b, in which a dandy occurs as subject, is a felicitous reply to (26)a, and is pragmatically equivalent to (26)b.

This argument provides support for the proposal being made here, since it suggests that the association between subject and topic status is strong enough to survive the effect of focus in the discourse contexts considered.

If ES complements are examined in the light of these suggestions, the DE can be accounted for as a restriction on Predications as the complements of ES. The examples given above in (1)b, (2)b and (3)b all contain complements of be in which the form is NP XP, and in which the definite subject will favour a Predication analysis rather than a Neutral Description. This is the case whether the NP and predicate constituent are explicitly related

daughters of a clausal node, or are linked by a rule of predication of the sort proposed by Williams (1980). The DE illustrated in (1) can, therefore, be interpreted as a restriction on the complement of there is being analyzed as a Predication. This echoes Milsark's observation (1974:133) that the focus of ES is not a topic.

Consider also the following example, in which acceptability is affected by the presence of a definite NP:

- (27) a Why didn't you go in?
b ?There was John in the room

To the extent that intuitions are possible on this point, I would suggest that the discourse context favours a Neutral Description interpretation of the complement of be, in that it presents a complete state of affairs to the addressee, while the presence of a definite NP favours a different analysis. Hannay (1985:128) expresses a similar view concerning the example in (28):

- (28) Hey! There's John at the door. (not demonstrative there)

The judgements of some people, including Hannay, are that an appropriate discourse context may redeem the acceptability of sentences such as (27)b and (28). Consider in this respect, other examples from Hannay (1985:129):

- (29) a Where was your car?
b What was (there) in the garage?
c There was my car in the garage

Hannay points out the difference in naturalness of (29)c as a reply to (29)a compared with (29)b. Although the discourse pair (29)b, c is far more natural, there is a problem if we allow discourse factors to dominate over formal, sentence-based features. It would be difficult to explain why, even in favourable discourse contexts, an ES is not the unmarked structure. The view that I will adopt here is that such sentences with definites fail to reach full acceptability precisely because of the conflict between the contextual factors and the more general requirements that associate definites with Predication analysis.

Consider now ES of the form there be the X which have the structure shown in (18)a. ES with this structure are in one way different from ES with complex NP XP complements. There is no question of (27)b or (28) being intrinsically uninformative. By contrast, a sentence such as (30) asserts what is presupposed by the use of the NP, namely, the existence of the entity referred to by the NP:

(30) there is [_{NP} the car in the garage]

Therefore, while there is no semantic restriction on definite NPs in this position, ES of this form are potentially uninformative according to their literal interpretation. This makes it more likely that in interpreting the utterance, the hearer will go beyond the literal assertion and relate the utterance to the linguistic context and derive an enumerative interpretation. At the same time, since the complement of be consists only of an NP, there is no tendency to interpret the material following be as a Predication. Therefore, there is no DE and such a sentence may attain full acceptability. This accounts for the earlier observation that clear cases of enumerative ES with definite NPs tend to have the structure there be the N. At the same time, there is some indication that the restriction based on NP XP sequences may be relevant in a wider range of presentational structures.

- (31) a There stood behind some trees ^a the Methodist church
b There stood ^a ?the Methodist church behind some tress
c Behind some trees there stood a Methodist church
the

Although judgements are by no means clear-cut, it seems that the least natural sentence is the version of (31)b in which there is a sequence of the form NP [+def] PP, that is, the candidate for a Predication analysis.

5. Communicative function of ES

It remains to indicate why speakers should make suggestions using the form in (30), which does, after all, require more effort than a minimal elliptical response. The answer seems to be that the structure provides an indirect way of making a suggestion. Compare (32)b and c as possible replies to (32)a:

- (32) a What could I give my sister for her birthday?
b The new record by Split Enz
c There's the new record by Split Enz

(32)b is taken as asserting a reply to what was literally asked. That is, the reply is taken as asserting the same proposition as (33):

- (33) You could give your sister the new record by Split Enz

Odd results are, therefore, produced if the relevance of the reply is explicitly cancelled:

- (34) ??The new record by Split Enz, but I'm not suggesting that it would make a suitable present

On the other hand, the assertion that something exists, or that something is located at some place, seems to be a source of implicature and enables a speaker to convey a suggestion by less direct means. This was shown in the discussion of the examples in section 1.

6. Conclusion

I have indicated that what is normally identified as the DE in ES need not be interpreted as a unitary phenomenon:

- (35) a There is John
b ?There is John walking his dog

A direct account has been given of (35)a, based on the uninformative nature of its literal meaning. The explanation for the status of (35)b is somewhat less direct, and involves the claim that definite subjects favour Predications, which are restricted as complements of ES. I have already indicated that there is some plausibility behind this suggestion, but one might then ask what property of there is makes its complement resist analysis as a Predication. One response would be simply to claim that this is a lexical fact about there is. Another response, and perhaps a more promising one, is to appeal to the normal use of the expression and to argue as follows: there is can occur with NP and clausal arguments. In the first case, there is is used to assert the existence of some entity or introduce it into the world of the discourse. In the second case, there is is used to assert the existence of an event or situation, or introduce it into the world of the discourse. We might then claim that the clausal counterpart of a new entity is an all-new proposition, and a Predication, with its known subject, is, therefore, less favoured than a Neutral Description. In other words, the clausal and non-clausal structures that have been distinguished in the arguments proposed here, may, nevertheless, share an underlying unity at a more abstract level.

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TELLING LIES: SOME LITERARY AND OTHER
VIOLATIONS OF GRICE'S MAXIM OF QUALITY

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1. Introduction

Grice (1975) suggests that violations of the Maxim of Quality (henceforth MQL) might serve to identify instances of metaphor, meiosis, hyperbole, irony and perhaps other figures of speech that occur in discourse. This paper attempts to provide a limited set of criteria which can systematically distinguish between various kinds of violations of literal truth since, in addition to the violations mentioned by Grice, there are at least four other equally apparent categories of MQL violation. Examples of all eight types follow below:

- (i) a. Lie Julia is my mother (where Julia is no relation of the speaker)
- b. White Lie Julia is my mother (where Julia is the speaker's stepmother)
- c. Metaphor Julia is a mother hen
- d. Paradox Julia is her mother's mother
- e. Hyperbole Julia is the worst mother in the world
- f. Melosis Julia is not the best mother in the world
- g. Irony Julia is a wonderful mother! (where it is known that Julia is not)
- h. Euphemism Julia is quite a relaxed mother (where it is known that Julia neglects her children)

Each of the MQL violations listed above involve some sort of 'misrepresentation of reality' (see Goffman, 1972), of the facts as they are, or as they are agreed upon. Therefore, to state that they are all violations of literal truth is necessary, but certainly not sufficient to account for differences that we, as competent discourse participants, perceive between them, nor for the interesting fact (suggested by informant tests) that some of these MQL violations are consistently judged to be more closely related and some further apart, (see informant tests and results given in Sections 11 and 12). So the central

questions addressed here are the following. What is the nature of the semantico-pragmatic knowledge we must have to tell a lie from a white lie, a white lie from a euphemism, a metaphor from a paradox? How are these and other MQL violations structurally related to one another?

2. Criteria

The research on which this paper is based suggests that MQL violations may be classified, as well as structurally related, by the four simple criteria of overtness, comparison, exaggeration and acceptability. Thus, a contrastive table of such violations (interpretable, of course, as a cline) would look, ceteris paribus, something like Figure 1:

Types of MQL Violations	Lies	White Lies	Hyperbole	Meiosis	Irony	Euphemism	Metaphor	Paradox
Contrastive Criteria								
Overt								
+ O -	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Exaggeration								
+ E -	o	o	+	-	o	o	o	o
Comparison								
+ C -	o	o	o	o	o	o	+	-
Acceptability								
+ A -	-	+	o	o	-	+	o	o

Figure 1

For all types of MQL violations, along each cline, the positive symbol +, the neutral symbol O, and the negative symbol - may be glossed as:

- + = necessarily a criterial requirement of
- o = not necessarily a criterial requirement of
- = necessarily not a criterial requirement of

This simple grid of contrastive clines, based on everyday concepts like exaggeration and comparison, helps to explain how conversationalists:

- (a) differentiate between various types of MQL violations,
- (b) judge which MQL violations are closely related and which far apart, and
- (c) judge which combinations of MQL violations are permissible and which are not.

As the table shows, it may be possible to account quite specifically for some of our intuitive judgements about the relationship of certain MQL violations to each other. Thus, lies differ from white lies along one cline only, that of acceptability (defined broadly, at this stage, as that which is socially permissible even if it is recognised by participants as an MQL violation). White lies, in turn, differ from euphemisms along a single cline, that of overtiness (roughly defined as immediately recognisable semantic or pragmatic violation of literal truth). Lies, therefore, are judged to be further away from euphemisms than are white lies, since the differentiation is marked in terms of two criteria (acceptability and overtiness) rather than just one. Similarly, metaphors are judged to be distant from lies and white lies and most closely related to paradoxes since both figures bring together disparate lexical items (words or phrases that conventionally do not belong together) for comparison: hyperbole (overstatement) is most closely allied, in conversationalists' judgements, to meiosis (understatement), by differing markedly only along the cline of exaggeration. Finally, irony turns out to be closely related to the lie again as it is distinguishable from a lie only if it is overt, that is, if discourse participants happen to recognise from pragmatic circumstances and mutual knowledge that the speaker intends an implicature opposite to the proposition he actually makes.

3. Implicatures and Mutual Knowledge

Grice (1957) made it explicit that for the hearer H to be able to calculate the Implicature q, H must know, or believe he knows, the following:

- G1 The conventional content of the sentence (p) uttered
- G2 The co-operative principle and its maxims
- G3 The context of p
- G4 Certain bits of background information
- G5 That G1-G4 are mutual knowledge shared by speaker S and H.

But there is obviously a distinction to be made between the logically possible implicatures and the implicatures that are actually made in any given conversation. Take the sentence Julia is my mother. It is only when H knows or believes he knows that there is a mismatch between his own knowledge of any one or more of G1-G4 above and S's utterance to the contrary, that an implicature may be generated by this utterance in context. So, for example, if H knows or believes he knows 'for a fact' (G4) the background information that Julia is not S's mother, then S's uttering of 'Julia is my mother' may lead him to conclude that S is intentionally misleading him. Hence, it is the crucial factor of mismatch between H's knowledge or beliefs about his knowledge and the utterances he takes S to

be affirming S's belief in that leads him to the conclusion of a dishonest intention. Now, this may appear equivalent to saying, not very interestingly, that H must believe that one of the maxims has been flouted in order to derive an implicature. The question, however, is - how does H know in the first place that a maxim has been flouted? He knows this only by matching his own knowledge against the knowledge he believes S to be wrongly affirming, on the basis of S's utterance. Thus, a perceived mismatch between his own beliefs and what he takes to be S's is the essential trigger for H's working out of implicature.

At this point, it might be useful to characterise the pre-theoretical notion of mismatch further. The obvious way to do so is in terms of the notion mutual knowledge relied on by Grice himself. As is apparent from G1-G5 given above, mutual knowledge can be of two kinds:

- (a) pragma linguistic knowledge (including the entailments, presuppositions etc. of utterances, the linguistic and lexical rules that they are subject to and the pragmatic norms they are attentive to, i.e. all the knowledge that is subsumed under G1 and possibly G2). This type of knowledge is generally assumed to be by and large matching or shared between S and H in a conversation.
- (b) encyclopaedic knowledge (including all the knowledge that is proper to the context and universe of discourse, i.e. the knowledge that is subsumed under G3 and G4). This type of knowledge is not necessarily assumed to be wholly matching between S and H in any conversation, and can, therefore, be imparted by S as knowledge made matching between himself and H in the conversation.

Mutual knowledge, in short, is knowledge where a match is either assumed or created in a conversation between S and H. But naturally, where there is a possible match, there is also the possibility of a mismatch occurring (either intentionally or otherwise, though only the former is considered in this paper). Proceeding from the notion that there are essentially two kinds of mutual (that is, matching) knowledge, the following principles serve to derive two types of violations.

- P1 If H knows or believes that there has occurred a mismatch between his own beliefs and those of S in the area of pragma linguistic knowledge (including G1 and G2) then a violation occurs of a certain type. Let us call this type + overt. In these cases S believes that H knows that S knows that S is presenting an obvious violation of MQL, which means that S cannot have any intention of misleading H. Since these utterances therefore cannot possibly be lies, they are obviously interpreted by H as hyperbole, metaphor, paradox, meiosis, sarcasm and euphemism, collectively known as 'literary' violations).

P2 If H knows or believes that there has occurred a mismatch between his own beliefs and those of S in the area of encyclopaedic knowledge¹ (including G3 and G4) then a violation occurs of a certain type. Let us call this - overt. In these cases S believes that H does not know that S knows that there is a violation of the MQL which means that S does intend to mislead H. Since these utterances are not obviously and openly offered as violations of MQL, they have to be interpreted as either lies or white lies.

4. - Overt Violations

It may be noted at this point that it is the special distinction of - overt (henceforth -O) violations of MQL that they are intended to be indistinguishable from non-violations. These are interesting cases of maxim violations where, if S's intention succeeds, no implicatures are generated, despite the fact that we are accustomed to the overarching Gricean principle that wherever maxims are intentionally violated, implicatures are intended that H must work out. On the other hand, if S's intentions are unsuccessful, an additional meaning is in fact derived (i.e. that S intends to mislead) but surely it is not correct to say that H regards this as the meaning S 'intended' to convey.

What emerges is that there are in fact violations of MQL (namely lies and white lies) that, at best, do not generate implicatures and, at worst, generate unintended implicatures. How may we resolve the problem posed by the fact that not all violations of MQL result or are intended to result in implicatures, since we make use of an algorithm where all violations of Grice's maxims are taken to result in implicatures being conveyed provided G1-G5 hold? The solution suggested here is that there is a specific type of violation, namely -O violation in which S imparts encyclopaedic knowledge to H as mutual, when he knows that it is non-matching in actual fact. If H discovers this mismatch as a result of his own possession of some element of background knowledge contrary to S's utterance, his perception that the mismatch has occurred in the area of background information or encyclopaedic knowledge leads him to conclude that this is a -O violation typically not intended to convey an implicature at all. And, given that we can competently distinguish, in the abstract, not only between what constitutes 'the truth' and what constitutes 'a lie' or 'a white lie' but also between lies and other kinds of MQL violations, we require some criterion which can do this. The criterion of overtness enables us to characterise lies and white lies as possible representations of the truth imparted, to use Grice's phrase, 'quietly and unostentatiously' in the realm of encyclopaedic knowledge. As such, we know that lies and white lies are covert, or -O, and contrast with + overt

(henceforth +0) violations which blatantly flout the maxims. I therefore call these exploitations² of the maxims -0. The property of being -0 which results from lies and white lies being specifically imparted as encyclopaedic knowledge, results in their having the special characteristic that they are non-implicature generating, (see I and II in Sections 9 and 10). Now, given that -0 violations have this characteristic, Grice's original conditions for the working out of implicature have to be slightly modified at this point.

- G5 that G1-G2 are mutual knowledge shared by the S and H and that G3 and/or G4 contain some element which is not mutual knowledge shared by S and H but is nevertheless intentionally presented by S as such.

This revised condition G5 will account for the fact that -0 violations are consistently judged by conversationalists as qualitatively different from +0 violations, (see I, Sections 11 and 12).

5. +Overt Violations

These are violations we group together under the cover term 'literary', and they include hyperbole, meiosis, metaphor, paradox, euphemism and sarcasm (also, litotes, oxymoron, etc.). Literary violations occur when there is a perceived mismatch between H's knowledge of G1 and G2 and what he takes on the basis of S's utterance to be S's disregard of this assumed knowledge between the two conversationalists. Consider the following examples:

- 1.c Julia is a mother hen
2. Julia is a mother to me

In both cases, let us assume that Julia has definite reference and a lexical entry [(human) (female) (proper name)] but in (1)c there is an overt clash between the lexical entry for Julia and the lexical entry for hen (- human) and consequently a blatant flouting in this equative expression of the lexical rules that are assumed mutual knowledge. Implicatures are typically generated since such utterances cannot be possible representations of the truth if a matching lexis and grammar are assumed shared between S and H. In (2), however, the lexical entry for Julia does not clash semantically with any other element in the sentence. Yet there occurs a clash in another area of praga linguistic knowledge. The 'to me' complement conventionally contradicts a possible standard entailment of the sentence which is that Julia is actually the speaker's mother. This type of contradiction signals clearly to H that a further intersection with encyclopaedic knowledge (such as the fact that Julia has looked after S ever since S was a child) is now required by H for a full understanding of the implications of this utterance even

though H may not possess such knowledge at the time. In fact, this may be what influences the judgement by many speakers that such an utterance is not quite a metaphor, since it both assumes a mismatch in pragma linguistic knowledge as well as requires an imparting of further encyclopaedic knowledge that is not contrary to the presupposition of the assertion. This example is, therefore, a telling one, lying midway between +0 and -0. Interesting judgements are made by speakers differentiating qualitatively between the following utterances.

- 1.a Julia is my mother (where H has access to encyclopaedic information that Julia is not)

Such an utterance is judged a lie, not having any implicature.

2. Julia is a mother to me (where H does not necessarily have access to encyclopaedic information but knows that such information is required for a full interpretation).

Such an utterance is judged metaphorical, but not quite metaphorical, as having an implicature, but requiring encyclopaedic information for the full working out of the implicature.

- 1.c Julia is a mother hen (where H knows that access to encyclopaedic information is not required for complete interpretation).

Such an interpretation is judged a metaphor, as having a clear implicature.

It is suggested here that distinctions like those made by conversationalists between utterances (1)a, (2) and (1)c, are based on the criterion of +/-0 violation, which in turn derives from the division of mutual knowledge into pragma linguistic and encyclopaedic components. However, it is further suggested that there are violations which require input from both components in order to be fully interpreted and conversationalists' judgements may reflect this fact.

Moreover, data from informant judgements also shows that a +0 violation as in the case of the paradox (1)d 'Julia is her mother's mother' is consistently judged closer to the +0 metaphorical violation in (1)c and further away from the -0 violations (white lies and lies) in (1)a and (1)b; these two overt violations are in turn judged to be more closely linked to each other than to any of the six types of +0 violation, although the acceptability cline cuts across the overtiness cline, making the data somewhat more complex in terms of analysis. On the whole, however, informant judgements such as those set out in Sections 11 and 12, seem to indicate that the +/-0 distinction is a significant one, since +0 violations involve only conditions G1 and G2

whereas -0 violations involve only conditions G3 and G4. We can, therefore, now make a further revision of condition G5 on mutual knowledge.

G5 If G1 and G2 are assumed (known or believed) by H to be mutual knowledge shared by S and H and S's utterance contradicts this assumption, H shall derive the implicature that S's utterance is a +0 violation of the MQL and will therefore manifest itself as a 'literary' violation (i.e. metaphor, paradox, hyperbole, sarcasm or euphemism). If G3 and G4 contain some element known or believed by H not to be mutual knowledge shared by S and H, but is nevertheless imparted by S as such, H shall derive the implicature that S's utterance is a -0 violation of the MQL and therefore to be interpreted as a 'non-literary' violation (i.e. lie or white lie).

A flow-chart (Figure 2) might be helpful here before we consider each of the criterial clines following after overtness:

Criteria differentiating between MQL violations




Figure 2

6. Exaggeration

The following were used in the informant tests and reveal judgements relevant to the cline of overttness.

3. a. John is the worst doctor in the world
- b. John is one of the worst doctors in the world
- c. John is the worst doctor I know
- d. John is a dreadful doctor
- e. John is a bad doctor
- f. John is not the best of doctors
- g. John is not the best doctor in the world.

4. Not poppy nor mandragora
Nor all the drowsy syrups of the world
Shall ever medecine thee to that sweet sleep
Thou owd'st yesterday.
(Othello)

The examples and the judgements on them indicate the following. First, utterances are graded systematically and consistently by conversationalists, along a cline from overstatement (+E) to understatement (-E) (see IV, Sections 11 and 12). Second, certain lexical items and conventional phrases (given by G1) tend to trigger judgements of either +E(xaggeration) or -E(xaggeration). These facts can be accounted for by assuming a mutual pragma linguistic knowledge between S and H which is overtly flouted. For example, it may be that utterances containing phrases like 'best in the world' conventionally imply +E because it is a matter of mutually given pragmatic understanding that estimates of 'best' and 'worst' cannot reliably be made by an individual with limited experience. Therefore, in asserting something like 'John is the best doctor in the world', S flouts this mutual pragmatic rule assumed between himself and H, thereby producing a +0 violation. It is important to note here that this sort of +0 'misrepresentation' arises from the flouting of a general and mutual pragmatic rule, not subsumable under specific encyclopaedic information. Judgements of +/-E sees to be made very largely on the basis of our assumed knowledge of conventional words and phrases that convey overstatement or understatement. Encyclopaedic knowledge is not required for an utterance to be judged +/-E; indeed, if encyclopaedic information is introduced it may cancel the judgement +E. Consider the following example:

5. John is the best doctor in the world. I know because I was on an United Nations committee that conducted a worldwide survey of doctors and he had the highest rating along a number of variables.

In such a case, the utterance 'John is the best doctor in the world' is no longer assessed along the cline of +/-E, or for that matter, as a +0 'flouting' of a pragmatic rule. The introduction of encyclopaedic information results in the utterance being assessed now along the -0 cline as a possible truth imparted by S to H as knowledge made mutual during their conversation. Thus, it is necessary to stress that judgements of +E or -E occur as a result of a 'misrepresentation of reality' by S that flouts some mutually assumed pragmatic or linguistic rule. H can, therefore, conclude that if there is a +0, +/-E mismatch between himself and S that can only be taken to imply either hyperbole or meiosis.

7. Comparison

In the case of utterances judged along the cline of comparison

(C), the problem is specifically to distinguish between metaphor and paradox. This is simply achieved by placing metaphor at the + end of the cline (thus stressing its affinity with simile) and paradox at the - end of the cline (thus negating its affinity with simile). Consider the following examples.

6. a. My mother is a child
- b. My mother is my child
- c. Iago is an eel
- d. Iago is Othello.

Both (6)a and (6)b assert a state of affairs that mutually may pragmatically be judged a 'misrepresentation of reality' but whereas in (6)a the flouting can be conventionally taken (by assuming G1) to imply an analogy between S's mother and a child, that is, a comparison of the semantic features attaching to the two lexical entries 'mother' and 'child', (6)b cannot be taken to conventionally imply a comparison because in this case S's mother is not being compared to just any child, she is being identified with S's child. Such an identification explicitly excludes the simple comparative metaphorical implicature in favour of an implicature of antonymous identification between S's mother and S's child. There is no comparison of individual semantic features here, rather a holistic identification of the antonymous phrases 'my mother' and 'my child'.³

The point becomes clearer if we examine examples (6)c and (6)d. In (6)c Iago is compared to an eel, which might have such connotative semantic features associated with it as 'slimy', 'wriggling', 'offensive', etc., but in (6)d we do not need to know individual semantic features associated with 'Othello' to derive the paradoxical implicature; all we need to know is that Othello and Iago are distinct proper names in the lexicon.⁴

To generalize; paradox and metaphor have in common the fact that they bring together for comparison disparate lexical items (words or phrases) that we know do not go together conventionally. Metaphor (+C) is implied when the element of comparison is emphasised and individual semantic features are overtly likened between conventionally disparate items; paradox (-C) is implied when the element of comparison is suppressed and entire lexical items which are conventionally disparate (in terms of collocation) are not likened, but actually overtly identified with each other.

8. Acceptability

The final criterion of acceptability (A) differentiates as well as links four separate MQL violations, lies, white lies, euphemism and sarcasm. An utterance is judged +A if it is

inoffensive to what Goffman calls 'social face'; an utterance is judged -A if it is offensive to H's social face. Goffman (1972) observes that there are a number of ways of socially violating MQL which constitute 'misrepresentation of reality' without being labelled lies. Goffman writes:

Let us try another approach to the understanding of misrepresentation. An open, flat or bare-faced lie may be defined as one for which there can be unquestionable evidence that the teller knew he lied and wilfully did so...Those caught in the act of telling bare-faced lies not only get caught in the interaction but may have their face destroyed, for it is felt by many audiences that if an individual can once bring himself to tell such a lie, he ought never again to be fully trusted. However, there are many 'white lies' told by doctors, potential guests and others, presumably to save the feelings of the audience that is lied to, and these kinds of untruths are not thought horrendous. Such lies [are] meant to protect others rather than to defend the self. Further, in everyday life, it is usually possible for the performer to create intentionally almost any kind of false impression without putting himself in the indefensible position of having told a lie. Communication techniques such as innuendo, strategic ambiguity and crucial omissions allow the misinformer to profit from lies without, technically, telling any. (1972:69)

Irony is one such type of misrepresentation. Irony may be classified as -A along the cline of acceptability because it is wilfully and intentionally offered as an insult to H and only succeeds if H recognises the intended offence. Otherwise, it is indistinguishable from a truthful compliment. In this respect it is like the lie, which is indistinguishable from the truth if H fails to recognise a mismatch between the imparted utterance and what he himself recognises to be the truth. Both irony and lies share the characteristic that they can be suspected as being possibly untrue, without H necessarily knowing that they are untrue. This is not the case with other +0 violations such as hyperbole and metaphor, where it is immediately clear that a semantic or pragmatic rule is being flouted. Irony is also like the lie, in that the lie, as Goffman points out, is in most societies taken to be injurious (and therefore offensive) to H's expectation of trust between himself and S. Unlike the lie, however, irony is +0, that is, it is intended to be recognised as insulting, whereas a lie is not so intended. Insofar as it is +0, irony is similar to euphemism from which it differs only along the cline of acceptability.

Euphemism is +A, because it overtly protects H's face by seeking the most inoffensive synonym for a harsher word or expression which S has in mind. Such inoffensive synonyms are conventionally

recognised in a language (by G1) and, therefore, judged +0 as well as +A, thus implying euphemism. Irony is -A because it overtly attacks H's face by implying the exact offensive contrary to what is actually said by S. White lies, though like lies in that they are -0 and not intended to be recognised as such, are nevertheless, as Goffman says, inoffensive to H's face and indeed often positively intended to protect H's feelings. Even though they are intended not to be discovered, being -0, if they are found out they are 'not thought of as horrendous'. Like euphemisms, they are judged by conversational lists to be +A. Knowledge based on the criteria of acceptability (characterised in terms of offence to H's face) seems thus to govern conversationalists' intuitive judgements about what constitutes lie, white lie, euphemism and sarcasm (see I, II and III, sections 11 and 12). The diagrams below (Figure 3) represents the relation between these four violations:




Figure 3

Having explored each of the four criterial clines presented in this paper, it is now possible to present rules used by S and H for differentiating MQL violations.

9. Procedures

S's procedural rules for presenting particular MQL violations

1. Present mismatch as

- either (a) +0(vert) in what you take to be assumed semantico-pragmatic knowledge
or (b) -0 in what you take to be imparted encyclopaedic knowledge

2. If you present mismatch as +0, you have the choice of presenting it as

- (a) + or - on the Exaggeration Cline. If you present it as +E, you are, ceteris paribus, presenting H with a meiosis.
(b) + or - on the Comparison Cline. If you present it as +C, you are, ceteris paribus, presenting H with a metaphor. If you present it as -C, you are, ceteris paribus, presenting H with a paradox.

- (c) + or - on the Acceptability Cline. If you present it as +A, you are, ceteris paribus, presenting H with an euphemism. If you present it as -A, you are, ceteris paribus, presenting H with sarcasm.

3. If you present mismatch as -0, you have the choice of presenting it as either + or -A. If you present it as +A, you are, ceteris paribus, presenting H with a white lie. If you present it as -A, you are, ceteris paribus, presenting H with a lie.

H's procedural rules for differentiating particular MQL violations

1. Check for mismatch in either (a) what you take to be assumed semantico-pragmatic knowledge and proceed along +0 route or (b) what you take to be imparted encyclopaedic knowledge and proceed along -0 route.
2. If mismatch is +0, check along
 - (a) the E-Cline and assign either + or - value, or neutral
 - (b) The C-Cline and assign +, - or neutral value. If - value is assigned, you have, ceteris paribus, a metaphor. If + value is assigned, you have, ceteris paribus, a paradox.
 - (c) The A-Cline and assign +, - or neutral value. If + value is assigned, you have, ceteris paribus, an euphemism. If - value is assigned, you have, ceteris paribus, sarcasm.
3. If mismatch is -0, check along the A-Cline and assign +, - or neutral value. If you assign a + value, you will have a white lie. If you assign it a - value, you will have a lie. However, assign a -0, -A value only if it is impossible to treat the utterance as +0 and/or +A value.

These, in their simplest form, are an outline of the parsing procedures followed by S and H in the presentation and unravelling of the eight distinct types of MQL violation. Of course, the actual procedures may be a great deal more complicated because for one thing, we can have various combinations of MQL violations (e.g. hyperbolic metaphor, ironic meiosis). The knowledge schema already given in Fig. 1, not only accounts for our intuitive judgements on various types of MQL violations, it also makes the following predictions.

10. Predictions

Presented randomly with various violations of MQL, Hs would

- (1) group metaphor with paradox, lies with white lies, white lies with euphemisms, hyperboles with meiosis, etc. on the basis of the underlying knowledge grid.

- (2) never classify an utterance as both a lie (-A) and a white lie (+A), as both a hyperbole (+E) and a meiosis (-E), as both a metaphor (+C) and a paradox(-C), etc. on the basis of the underlying knowledge grid,
- (3) take a longer time to process judgements of complex combinations (e.g. a hyperbolic (+E) metaphoric (+C) sarcastic (-A) lie (-A)) as given by the knowledge grid, than simple combinations (e.g. euphemistic (+A) white lie (+A)).

Prediction (3) is non-trivial in that a complex combination might have fewer words than a simple combination and yet take longer to process than the latter. So, for example, if S says to H (who has been asking a conversational fool of himself), 'Your solar brilliance quite eclipsed me' thus producing a hyperbolic metaphoric sarcasm, the prediction would be that the utterance would be more difficult for H to interpret than 'You are wearing the most wonderfully/colourful dress in the world' (said to H wearing a dull/garish dress) which is a hyperbolic sarcasm without any metaphorical element, even though this second utterance is almost twice the length of the first and has a grammatical structure comparable in complexity.

11. Informant Tests

An initial series of informant tests given below tends to confirm, on the whole, prediction (1) while (2) and (3) await further testing. The tests sought to ascertain whether informants grouped sentences non-randomly according to the clines of overtness, acceptability, exaggeration and comparison proposed in this paper. The informants were nineteen first year university students whose other languages were Chinese, Malay, Malayalam, Punjabi or Tamil⁵ although they speak English with equal or perhaps greater facility. They were chosen as informants precisely on the grounds of their linguistic naivete, which was apparent both from interviews and their school records which showed that they have had little formal exposure to literary conventions. At no stage during the tests were they introduced to the terms metaphor, meiosis, hyperbole, etc., nor were they given any telling examples of these violations. They were just briefly introduced to the idea that there might be other ways of misrepresenting an agreed upon literal truth than lying point blank. They were then asked to group the sets of utterances below as the instructions dictated. No time limit was set, but most of them finished the task in about half an hour.

Test Materials

The following utterances are presented in random order. Follow instructions:

I. Sort the following utterances into first two groups and then four groups. (Groups need not be of equal size):

- a. Julia is my mother (whereas in fact Julia is no relation of the speaker)
- b. Julia is the worst mother in the world
- c. Julia is a wonderful mother! (where it is known that Julia neglects her children)
- d. Julia is my mother (whereas in fact Julia is the speaker's step-mother)
- e. Julia is her mother's mother
- f. Julia is not the best mother in the world
- g. Julia is quite a relaxed mother (where it is known that Julia neglects her children)
- h. Julia is a mother-hen

II. Sort the following utterances into two groups of equal size:

- a. I'm afraid I have a headache (claimed when the speaker wishes to leave a party earlier, even though the speaker actually does not have a headache)
- b. I know Noam Chomsky quite well (claimed when S has met Chomsky just once at a linguistics convention)
- c. I am thirty years old (claimed when S is actually 34 years old)
- d. I have written several books (claimed when the speaker has actually not written any books at all)
- e. I live in Singapore (claimed when S actually lives in London)
- f. I have a sister and two brothers (whereas the speaker actually has two brothers and one female cousin)

III Sort the following utterances into three groups of equal size:

- a. This is the best surprise I ever had
- b. This present is not really a present because the giver is absent
- c. That is a wonderfully colourful dress you have on (said when the addressee actually has rather garish attire)
- d. This is not the worst place in the world
- e. This is a delightful meal (said when the addressee has actually offered S rather poor fare)
- f. This professor of mine is a giant among intellectuals

IV. Arrange the following utterances in a sequence if you can. Then sort them into two/three groups if possible (not necessarily of equal size):

- a. John is the worst doctor in the world
- b. John is a dreadful doctor
- c. John is not the best of doctors
- d. John is one of the worst doctors in the world
- e. John is a bad doctor
- f. John is the worst doctor I know
- g. John is not the best doctor in the world

V. Sort the following utterances into two groups of equal size:

- a. The book is based on an interesting concept! (said about a book which does not have any particular merit)
- b. The book is extremely readable of course! (said about a book which is dense and utterly unreadable)
- c. The book is beautifully produced! (said about a book which has nothing else to recommend it)
- d. The book is exciting! (said about a book full of unbelievable adventures)
- e. The book is for the select few! (said about a book which is very limited in its appeal)
- f. The book is wonderfully imaginative! (said about a wholly dull book)

VI. Sort the following utterances into two groups of equal size:

- a. My mother is a child
- b. Iago is a wolf
- c. Iago is Othello
- d. The stone died
- e. My mother is my child
- f. Death died

If you have had any difficulties in sorting into the above groups, please feel free to comment. Also please state any strong intuitions that you may have about the data.

12. Results of Informant Tests

(I) Predicted order of groups: a d c g b f e h

Subjects

3	a d	c g	b f	e h
6	a d	c g	b f	e h
2	a d	c g	b f	e h
1	a d	[c g	b f[e h
12	a d	[c g	b f]	e h
16	a d	[c g	b f]	e h
17	a d	[c g	b f]	e[h]
19	a d	[c g	b f]	e[h]
10	a d	[c g	b f]	e[h]
8	a d	[c g	b f]	e[h]
4	a d	c[g	b f]	e[h]
5	a d	c[g	b f]	e[h]
9	a d	c g	[b f]	e[h]
11	a d	c g	[b f]	e[h]
.....				
7	a[d	c g]	b f	e h
13	a[d]	c g	[b f]	e[h]
14	a[d]	c g	[b f]	e[h]
18	a[d]	c[g	b f]	e[h]
20	a[d]	c[g	b f]	e[h]
.....				

White Lie + Lie	14/19 (approx. 74%)
Irony + Euphemism	14/19 (approx, 74%)
Hyperbole + Meiosis	14/19 (100%)
Paradox + Metaphor	7/19 (approx. 37%)

(II) Predicted order of groups: d e will occur together
 f b will occur together

Subjects

1, 2, 7, 10, 13	d e a	f b c
9, 5, 8, 14, 18	d e c	f b a
3, 4, 20	d e b	f c a
12	d a c	f b e
6, 11, 17	d c b	f a e
16, 19	d a b	f c e

(Combinations which did not occur: abe, abc, cdf, bce)

[de] 14/19 (approx. 74%)
 [fb] 10/19 (approx. 53%)

(III) Predicted order of groups: [a d b f c e]
 or [a f b d c e]

Subjects

2, 5, 11, 14, 16, 19	[a d b f c e]	
1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8	[a f b d c e]	
10, 13, 20		15/19 (approx. 79%)
19, 9	[a e b f c d]	
17	[a d b e c f]	
18	[a c b f d e]	

(IV)a Predicted order of arrangement - a d f b e c g

Subjects

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,	
7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16	a d f b e c g
17, 18, 20	
10	a d f e c g b
19	b a d f e c g
12	f d a b e c g
9	a f d c g b e

(IV)b Predicted order of arrangement - [a d f] [b e] [c g]

Subjects

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,			
7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14,	[a d f]	[b e]	[c g]
16, 18, 20			
9	[d b]	[a f e c g]	
10	[f b e]	[a d c g]	
17	[c]	[a d f b e g]	
19	[d g]	[a f e c b]	
15/10 (approx. 79%)			

(V) Predicted order of groups b f will occur together
 d e will occur together

Subjects

1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8,	/ b f a / d e c /
11, 14, 20	
10, 13, 17	/ b f e / d c a /
9, 12, 18	/ a f c / d e b /
19	/ b f c / d e a /
6	/ b f d / c e a /
2	/ a f d / c e b /

bf ratio = 14/19 (approx. 74%)
de ratio = 13/19 (approx. 68%)

(VI) Predicted order of groups: a b will occur together
 e f or e c will occur together

Subjects

1, 5, 7, 10, 16	/ a b c / e f d /
3, 8, 11, 12, 13,	
18, 19, 20	/ a b f / e c d /
9, 14, 17	/ a b d / e f c /
2, 6	/ a e f / b c d /
4	/ a d f / b c e /

ab ratio = 14/19 (approx. 74%)
ef ratio = 9/19 (approx. 47%)
ce ratio = 12/19 (approx. 63%)

13. Concluding Remarks

Further research growing out of the work just presented in this paper would probably concern itself with elaborating, refining, and perhaps changing some of the criteria presented here, as well as with testing the predictions made by the model with a larger number of informants. Searle (1979) attempted to distinguish between ironical, metaphorical, indirect and literal speech in pragmatic terms. This paper may be construed as an attempt to carry his programme further, dwelling on the explication and justification of certain systematic criteria which influence our understanding of MQL violations. Further study is needed to clarify the manner in which these criteria interact with social and cultural factors to provide an underpinning of deductions of conversational intent made when literal truth is violated.

Notes

1. There is an interesting subset of cases where mismatches in the area of encyclopaedic knowledge do indeed produce interpretations by H in terms of metaphor, hyperbole,

meiosis, etc. rather than in terms of lies and white lies. These occur when it is quite clear from the situation of discourse to both S and H that literal truth is being violated (e.g. if S points to his favourite armchair and says 'Meet my best friend'). Such obvious violations are interpretively treated by H in the same way as +0 violations in the area of pragma linguistic knowledge, even though they refer to the encyclopaedic setting. More generally, in co-operative discourse, there appears to be a strong preference for H not to interpret any utterance as a lie (-0, -A) if it is possible to interpret it as either +0 or +A. This point will be reinforced when the parsing rules for H's working out of MQL implicatures are set out.

2. The terms 'flouting' and 'exploitation' are used here in ways quite unlike Grice's use of them.
3. Compare Wordsworth's epigram 'The child is the father of the man' which again appears to be an instance of paradox since the generic definite article identifies 'the child' with 'the man'.
4. However, observe the low scores in IV, Sections 9 and 10, where the student informants were unable to carry out the grouping task adequately since they were not familiar with the story of Othello. The test was flawed in its assumption of a lexical knowledge which informants did not possess.
5. The test data suggests that cultural background and/or functional categories such as compliments, excuses and boasts may be correlated with informants' choice of grouping. For example, for Chinese informants the category 'boast' appears to overlay the examples of white lies and lies given in II, Sections 9 and 10. Thus, these tests may need revision in this respect. However, further evidence is needed before any firm conclusions can be drawn about the connections, if any, between culture, functional categories and literary judgement of the kind dwelt on here.

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THE CONVERSATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF ANYWAY

Marion Owen,
Acorn Computers,
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The research reported in this paper represents part of a project investigating topic organisation in conversation, funded by the SSRC at the Department of Linguistics, Cambridge University, and held jointly by the present writer and Dr. S. C. Levinson. Its purpose was not only to examine the linguistic means by which speakers structure topics, but to call into question the very notion of topic itself as a fundamental organising principle in conversation. Our strategy was to focus on a limited number of specific conversational devices and expressions, to examine how and where they occur in actual recorded and transcribed conversations, and to attempt to identify their functions, in the hope of establishing some of the concepts and principles to which the linguist must appeal in describing such devices. In particular, we were asking whether it is in fact topic that is being structured when speakers use these expressions, or something else. One of the devices to which we gave particular attention was the expression anyway, and it is our observations and conclusions about this item that are presented here.

Let us therefore begin by supposing that the discourse topic of an utterance is closely associated with its referent, and on this basis attempt to assign discourse topics to the utterances immediately before and after anyway, to see whether or not anyway marks a topic shift. In other words, we shall stipulate, hypothetically, that two adjacent utterances are 'on the same topic' if they each make reference to some entity or concept, and that a topic change has occurred if this condition is not met. Maynard (1980:263-4), for example, proposes that:

there are places where a current utterance may not display a relationship to, or may not fit with, a prior one. A class of such utterances can be considered as topic changes; they are unrelated to the talk in prior turns in that they utilise new referents. (my emphasis)

We can indeed find uses of anyway which appear to coincide with a shift of reference. An example is in the following:

(1) 19A19/79

76 M: ..sup^lposing there was a 'leak in the ✓roof | or ,something|
77 F: well that's 'totally `different|
78 M: \yes|
79 F: \anyway| the 'question is `this| the 'thing is \this| that
80 ↳basically a ✓tenant| (1.0) has the 'right to ex\clude the
81 •landlord|

In this example the utterances in lines 76-78 have the following referents: 'leak', 'roof', or perhaps 'a leak in the roof', 'something' (a variable with vague reference) and whatever we take to be the referent of 'that' (77). In lines 79-80 the referents are 'a tenant', 'the landlord', and possibly 'the question' and 'the thing'. We will remark in passing that the business of determining the referents of actual utterances is even more difficult than has been supposed, as this simple and perfectly unremarkable example shows. We are also identifying referents with expressions occurring in the discourse: strictly, of course, they are entities in the real world. The instance of anyway in line 79 seems to occur at a point where the referents change. However, it is not obvious how far either side of anyway we are permitted to look; in other words, what, for this purpose, is 'an utterance'? If we take a larger extract, it is clear that there are common referents:

(2) 19A19/79

74 M: ...but 'tell me| ↳doesn't a •landlord have •some •rights of ✓entry|
75 ✓surely| I mean (if) he 'just 'wants to 'come and| 'you ,know|
76 sup^lposing there was a 'leak in the ✓roof| or ,something|
77 F: well that's 'totally `different|
78 M: \yes|
79 F: \anyway| the 'question is `this| the 'thing is \this| that
80 ↳basically a ✓tenant| (1.0) has the 'right to ex\clude the
81 •landlord|

So if we look back just a little further in the conversation, we find a reference to 'a landlord' which thus gives us a possible referential; and thus topical, link, across the occurrence of anyway. However, once we permit such a 'looking back', it is hard to know where to draw the line. In a conversation lasting half an hour, we would not want to say that there had been no shift of topic just because the same referent had been mentioned twice, with a twenty minute gap in between. We shall see in our detailed discussion of anyway that there are other matters that have to be taken into consideration in accounting for its function.

Here is another example in which there appears to be a referential 'break' marked by anyway:

(3) 10A920/189

185 C: ...but I 'don't know 'whether to ap'ply | 'you ,know |
 186 M: you'd 'be a 'lot 'happier 'staying in 'Cambridgehehheh |
 187 C: well I 'would ,really | but er of 'course you 'know
 M: [(-----)
 Nottingham | 'don't you |
 188 M: [mm hehheh |
 189 C: 'erm | but ,anyway | (1.7) 'so | (1.0) 'er | (1.5) 'what sort of
 190 'days are we 'talking about 'over 'Christmas | it's a 'Monday |

At first sight there seem to be no shared referents between the lines 187-188 and 189-190; if we are looking for a really strict analysis, however, we would have to concede that the referent of 'you' (187) is the same as one of the referents of 'we' (190). But intuitively, such an identity does not of itself serve to maintain the topic. Perhaps we could add to our topic-assigning rules an additional rule specifying that references to the speaker and hearer do not contribute to topic-assignment.

It appears, then, that even where there is intuitively a break in reference between utterances separated by anyway, we may be able to find referential connections if we look further afield in the conversation, and in addition, we are likely to have to construct ad hoc rules to block the assignment of 'same topic' to certain pairs of utterances. However, there is little point in attempting to solve these problems, since in any case anyway is frequently used when there is a clear referential link between the two utterances, as in this extract:

(4) 10A920/130

123 C: it's a 'nother | e'leven 'hundred | 'it's a 'thirteen .hundred
 124 ,actually | ((speaking away from phone)) 'isn't it | ,yeah | ((to M))
 125 'er:: | in a ,horrible .sort of | (1.0) er ,vomit .colour |
 126 M: hehhehoh ,god |
 127 C: hh it's 'called 'actually called 'lime .flower | but I (mean)
 128 'don't .know 'why it's .called hehheh
 129 M: ['(vile) | 'bilious (colour)
 130 C: [,yes | ,yes |
 131 (0.9)
 132 C: but ,anyway | it's 'all 'right |
 133 M: 'how much did you ,get for the .other one |

There are two referents for 'it' in this passage. In lines 123-4 and 130 the referent is the car, and in lines 127-8 'it' refers to the colour of the car. Perhaps on a strict basis we would have to say that between lines 128 and 130 the referent of 'it' changes, and anyway marks this shift, but in terms of an only slightly broader notion of topic there is an intuitively strong link between the car and its colour, and therefore there is no topic change between 128 and 130.

Now consider the following example:

(5) 34B356/434

419 C: do you re'member 'any of the 'names of 'these| (.) 'firms|

420 D: well I I just 'just went 'through the 'ones in in the 'Yellow
Pages|

421 C: yeah|

422 D: the 'cheapest 'one was | 'Cambridge| (.) 'Car 'Hire |

423 C: yeah|

424 D: 'which is erm (the one we're considering)

425 C: mm,hm|

426 D: which would be 'preferable|

427 C: mm,hm| so per'haps we could 'use

428 D: and the 'other one was 'Willhires| 'quite 'cheap (although)

429 C: 'where 'are 'they|

430 D: erm (0.7) out (.) 'Chesterton 'way| I 'think|
(0.8)

431 C: er::

432 D: (and er)

433 C: 'oh 'yes| I 'think I've 'been 'there| mm|

434 D: 'anyway| th there are 'more in the 'Yellow 'Pages| erm 'just don't

435 'bother with 'things like 'Hertz and 'Avis|

Provided that we have some means of representing the participants' shared knowledge that 'Cambridge Car Hire', 'Willhire's', 'Hertz', and 'Avis', are all names of car hire firms, and that 'these firms' refers to a collection of these, and provided also that we do not restrict ourselves to looking only at the utterances in 433 and 434, it is not hard to see that there is a referential or topical unity to the whole extract.

This demonstrates that anyway does not always occur at topic boundaries, if these are understood to be substantial shifts in reference. Nevertheless, in many of the short extracts given we can see that anyway indicates some kind of boundary, even if it is not one of topic. It will be the task of the rest of this paper to discover what that boundary is.

The only treatment of anyway in the linguistics literature that deals at any length at all with the use of the expression is in a paper by Brockway (1981, but first circulated in a somewhat different form in 1979; we will need to refer to both these treatments). These papers are concerned with the use not only of anyway, but also of after all, well, actually, still, and now, and unfortunately (for our purposes) Brockway devotes most of her attention to after all. However, she begins by making certain claims that apply to all these expressions. First, she observes, surely correctly, that when used as prefaces to sentences they do not affect the truth conditions of those sentences. Second, and more controversially, she claims that their function is to constrain the TYPE OF RELEVANCE that may obtain between the sentence and the speaker/hearer's beliefs.

RELEVANCE must be understood here in the sense of Wilson and Sperber's work (e.g. 1978), where it forms the lynch-pin of their pragmatic theory. In this theory, CONTEXT is defined as the set of propositions expressed by the immediately preceding sentence and any propositions which have been used in its interpretation, or which form part of its interpretation. It is with respect to this set of propositions that an utterance may be relevant, and one task of a pragmatic theory, according to Wilson and Sperber, is to 'describe how a given utterance helps to determine the set of utterances against which its relevance is to be assessed. (1978:14). Brockway argues that the expressions she is concerned with serve to constrain the relevance of the utterances they precede.

Her examples all consist of two sentences (which we will call A and B), the second prefaced by one or other of the expressions in question. Thus we have

- A: I'm going to vote for Fred Dagg in the next election.
B: Anyway, he'll do the most for the farmers.

Brockway claims that when these two sentences are uttered in sequence, whether by the same or different speakers, the effect is to suggest

'that the speaker believes that there could be some objection to voting for Fred Dagg in the next election, but that this is unimportant or irrelevant in view of the fact that he will do the most for the farmers' (1979:2)

On the basis of this intuition, Brockway goes on to suggest that the use of anyway 'seems to indicate that its associated utterances are not relevant against K-subsets which include the propositions expressed in the previous utterance' (1979:21). With the specific sense of relevance invoked here, Brockway then claims that anyway is used to block any inferences that might be drawn using the two sentences A and B as premises (it is not clear how the role of sentences that do not simply express propositions is to be assessed in this inferential process. Indeed, a view of utterance as ACTION tends to undermine this approach quite fundamentally). More loosely, we might say that anyway, used as a preface to the second of a pair of sentences A and B in conversation, is a signal that A is not relevant to the interpretation of B.

Brockway examines all the expressions with which she is concerned within the same format, viz,

[sentence A] - <[particle] [sentence B]>

However, the expressions differ in their distribution; some can be attached AFTER sentence B, while others cannot, and for those

that can, the difference in position may affect their discourse function. Also, some of them - anyway, well, and still - can occur as complete conversational turns. Examining these possibilities in the case of anyway, it turns out that as far as Brockway's analysis is concerned, her intuitions seem more appropriate to sequences in which it occurs in utterance-final position.

We begin, then, by simply noting the positions with respect to other utterances in which anyway may occur. As a preliminary, we observe that in our corpus it is always intonationally nuclear and has falling pitch (except for the two occurrences in questions, which have rising pitch). We can regard anyway as having varying strengths of attachment to its neighbouring utterances, and four types of attachment may be distinguished:

1. It may form a separate tone-group at the beginning of a longer utterance:
 \anyway | I'm \coming |
2. In some instances anyway, remaining nuclear, is so intonationally 'isolated' from the preceding and following talk by pauses, hesitation sounds, etc. that it appears reasonable to class it as an entirely independent unit, not as appended to or as immediately prefacing some other stretch of talk.
3. It may be post-posed, forming a separate tone-group:
 I'm \coming | \anyway |
4. It may be the nucleus of a longer tone-group. In this role it must come at the end of an utterance:
 I'm 'coming \anyway |

We shall call these anyway <1>, anyway <2>, etc. We begin by examining anyway <1>, since it is this type that Brockway is concerned with. We observe first that there is no useful sense in which we can account fully for this sense of the word with reference only to two sentences, i.e. Brockway's sentences A and B. We have already mentioned that a problem arises when an utterance as it stands has no propositional content, though it may be possible to expand it with reference to the linguistic context, as in the following example:

- (6) 1B90/78
75 R: ...yes | I 'think it's 'probably 'is quite ,interesting | yes |
76 C: | mm |
77 R: yup |
78 C: [ʔ] \anyway | um | oh well I'll 'see you to_morrow | 'praps we
79 could 'fix up something 'later in the 'week .then |

If we identify 77 as sentence A, we could perhaps consider it as expressing for a second time the proposition <I think it's probably quite interesting>, and then interpret anyway as signalling that it is not to be taken as relevant to the interpretation of the remainder of 78-79. However, this would be to disregard its interactional function. The chief function of 78-79 is to initiate the closing of the conversation; this possibility is prepared for by R's handing back the floor to C in 77. The utterance specifically does not make any contribution to the content of the conversation; it is, we might say, a conversation-management device, and to regard it as primarily functioning to express its propositional content is misleading. There is, then, a 'break' marked by anyway, but it is not simply one of topic, although there is indeed no referential link between 75-7 and 78-9.

If we look at a few more examples of anyway<1>, it becomes clear that it is often used in this way to initiate closing sequences:

(7) 26A/59

J: I mean there was only Susan who was at the age sort of hhh
 A: [who'd've been left in the house et (.) on er own
 yes

(0.3)

A: mm

(0.4)

A: yes

J: anyway hh I'll see you in a few minutes then

A: [(I'll see) see you in a few
 minutes

(8) 26A/62

V: they might be going across to Chester for the day on (.) on
 Monday an (.) e said would you like to come with us Mum

J: well that's nice (Vera)

V: [yes anyway I'll tell you all the news when
 uh when you come by

(9) 26A/81

A: I look forward to seeing that then

J: [hehhh huhh hehh

J: anyway I'll see you on Sunday Ann

An account of these examples requires reference to an analytic concept that is also a familiar everyday notion. All the extracts come from telephone calls, which are a large subset of a type of interaction that we may call 'warranted interactions' (more accurately, but more clumsily, 'interactions that require warranting'). Where one individual encroaches on the privacy or territory of another without prior permission - as is the case with all telephone calls with the exception of 'return

calls' - a warrant for the interaction must be provided; whether or not this is the initiator's 'real' or 'most important' reason is not significant. Conversation analysts, working substantially with telephone material, have observed this phenomenon extensively and label it the 'reason-for-calling' (RFC) (Sacks Lectures, May 8 1968, and Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). Since the identical phenomenon is observable in other settings - knocking and entering someone's office, for example - the term can be used for the whole class. That this is not merely an analyst's construct but a participant's resource is shown in several ways, which here we will merely list without exemplification, for reasons of space:

1. Speakers frequently make overt reference to RFC's
2. If no RFC is offered, a recipient may suggest or request one
3. Calls normally have one and only one RFC, unless the caller specifies otherwise.

If we now return to extracts (6), (7), (8), and (9) (and here, reference to the complete conversation-so-far would be desirable, but extremely space-consuming), we can see that the material prefaced by anyway<1> is a return to the RFC. The conversation to which (6) initiates the closing had opened as follows:

(10) 1B90/78

- 1 C: ✓Steve | it's ✓Marion |
2 R: oh | hel, lo |
3 C: um I | wondered if there's | any | chance of | seeing you to |morrow
4 | sometime | ✓morning | or be | fore the | seminar |
5 (1.0)
6 R: ✓ah | ✓um I ✓doubt it |

The issue of a meeting is left unresolved at this stage in the conversation, and other material is introduced, but in (6) the current topic is closed and C reverts to the RFC.

(7) opened as follows: (note that this passage is preceded by a sequence in which the caller, J, speaks to A's son and asks to speak to A, so that (14) does not represent the beginning of the connection; it opens with greetings, not identifications)

(11) 26A/55

- 1 A: | hel, lo | there |
2 J: | hel, lo | there | , Ann | I've | only | just | got | in | and I | thought well
3 | per | haps it was a bit | late | to | come | round for | coffee |
4 A: ^ no

Unlike in many instances (for example, (6)/(10)), the RFC is resolved in the opening section, but the closing section is, nevertheless, initiated with anyway<1> plus a reiteration of the arrangement made at the start of the call. Indeed,

arrangements to meet are a very frequent feature of the initiation of closings (Jefferson, 1985:192) and are thus often preceded by anyway, but as we have seen, the reason for this co-occurrence is an indirect one, that is, it is not the topic, as such, of 'arrangements' that is commonly associated with anyway, but rather that the conversational activity of closing is frequently accounted with anyway plus a reversion to the activity that has been set up by the participants as the RFC. Anything at all may be 'talked about' in the RFC and the closing section; there are no referents or types of referent that are particularly appropriate as candidates for mention. It is what is done by way of conversational activities that is important for the structure of the conversation.

The RFC has a special status in conversations of this kind, in that it may be returned to in the closing section even if the issue had apparently been resolved earlier. It is also special in that it is concerned with managing the interaction, since with the exception of activities associated by their nature with openings and closings (such as greetings and 'goodbye' sequences) any topic or activity can occur in an RFC; nevertheless, arrangements for further meetings are frequent. However, anyway<1> is not associated only with these very common, but nonetheless, special cases. Unfinished, unresolved activities elsewhere in conversations may be resumed with anyway as a preface. The intervening activity may or may not be closely related to the activity into which it is embedded, but by the use of anyway a return to the main thread of the conversation is announced and the intervening matter set aside as in some way subordinate or inessential (here we see an echo of Brockway's intuition that sentence A is not to be taken as relevant to the interpretation of sentence B). So, for example,

(12) 26A/27

- 1 J: and em 'Kerry was um | in the ^chess match | you know |
2 I: [okhh'oh |
3 J: that's why ^he was out | on Thursday night |
4 I: ee,yhes |
5 J: an (.) ah it's 'some ^chess m I 'think (it's 'with) the eh
6 'Sunday ^Times or something |
7 (.)
8 I: ee,yes |
9 J: 'school chess match | hh ^anyway h eh | his 'game (they)
10 'couldn't ^finish it | in the time |

At line 1 J is in the course of telling I a story which she interrupts, in line 5, to enlarge upon the reference of the expression 'the chess match' in line 1. The brief pause (7) before I's response, and the nature of that response - that is, it is not one that suggests I has been enlightened by J's expansion - leads J to abandon the activity of getting I to

show that she can identify precisely the referent of 'the chess match' and to revert to the narrative itself. Unlike classic 'insertion sequences' (Schegloff 1972) or 'side-sequences' (Jefferson 1972), satisfactory progress of the main activity - in this case, the narrative - does not depend on the successful completion of the inserted subordinate activity. As a result of this, sequences in which the participants collaborate in attempting to resolve some uncertainty or problem, fail to do so, and then revert to the 'framing' activity, prefacing the return with anyway, are common. The following extract shows this pattern clearly:

(13) 26A/9

1 V: she's 'selling 'some of her fur | she's 'sending (.) 'some of her
2 'furniture to the 'sale , room |
3 (0.3)
4 J: yes |
5 V: eh: m (0.3) P T 'thought it was 'going on 'Wednesday | , actually P |
6 J: (.) oh |
7 V: P so P I 'don't v know |
8 J: anyway | v some .went to v day | v obviously | be .cause the the ^lorry was
9 .there | this ^morning |

It is this use of anyway that Sacks probably had in mind when he suggested (Lecture, April 18, 1972) that anyway is a topic marker indicating that the prefaced utterance is linked topically to the last topic but one, with intervening material on some other topic. He suggests that anyway can be seen as a 'right hand parenthesis' closing off an inserted topic. It is clear, however, from the several references to and discussion of topic in Sack's lectures, that he thought of it in terms similar to our 'activity'.

Anyway<1> is thus used to signal reversion to an interrupted activity, or to re-invoke the RFC in the closing section of a telephone conversation. A special case of this use can be found in narratives, in which activities such as clarification of reference or comments on the content of the narrative may interrupt the smooth flow of the story itself; on resuming the narrative, the speaker may signal that he is doing so with anyway, as in the following example:

(14) 28A000/330

317 B: P P and .so I said all right well P P I'll have v some of them
318 v boards .up (.) ([3:11f]) v eight foot by v four foot v sheets |
319 v I'd put .down |
320 (0.3)
321 A: 'uh |
322 (0.9)

323 B: we ↘go down to the ↘cellar n we ↘find that .uh ((clears throat))
 324 we could've taken ↘one or .two ↘joists out| with our e'leven by
 325 ↘fours|
 326 (2.2)
 327 A: mmhh::: |
 328 B: P'ten pound ↘each P|
 329 A: , mm_hmm::: |
 330 (1.1)
 331 B: ↘anyway | ↘when I ↘started ↘taking the ↘floor .up |

In line 328, B interjects a comment on the price of the joists, to which A responds, before B returns to the narrative in 331. some speakers may be sufficiently aware of this use of anyway to incorporate it into examples like the following caption to a Punch cartoon, showing two free-fall parachutists thousands of feet above the ground, one of whom is saying to the other:

(15)...anyway, ten years ago my wife ran off with the man from the council who came to unblock the drains and then I was sacked from my Accountancy job - fifteen years I'd worked there! Anyway, after a couple of months on the dole I got the job I'm doing now - it's another Accountancy job for a small firm so it doesn't pay too well but beggar's can't be choosers, can they? - Anyway, where was I? - Oh yes! - I was just getting on my feet when the house burnt down, so I decided it was time to...
 (Ken Pyne, Punch, July 2, 1980)

Not only does the speaker in this example use anyway to pick up the story after two interjections designed to elicit a response from his fellow parachutist, but by indicating an absence of such responses, the cartoonist successfully characterises a type of monologic conversation associated with the 'bar-room bore'.

We turn next to some examples of anyway<2>, which must be regarded as a conversational unit in its own right and not as attached to some other, proposition-expressing utterance. Examples include the following:

(16) 26B/159
 1 M: [...you 'feel as if you don't 'want to 'stay in the 'same ↘place
 2 J: [↘no | (place)
 3 M: [hhh that 'where you've ↘been| .with your ,parents 'hh|
 4 J: [yes ↘yes|
 5 (.)
 6 M: [mm | hh
 7 J: [but uh | ↘anyway |
 8 (0.3)
 9 ? : ((clunk))
 10 M: by the ↘way | ↘Jenny | 'did you 'get my 'anni'versary| , card |

(17) 7B265/
176 M: 'can't re'member 'why I | 'why I 'think of that 'shop | it's it's
177 (1.2) 'what's their .name | 'Angell | it's 'not 'his .name |
178 'is it | but it's a 'friend of .his | 'yes |
179 G: 'no | not his | not 'his .name |
180 M: 'anyway |
181 G: 'mm |
182 M: 'mm | so I'll 'see you 'Saturday 'morning

These examples we interpret as offers to close. Similar to those in position 1 already examined, in that they are strongly associated with closing sequences, the speaker's use of anyway in this position serves to offer the floor to the other speaker, indicating that the present speaker has nothing more he wants to do in the conversation and is willing to close the interaction. At this point, the recipient of anyway has the option of introducing new material, and this happens in (16).

In example (17) M's offer to close is accepted by G with mm; this acceptance is itself accepted by M, who then moves to the classic closing activity of reiterating the arrangements to meet that formed the RFC. Example (18) shows that anyway can in fact be used in both parts of this two-part exchange of [offer-to-close] + [receipt], within the same example:

(18) N: anywa::y,=
H: =.pk! a:nywa:y
N: so:::,
(Button & Casey 1985: 168; for notation see Atkinson & Heritage (1985: ix-xiii))

After so, N moves on to reiterate arrangements to meet.

We turn next to an examination of anyway <3>, that is, following another utterance, but one with its own intonational nucleus. We begin with another example which, like (16), contains a 'misplaced' activity:

(19) 26A/13

1 I: hel'lo|
2 (.)
3 J: \lo|, Ida | it's \ Jenny ,here|
4 I: [hel'lo| 'Jenny|
5 J: [ehh heh hehh
6 J: 'hel'lo .there| I 'rang you \earlier| but .you were ,out|
7 (.)
8 I: ^oh| I 'must've 'been at 'Des's \mum's|
9 J: \oh|
10 I: uhm (.) but 'mind \you| we've been .in a ^good .hour n a .half to
11 ^two|
12 J: oh well I 'went ^shopping| ,then .hhh
13 I: [ohh
14 J: [hehh heh he'ekh'ekh
15 I: [h a h a \yes|
16 J: \yes|
17 (.)
18 J: [mm
19 I: [how is \things| 'all 'right|
20 J: [yes| ,fine| ,yes| I'm .ringing .up
21 a .bout to^morrow| ,actually| nd I'm ^I'll do .coffee| to .morrow|
22 ,morning|
23 (.)
24 I: it chee 'not \Vera's|
25 J: (h) eh in 'stead of \Vera's |
26 I: [all ,right|
27 J: [yes| \yes|
28 I: [yes|
29 J: [cos uh there's 'no \badminton|
30 I: [is 'Vera's .
31 (.)
32 I: ^pardon|
33 J: [there's 'no \badminton| to ,morrow| .so uhm
34 I: [oh|
35 (.)
36 J: \yah|
37 (.)
38 J: [so I 'thought well uh
39 I: [ee ,yeah|
40 J: it'll 'be an oppor'tunity for 'me to \do it|
41 I: oh hhoh hhoh \yes|
42 J: \yes|
43 I: [u 'Vera's all 'right .is she|
44 J: 'yes she's \fine| eh I 'popped 'down 'last \night|
45 J: ()
46 I: [oh| ,that's .good| she's all \right|
47 J: [for a ,while| 'Matthew 'came ,with
48 .me| 'so uh
49 I: [ee ,yeah|
50 J: hh so 'that was \it| 'h 'how's \Des| ^ anyway |
51 (.)
52 I: 'yes he's eh ee ee 'went for is 'X rays on ,Friday |

After an [identification] + [greetings] sequence, J presents a puzzle to be solved; this cannot, however, be the RFC, since when a call is repeated because contact was not made on the first attempt, and the caller reports this fact, the RFC for the current call will be taken to be the same as it would have been for the original call. Although the puzzle is solved - including a secondary puzzle of when the first call could have been made - J fails to produce an RFC at the first opportunity in lines 16-17. I thus produces 19 as an attempt to elicit an RFC; this is a successful attempt since an explicit RFC is produced in lines 20-22. Limitations of space here preclude the presentation of data to support the view that failure to produce an RFC at the right time will lead to an attempt to elicit one by the recipient, but most collections of telephone data provide several examples. In (19), the first, pre-RFC activity has the effect of misplacing another activity regularly positioned immediately before the RFC: health enquiries by the caller. This is produced in line 50, which includes anyway<3>. Just as a previously initiated activity may be suspended, a subordinate activity introduced, and the 'matrix' activity reverted to with anyway as a prefix, so an activity that should have occurred earlier in the conversation but for one reason or another was not done there, will be treated as if it had been begun in its proper place and is being resumed later. A similar example illustrates the same feature:

(20) 26B/120

1 M: [hh hel'lo 'Jenny|
2 J: [hel\lo | 'are you ,busy|
3 M: ['hh hhh ~ehm | well I've 'just 'got
4 [a \wholesaler .here| at the ,moment|
5 J: [\oh |
6 M: =but there's 'no ,urgency| 'just 'bringing me ,stuff .in|ihhih 'hhh
7 J: \oh | it's 'just | \oh | how \are .you| ,anyway|

Here again, although as in (19) the activity effectively displacing the caller's enquiry is the kind of activity commonly produced at this point in the conversation (cf. Schegloff & Sacks 1973:250 for further discussion, and observation of the way in which such materials are often utilised in closing), the use of anyway<3> marks the enquiry as misplaced. In this example we can also see that the nuclear stress in the final utterance is on are, not on you; although either position for stress is quite common for health enquiries at this stage in a conversation, we might also explain the placing of the nucleus with reference to the fact that M, the referent of you, has been the principal referent of the preceding utterance. In our Final Report to the SSRC on this project, we produced evidence to show that reference to the conversational activity may be necessary for the explanation of the 'reduction' of NPs (or the absence of such reduction) either by pronominalisation,

or stress reduction, or both. Suffice it to say here that we may need to refer to more than just the occurrence or non-occurrence of referring expressions in the previous utterance to explain the placement of nuclear stress.

Returning to our examination of extract (20), we find the following exchange, no less than twenty minutes into the conversation:

(21) 26B/162

1 M: [course 'this is the 'state I'm in | at the 'moment hh hih heh huh
2 J: 'yeah
3 M: [huh 'can't re'member 'things 'hh | but it 'came to me |
4 J: how 'is your 'back | 'anyway |

Here it seems that M's mention of 'the state I'm in' reminds J that she has not yet enquired about this particular aspect of her friend's health; however, by her use of anyway she marks the enquiry as not connected, as an activity, to the previous utterance.

Another fairly easily defined usage of anyway<3> occurs following a fall-rise nucleus in the prior utterance and prefaces an explicitly-made hedge on the assertion just expressed, as in the following extracts:

(22) 4B110/51

A: it's 'not 'four part 'anyway | that one | you 'mean |
B: 'don't 'think 'so | 'anyway |

(23) 4B1370/6

A: let me 'check | per'haps I've 'got the 'wrong 'numbers | ((checks)) um
'yes | 'that's what I 'thought | 'anyway |

Unlike our quoted examples of anyway<1> and anyway<2>, there is no need to go far beyond the sentence to which anyway<3> is appended in order to understand its function. (22) is a little different in that we also need the prior sentence in which A imputes a belief to B, and in (23) the intervention of other material between the fall-rise nucleus and the sentence containing anyway would make a rigorous definition difficult. Nevertheless, notions unusual to linguistics such as conversational activity and RFC are not needed for the explanation of this usage. In other words, at least some instances of anyway<3> do not have discourse/conversational functions but can be described using a more conventional pragmatic approach, though not necessarily a truth-conditional one. Returning to the familiar world of sentences and propositions, however, does not mean that it is easy to determine the function of these remaining cases of anyway<3>, nor of anyway<4>, which we have not yet discussed. Our only resource seems to be the usual methodology using paraphrase

and expansion, and if we fail to produce any coherent intuitions about the 'meaning' of anyway in these positions, no other strategies appear to be available.

However, we begin with some examples, firstly of anyway<3>:

(24) 8B15/309

A: so I ✓just ✓hope | that it's¹ all ✓right | ✓otherwise •I shall (.)
B: well ✓ring them | ✓ anyway |

(25) 5B463/23

F: I ✓managed to •stop them •going along ✓later to•day | ✓ anyway |

(26) 10B1066/30

M: it's a ¹bit ¹boring in a ✓way | or it ✓could be | but ... we'll ✓think
a•bout it | ✓ anyway |

(27) 10B515/20

P: even ✓then | ... you ✓couldn't have •seen •Peter •Miles •then |
✓ anyway |

(28) 13A180/786

A: it •seems to •use ¹rather a ¹lot of ¹petrol | and ¹rather a ¹lot of ✓oil |
... it ✓certainly (0.9) ✓works O.K | ✓ anyway |

These sentences can be paraphrased using either 'nevertheless' in place of anyway, or a clause or noun phrase beginning 'even if' or 'despite'. The effect is that some fact or consideration is 'set aside'; for example, in (24), B advises A to telephone despite A's belief that 'it's all right'; in (28), the fact that the car uses a lot of petrol and oil is not to be taken as indicating that it does not work to the user's satisfaction. These intuitions may appear rather similar to Brockway's; we are not suggesting, however, that the speaker of, say, (28), is making his first sentence irrelevant to the understanding of his second, but rather that one or more of the implications of the first sentence (e.g. that the car is not a very good one) are set aside and replaced by the second. Another way in which our data would not be amenable to a Brockway-type account, is that although in some cases the material set aside is expressed in sentence A (as in (28)), this is not always so. In (25), for example, the speaker, F, had arranged with the addressee, H, for a removal firm to collect a piano, not belonging to H, from H's house before ten o'clock on the day of the conversation (which took place in the evening). At ten o'clock, H, a nurse on night duty, would be going to bed, and it was therefore important that she was not disturbed. Thus, although from the quoted extract alone we might reasonably infer that what is being 'set aside' is the fact that M failed to stop 'them' going earlier in the day, this is not the case. Therefore, to know fully what anyway does in this instance, we need to know a

good deal about the conversational context. However, this does not mean that anyway<3> could not be given a semantic-pragmatic representation that would indicate its function in any context, even though it is not possible to specify an algorithm that would allow us to determine from its linguistic context alone what the other material is that is being 'set aside'. The same is in any case true for all anaphoric phenomena; for example, it may be possible to specify in some cases what the referent of a pronoun is, using only syntactic resources, but there are many occasions on which the referent is recoverable only from the total context of utterance (cf. Bolinger 1979, Li & Thompson 1979).

We turn finally to some examples of anyway<4>:

(29) 10B1066/13

it 'praps 'might be as 'well if I 'came along `anyway|

(30) 9A212/88

I shall 'come 'down there to'morrow at 'three `anyway|

(31) 9A181/120

I'll 'have to 'ring him 'up a 'gain to'morrow 'morning | or 'he'll 'probably 'ring me `anyway|

The function of anyway in these examples is similar to that of anyway<3> in (24)-(28), setting aside some consideration that may or may not be recoverable from the linguistic context (cf. Greenbaum 1969:69). What then is the difference between anyway<3> and anyway<4>? Here some invented - and admittedly unnatural - examples will serve to point up the contrast. Suppose we re-examine our original illustrative sentences:

(32) I'm `coming| `anyway|

(33) I'm 'coming `anyway|

and consider these as responses to imperatives, the most appropriate sequences are the following:

(34) A: `don't .come|
B: I'm `coming| `anyway| (ie anyway<3>)

(35) A: `come|
B: I'm 'coming `anyway| (ie anyway<4>)

In more general terms, anyway<3> is appropriate with an assertion to the effect that the speaker intends to do X where this is made against a contextual background including reasons why he should not do X; since the occurrence of an imperative

though relevant to conversation - as are all matters of language structure and meaning - can be described in more familiar terms.

This consideration of the meaning and function of anyway has led us to propose that it is not topic, strictly defined, that conditions the use of this expression, but the structuring of conversational activities: under certain conditions, anyway can be used to indicate that the activity is being changed and that therefore new sequential expectations will be set up.

Acknowledgement

I would especially like to thank Gail Jefferson for the use of her collection known as the Rahman tapes; extracts from this collection are identified here by numbers beginning 26. I have, however, used my own transcripts (though they owe much to Jefferson's originals) for the sake of consistency with the rest of the data presented here.

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REVIEW

Oreström Bengt (1983) Turn-taking in English Conversation
Sweden: Liber, pp.11+195, Kr.87.75.

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Turn-taking is a clearly perceptible feature of conversation but this fact in itself should not be seen to imply that the notion is a simple one. Indeed, the underlying mechanism of turn-taking shows a high degree of complexity. If conversation is to be optimally efficient, then a system to allocate turns must be incorporated into the interaction, thus avoiding simultaneous speaking and listening by the interactants and ensuring, for the most part, that only one person holds the turn at a given time.

In Turn-taking in English Conversation Oreström investigates the linguistic properties of speaker-hearer interaction, and thereby illustrates the complexity of this phenomenon. In particular, his aim is to address four aspects of turn-taking: the relationship between turn-yielding, the Transition Relevance Place (TRP) (a point in conversation when the turn is likely to be taken) and the linguistic features displayed; the length of the speaking turn; listener activity and finally simultaneous speech and interruption which Oreström collectively terms Unsmooth Speaker Shifts (USS's).

By way of introduction to this investigation, Oreström considers the nature of communication and then focusses on conversation and turn-taking. Before entering into a discussion of the inadequacies of the current state of knowledge on turn-taking, Oreström outlines the notion of a Turn. He defines it as 'a continuous period of time during which a speaker delivers a message which conveys new information and expands the topic. He does not, however, give any grounds for his choice of these criteria, and since investigators have found the turn difficult to define (Edelsky 1981:399) his definition deserves qualification. The major part of his discussion at this point is orientated towards defining and thereby distinguishing a Back Channel (BC) from a Turn which, although a significant distinction, has the effect of glossing over the Turn rather than explaining the notion.

In the course of this discussion, he directs attention to the interesting question of the difference between the Floor and the Turn, terms which other studies (Jaffe & Feldstein 1970:19) have taken as synonymous. Oreström does not, however, pursue this line of inquiry, but refers the reader to the work of Edelsky (1981).

The first two chapters provide the reader with general theoretical background on turn-taking. The rest of the book is concerned with considering the four aspects specified above, through the analysis of ten face-to-face dyadic conversations.

One of the most notable proposals of this study is the division of the 'signals of possible turn-yielding' into primary and secondary cues. Primary cues are identified as complete syntactic, semantic and tone units, which together are defined as a Grammatical Boundary (GB). Secondary cues are specified as loudness and pauses. Oreström proposes that it is the combination of these two cue types which facilitates turn-taking. A TRP is signalled when a GB is combined with at least one secondary cue. However, the presence of all the cue-types would heighten the probability of the turn being taken. This contrasts with Duncan (1972:283) who gives equal weighting to all the cues and Sacks et al (1974:703) who are concerned purely with cues of syntactic and semantic completion.

USS's are another area of interest, since not every study that has considered interruption has, in fact, attempted to provide a definition of this phenomenon. Rim (1979) for example, avoids the issue completely. Oreström however discusses the USS's in detail, and like Ferguson (1976) investigates the linguistic concomitants of such behaviour. However, he attempts to extend Ferguson's work by systematically taking into account such aspects as 'point of entrance', 'type of contribution', and 'speech disruption'. Thus, Oreström arrives at a more comprehensive account of USS's than has previously been given.

His findings were based on a data sample selected from the London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English (LLC). The use of this corpus is possibly the major weakness of the study. One of the disadvantages of using the LLC is that the choice of data is restricted. Initially, Oreström's investigation was to have been based totally on surreptitiously recorded data. Since in the LLC this is limited to four conversations, Oreström found he needed to select six non-surreptitiously recorded conversations so that he could adequately assess the effects of age and sex on aspects of turn-taking. (Thus, a third non-linguistic variable - manner of recording - was included in the investigation).

Apart from this, a more significant disadvantage is that the corpus does not provide detailed background information with regard to the interactants. Oreström admits that 'this lack

of information makes statements about the relative status and personal relations between speakers problematic'. He therefore refrains from considering these features, but in doing so, he is limiting the validity of his results. In the case of USS's, for example, he found no influence with respect to any variable. This may be legitimate, but it may also result from the effect of non-accountable variables (to a higher degree than is the norm for any investigation).

In view of this, this study would have been enriched if Oreström had collected his own data-base which would have been more applicable to the purpose of his investigation and used this as a secondary source to compare with his findings from the LLC. An added benefit of using one's own data is that the process of transcription should make the investigator more perceptive to the nature of the data (Owen 1982:442).

There are, however, positive points in using the corpus. One advantage is that the conversations are already transcribed in detail. Thus, Oreström is not faced with such problems as failing to hear simultaneous speech when it did occur, or not detecting the actual place of onset of simultaneous speech. In addition, Oreström has access to the original audio-tapes which are unavailable to the majority of investigators who choose to use the corpus (Owen 1982:337). Thus, he has the ability to question the transcribers' judgements and thereby override what Owen (1982:441) considers to be 'a fundamental problem for any investigator using the LLC'.

Although I have reservations regarding certain aspects of Oreström's investigation, I consider Turn-taking in English Conversation to be a useful study which, hopefully, will stimulate further investigation in a field in which answers are far from conclusive. For instance, according to Oreström, the establishment of primary and secondary cues has implications for anyone interested in comparing different discourse types (for example, a conversation with a debate) and also in the consideration of USS's. Apart from this aspect, the text itself is informative and of interest to anyone who requires an appreciation of the nature of conversation, or more specifically, requires an understanding of the systematics of the turn-taking process.

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NEWS

Report on the work of the
National Congress on Languages in Education

The National Congress on Languages in Education is a standing body established in 1976 by a number of professional organisations to act as a forum for continuous discussions on matters affecting languages and languages in education. NCLE brings together the views of the major language associations and organisations in the U.K., at all levels of education, with the object of formulating recommendations for policy and action by central government, local authorities, the constituent organisations of NCLE and other appropriate bodies. NCLE also initiates and conducts research on issues affecting the nature and quality of language teaching and learning.

With the start of the 1985-1986 academic year, the fifth cycle of NCLE's operations was at its half-way stage. The working parties are currently engaged in investigations and producing reports and other documentation.

The Language Awareness Continuation Project

Following completion of the work of the first Language Awareness Working Party during the previous cycle, its papers and Recommendations were considered at the NCLE Assembly at York in July 1984. The documents have appeared as a book entitled Language Awareness, edited by B.G. Donmall and published by CILT. This can be purchased from CILT, Regent's College, Inner Circle, Regent's Park, London NW1, at a cost of £6.99 plus 75p for postage and packing.

This book contains the Working Party's definition of Language Awareness, explanation of its nature and intentions and rationale for inclusion in the curriculum. There are descriptions of case study activities in seven schools, a list of all schools known to be operating in the field, and the bibliography is set out in categories and annotated to assist selection for use. In addition, there are a number of supporting papers. The Language Awareness Continuation Project (LACP) is endeavouring to ensure that this (and other CILT publications) reaches as wide a market as possible. The LACP was set up to carry out further work in this interesting new field. In particular, it has as its remit the production of:

- (a) an evaluation programme for use by schools in considering the effect of their Language Awareness courses, and
- (b) a module for teacher training, for use on either in-service or pre-service courses.

Clearly, in order for teachers to be able to sensitize their pupils to language in teaching Language Awareness courses, they must have the necessary sensitivity themselves as well as the skills of developing it in their pupils.

In addition to the above, the LACP maintains its contacts nationally and disseminates news concerning Language Awareness from and to a wide range of sources by means of its Newsletter, which appears regularly. The editor would be pleased to have items of news for inclusion, no matter how new or tentative developments may be. Anyone wishing to receive copies of the Newsletter and/or to contribute to it, should contact the editor, Ms. A. Piper, School of Language Studies, Ealing College of Higher Education, St. Mary's Road, Ealing, London, W5 5RF.

The LACP is currently seeking to relate its activities to those language areas which have been rather less involved than others hitherto, viz EFL, ESL and EMT. Useful talks have been held with Mr. Peter Strevens, Director of the Bell Educational Trust and with HMI's Staff Inspector for English.

The LACP is extremely grateful to the Bell Educational Trust and the Hilden Charitable Fund for making further funds available for the continuation of its work.

Language in Teacher Education Working Party

This new Working Party has three principal aims:

1. to establish current pre-service and in-service provision for:
 - (a) training teachers of language in all its forms (mother tongue English, community languages, classical, second and foreign languages);
 - (b) educating all teachers about the role of language in education and the implications of this for their work;
2. to identify and describe a number of cases of work in this area to illuminate organisational, curriculum development and methodological issues;
3. to provide a detailed commentary on the material obtained in relation to an overall philosophy of the role of language in education and its implications for teacher education policy and practice.

The Working Party intends to draw on existing surveys, but it is also carrying out its own survey and is to commission a number of case studies.

The ten members of the Working Party, under the Chairmanship of Professor Chris Brumfit, has met on three occasions and has collected diverse information on work in, for example, language for science teaching, language awareness in schools and teacher education, 'conversion' courses in English as a second language. The main business of the Working Party has otherwise been the production of a questionnaire, which was piloted in a number of Scottish institutions and has been distributed to all higher education institutions of teacher education, a representative number of further education institutions, local education authorities and private sector bodies.

The questionnaire seeks information on the general policy of the institution with respect to language in education, on the language element in particular courses, on the preparation of specialist language teachers, and on policies and trends in course developments. It is hoped that returns will arrive in time to enable analysis to be carried out by the end of 1986.

Simultaneously, a number of case studies will be commissioned in a representative number of areas, for example, in initial teacher education in higher education and in in-service work in local education authorities.

The Working Party intends that constituent members of NCLE shall receive a draft report before the Assembly, from which recommendations and a final report will later emerge.

The Standing Committee, meanwhile, has been active in drafting a number of responses to national consultative documents and other reports, of which there have been several this year, which are pertinent to language teaching interests. The views and concerns of NCLE have been expressed on the following publications:

- DES : Organisation and Content of the 5-16 Curriculum (1984). Scottish Consultation Document on French at Foundation, General and Credit Levels, (1984)
- DES/HMI : Mother Tongue Teaching in 4 LEAs (1984)
- DES : English 5-16: Curriculum Matters 1, (1984)
- DES/HMI : Boys and Modern Languages, (April 1985)

The next biennial Assembly is to be held at Sheffield University from July 10-12, 1986. It is here that the reports of the two Working Parties will be presented for discussion by delegates from the 37 constituent organisations and further recommendations for policy will be drafted.

NCLE is an independent body. The Centre for Information on Language Teaching and Research provides the services of a secretariat for NCLE. Enquiries relating to NCLE should be addressed to Alan Moys (Secretary to the Standing Committee of NCLE), Regent's College, Inner Circle, Regent's Park, London, NW1 4NS, Telephone 01-486 8221.

BACK ISSUES OF NOTTINGHAM LINGUISTIC CIRCULAR

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NLC 1.1. November 1971. Includes Butler on language for special purposes, and Nash on the dilemma of linguistics.

NLC 2.1. November 1972. Includes Albrow on the English writing system, and MacCarthy on phonetics for modern languages students.

NLC 3.1. November 1973. Includes two papers on linguistics and speech therapy.

NLC 4.1. January 1975. Includes papers by Hartmann, Grayshon, Stubbs and Butler on sociolinguistics.

NLC 5.1. March 1976. Includes Burton on language work in primary classrooms.

NLC 5.2. October 1976. Includes a four-articles debate between Radford and Pullum on the verb-auxiliary distinction in English.

NLC 6.1. May 1977. Special issue on Stylistics.

NLC 6.2. October 1977. Special issue on Child Language.

NLC 7.1. August 1978. Special issue on Phonetics and Phonology.

NLC 7.2. December 1978. Includes Crompton on intonation; Burton on discourse; Chilton on register.

NLC 8.1. June 1979. Includes: Berry on discourse; Carter on discourse and poetry; Corbett on adjective movement; Willis on speech pathology.

NLC 8.2. December 1979. Includes J. Coates on computational linguistics; Connolly on language change; Foster on child language.

NLC 9.1. June 1980. Includes: Cheshire on non-standard teaching English; Pountain on teaching Spanish; Walker on Frisia.

NLC 9.2. December 1980. Special issue on Syntax and Semantics. Wales on the pronoun 'one'; Killingley on Cantonese; Stubbs & Berry on English verbal groups; Durkin on English prepositions.

NLC 10.1. June 1981. Special issue on Text and Discourse.
Includes: Powell on speech act theory; Carston on irony and parody; Berry on exchange structure; Nash on narrative.

NLC 10.2. December 1981. Special issue on Varieties of English.
Hudson on wanna and the lexicon; Kirk on Scottish non-standard English; Lander on the English of Caribbean immigrants.

NLC 11.1. Juen 1982. Ritchie on computational linguistics;
Killingley on Cantonese classifiers; Davies on verbal interaction.

NLC 11.2. December 1982. Special issue on Lexis and Lexicography
including: Cruse on lexical ambiguity; Meara on word associations;
and other articles on core vocabulary, a historical thesaurus and polysemy.

NLC 12.1. June 1983. Champ on Cockney phonology; Cunningham
on Spanish intonation; Nystrand on written communication; Pimm
on linguistic and mathematical transformations.

NLC 12.2. December 1983. Special issue on Applied Linguistics
including: Brumfit on Krashen; de Houwer on Dutch-English
bilingualism; Lyne on word frequencies; Schwerdtfeger on
foreigner talk.

NLC 13.0. December 1984. Special issue on Systemic Linguistics

