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Silence Kills! Victim-blaming Social Norms and Violence Against Women*

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Abstract

Despite its huge social, psychological and economic costs, gender-based, intimate partner violence (IPV) is a phenomenon that persists in many countries. IPV is often not actively contested by society the persistence of victim-blaming norms might increase its social acceptability and thus hinter policy and behavior change. Are persisting victim-blaming attitudes and lack of action/policy support because of differences in own values or social norms? This paper examines the role of patriarchy values and social norms on gender attitudes towards and action/policy support regarding intimate partner violence. We conducted an online survey experiment in which a sample of 4,000 respondents in Turkey –a country with the highest IPV prevalence among OECD members– was randomly assigned to receive hypothetical IPV scenario treatment with or without invocation of social norms, or control. Simply making the existence of a social norm salient (by eliciting respondents' incentivized beliefs on what the majority/others think) increased support for policies to combat IPV by 3 to 4 percentage points compared to the control group. Our results suggest that while patriarchal attitudes are rather immovable and better at predicting own attitudes towards

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gender-based IPV, social norms do a much better job at changing policy preferences and (incentivized) behavior. Thus, policy change is possible even if individual patriarchy values are relatively stable. These findings highlight the need to consider the role of social norms when designing policies to tackle IPV. By exploiting our dynamic information-updating design, we also find strong convergence of individuals' attitudes (on gender-based violence) to the elicited social norms.

1 Introduction

Gender-based violence, specifically intimate partner violence, has been estimated to affect 30% of women at least once during their lifetimes (WHO 2021; OECD 2019; Devries et al. 2013). Intimate partner violence is often known or witnessed by family, friends or simply bystanders (Gracia 2004). Why do members of society – who are aware of such violence occurring (and do not necessarily hold violence-permissive values)– often fail to report and act upon intimate partner violence against women or support policies aiming at tackling the problem? In order words, why is violence against women not actively contested by bystanders who are, generically, not particularly prone to violence? While there is an ongoing literature on the predictors of violence against women and female killings (Christia et al. 2021; Asik and Nas Ozen 2021; Kavakli 2020; Cooper et al. 2020; Dildar 2020; Bhalotra et al. 2019; Tumen and Ulucan 2019; Erten and Keskin 2018; Pereira et al. 2017), less is known on the social aspect of violence against women: drivers of social norms that lead to a collective failure in acting and avoiding such crimes. Moreover, the flourishing literature on social norms and IPV remains heavily on the single angle of the research puzzle: role of commitment of men to traditional gender norms on the IPV (Yilmaz 2017); the relationship between female economic empowerment and IPV (Dildar 2020) or female victims' adherence to informal help strategies instead of formal means (Ergöçmen et al. 2013). In our work, we moved beyond this single faceted approach, instead we employ a multifaceted and dynamic approach to the IVP. For this, we use dynamics norms in line with (Morton 1999) who had a contribution on dynamic norms by employing laboratory experiments to test various formal models of voting rules on electoral outcomes (e.g. simultaneous and sequential voting on information asymmetry among voters and in return their impact on voter's positions (Morton and Williams 1999); the conditions under which groups versus individual decision-making could lead to better outcomes (Morton 1999)). While Morton's insightful work had been employed information on voting behavior or voting turnout; our current work applies

her theoretical output to understand the dynamic mechanism between intimate partner violence and bystanders while eliciting norms. As a result, we incorporate a new angle into the studies of both experimental methods and IPV by incorporating dynamic norms.

To be more specific, we investigate the role of social norms and misperceptions behind the lack of informal prevention mechanisms for gender-based violence in societies. Based on the evidence from observational studies, social norms seem to matter when it comes to community-level perpetration of intimate partner violence (Heise and Kotsadam 2015; Cools and Kotsadam 2017; Clark et al. 2018). Qualitative research highlights the persistence of victim-blaming norms as family members consider male violence on women acceptable when women do not comply with traditional gender roles (Agoff et al. 2007). Relatedly, we expect that bystanders do not report physical or sexual violence at early stages –thus letting it escalate– because they themselves justify somehow that the violence was fair. We further expect that failure to act decisively emerges not because the majority shares this norm, but because there is a vocal minority with strong beliefs about why this violence can be justified and the proportion of people holding this belief are overestimated by the majority. The alternative hypothesis, of course, is that people who choose inaction to gender violence –be they 'bystanders' or even victims themselves– actually do hold such patriarchal values.

We conduct a survey experiment via Benderimki (an online survey platform) to test these hypotheses on a representative sample of 4,000 respondents in Turkey, a country with the highest female homicide rates among OECD members (OECD 2019). We randomly assign respondents to three experimental groups: treatment group with no norms, treatment group with norms and the control group. While the control group is busy reading about an irrelevant subject, the first treatment group reads a hypothetical scenario where IPV occurred and is asked their own value statements. The second group reads the same scenario and is asked their own value statements and how they think other respondents would react in random order. Finally, the second group gets a dynamic update about the social norms based on other respondents' answers and responds to the same questions again. All groups

answer quasi-behavioral questions, questions about policy measures to combat IPV and their patriarchal attitudes.

Our paper aspires to provide answers to key questions regarding attitudes and policy preferences towards IPV –and violence against women more broadly. In particular, we are interested in understanding why do victim-blaming behavior –and failure to act against IPV– persist? Is it because there are fundamental differences in peoples' attitudes and values or due to erroneous perceptions about prevailing social norms? If the former, what role do patriarchal values play in sustaining such attitudes, and how are those values formed and maintained? If the latter, can misperceptions on the prevalence of such beliefs and norms explain tolerance to violent behavior against women and a lack of desire to act or introduce policies against VAW? And, finally, how does the relationship between norms and values maps into policy preferences; can we move policy by changing perceptions about norms, and additionally, how can the latter change (e.g. provision of information)? Or, are such norms immune to information provision and updating?

We find that norms are very poor predictors of peoples' own attitudes towards IPV. Unlike norms, patriarchal values can explain very well such attitudes. Yet norms not only have a very strong predicting power regarding peoples' policy preferences, but, at the same time they are also relatively much stronger predictors of policy preference changes compared to values. Moreover, we also find that information updates about prevailing norms can further shift policy preferences in a positive direction. In sum, our results point to the importance of social norms and information about them in understanding and explaining policy preference changes regarding IPV and VAW.

1.1 Theory and Hypotheses

The literature on social norms has flourished over the last decades, mainly engaging with the long-term tenacity of cultural traits and norms (Fernández 2007; Alesina et al. 2013; Voigtländer and Voth 2015; Benabou and Tirole 2011; Acemoglu and Jackson 2017). The

infamous work of Bursztyn et al. (2020) conducted research regarding the intervention on the beliefs of Saudi married men on women's working outside the home and found out that following change in their beliefs, these men have been supporting their wives for applying jobs outside the home. Their work studies how the existing and persisting social norms could be changed with the provision of information. In line with this growing literature on intervention via provision of information, our work is also demonstrating how social norms can affect behavior and policy preferences. Participants in Treatment 2 are asked the social norms and then are dynamically informed what the prevailing social norms is. In this way, we contributed to the existing literature by adding the dynamic provision of information.

Our work also contributes to the growing literature on social image concerns in political science and economics. In the work of Bursztyn et al. (2020), the issue is how men would be judged by others regarding their decisions on their wives working outside the home. Thus, the social image literature is focusing on the impact of societal norms on individuals' important decisions, in our work we also add the component of decision to charitable donations (in our case women's shelters in Turkey) similar to work done by DellaVigna et al. (2012). In other works, the authors look at how social image has been affecting individuals' decisions such as voting (Dellavigna et al. 2017; Perez-Truglia and Cruces 2017) and schooling choices (Bursztyn and Jensen 2015).

On social norms and violence against women, qualitative evidence show a link between social norms and community-level perpetration of intimate partner violence (Heise and Kotsadam 2015; Cools and Kotsadam 2017; Clark et al. 2018). Uthman et al. (2011) add that community tolerance is key. (Agoff et al. 2007) find that family members accept male violence on women who do not fit into traditional gender roles; pointing to the idea of victim-blaming norms we explore in this paper. We contribute to this literature by providing a causal identification of social norms and own values on actions and policy preferences towards VAW and IPV.

We use the theories on social norms to see if individuals' violence reaction behavior can be

changed. Individuals' perception of norms can be a guide to their own behavior, even when their perceptions are inaccurate. When people decide how much to react to a case of conflict or violence, they are likely to consider the norms of others. Tankard and Levy Paluck (2016) as well as others thus suggest that information about social groups can shape perception of norms, as it is easier to affect perceptions of norms –rather than attitudes– to change behavior.

In particular, we formulate the following three hypotheses:

(H.1) Norms (beliefs about others' values) better predict own attitudes/values about gender-based violence (based on a between T1 and T2 subject comparison).

(H.2) Respondents who harbor patriarchal values are: i) more likely to reveal more tolerant attitudes and inclinations towards IPV and, ii) less likely to act against and/or support policies to tackle IPV.

The alternative to H2 is, of course, that norms rather than own-values/attitudes better explain policy outcomes. We formulate this statement explicitly below as a new hypothesis:

(H.2B) Respondents' policy preferences (and elicited behavior) are influenced more by what is perceived to be a social norm than own attitudes/values (elicited norms > own attitudes/values in explaining outcomes).

(H.3) Respondents are more likely to support policies to combat VAW/IPV after receiving information about others' values/attitudes.

2 Data and Sampling

We recruited subjects via an online platform of pre-registered users Benderimki, a survey company with more than 250,000 members across all regions of Turkey.[1] Our incentivized survey paid 4 TL per participation.[2] As part of our incentivized norms and values elicitation

[1] Our ethics statement can be found in section B.

[2] For a survey that on average (across treatments) took respondents about 10-11 minutes to complete, our base rate is almost double the rate of the minimum hourly wage of 15.2 TL.

exercises our subjects were also eligible to win an additional bonus payment of up to 5 TL each. Our fieldwork took place between 28 January and 18 February 2022. Respondents had the option to withdraw from the survey at any point in time without any penalties or consequences. The realized (and targeted) sample is 4,000 individuals (aged 18 and above) across all 7 Turkish regions (Bölge). The sample is representative in terms of gender, age, educational attainment level and region.[3] We included two attention (manipulation) checks, one pre- and one post treatment. After excluding respondents who failed any of these attention checks, as well as those who failed to provide complete answers to all the questions, our effective sample contains 3,554 respondents.

3 Experimental Design and Methods

Pre-treatment, we ask respondents only basic demographic questions (e.g. age, sex). After the demographics, to identify the effects of social norms on victim-blaming attitudes, reporting behavior and support for policies to combat IPV, we randomly assign respondents to one of these three conditions: (i) placebo, (ii) treatment with only attitudes (no norms) elicitation (T1), and (iii) treatment with norms (beliefs) elicitation (T2). Those in the two treatment groups receive one scenario where violence against women takes place. We elicit respondents' values/attitudes and their beliefs about the social norm (values/attitudes of other members of the society) in an incentivized manner, following the method proposed by Krupka and Weber (2013) (for an application of the method see also Hargreaves Heap et al. 2020). The value statements can be found in Appendix section C.2. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the statements.

We provide a short summary of each condition below:[4]

[3] Our sample is also balanced across the three experimental conditions. We provide the balance test in Table 6 in the Appendix.

[4] A more detailed sequence of the survey experiment can be found in Appendix section A.



1. **Placebo:** Subjects assigned to control read about an irrelevant subject before they take quasi-behavioral and policy questions.

2. **T1:** Subjects assigned to T1 (No Norms) read a scenario (see in section C.1) where IPV takes place and be asked their preferences about six value statements. They then move onto quasi-behavioral and policy questions.

3. **T2:** Subjects assigned to T2 (Norms) also the scenario and are asked (i) their preferences about six value statements and (ii) how others in the sample would react to these statements in randomized order. They are informed that if they predict the majority of the statements correctly, they get a bonus payment of 5 Lira. After, they are informed about the true proportion –which is updated dynamically– of other survey participants who have expressed agreement with the above statements. After, they are once again shown the same scenario and asked to answer the same value statements and quasi-behavioral and policy questions.

3.1 Main outcome variables

Following the behavior and norm elicitation, we collect information for the following outcomes:

Policy preferences. We ask a series of question regarding respondents' preferences over policies that promote gender equality, protect victims of violence, and reinforce the legal framework (including harsher penalties to perpetrators) of enforcing policies that protect

women against various forms of violence. The descriptive summary statistics of the policy variables can be found in Table 4.

Actions (quasi-behavioral outcomes). We elicit respondents' actions (behavior) in cases where suspected gender-based violence has taken/been taking place. The descriptive statistics of this variable can be found in Table 5.

Trust in institutions. We ask if respondents think authorities do something if they contacted them about a possible violence act. The descriptive statistics of this variable can be found in Table 5.

Incentivized donation: Respondents be asked to declare their support by deciding whether to donate their bonus earnings to a well-respected, non-partisan NGO that supports victims of violence. The descriptive statistics of this variable can be found in Table 5.

3.2 Empirical Estimation

We perform three types of between subject comparisons to identify our main hypotheses. By comparing T1 with T2 we can identify whether perceived norms or own-values better predict behavior and preferences regarding IPV and VAW. By replacing policy preferences with values as outcomes we can also identify whether social norms or patriarchical values better explain own-values/attitudes towards IPV.

By comparing No Norms and Norms with placebo we can identify the relative importance of patriarchal values compared to norms in explaining policy preferences and attitudes. Finally, by comparing Norms Treatment with Placebo (and No Norms Treatment) we can identify whether information about perceived norms (beliefs about others' values) changes policy preferences and behavior.

To identify the causal effects described above, and to test Hypotheses 1 and 4, we estimate the following OLS regression that corresponds:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Assignment + \gamma M_i + \delta X_i + \epsilon_s \tag{1}$$

where Y_i is the set of outcomes we are interested (see section 3.1), *Assignment* is the the treatment group respondents were randomly assigned to (control, T1 or T2 ($Y_{i,t}$ and $Y_{i,t+1}$), M is region (Bölge) fixed effects and X is controls.

Further, following Hypothesis 2 (and 2b), to identify whether the behavior of subjects is consistent with their own values/attitudes, or mostly reflects –what they perceive to be– social norms (or both) and to test whether the mechanism for eliciting these preferences affects their consistency, we restrict attention to a between No Norms and Norms comparison, and estimate the following model:

$$Policy_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Treatment_{it} + \beta_2 V_{it} + \beta_3 Treatment_{it} * V_{it} + \gamma M_i + \delta X_{it} + \upsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

whereby $Policy_{it}$ is the set of outcomes measuring policy support to combat IPV (see section C.4), chosen by subject i in treatment t, V is the chosen value, Treatment is an indicator of assignment to treatment (or control), X is a vector of controls including age, gender, occupation, ethnocentric and religious values, income and student status and υ is the error term.

Finally, to test Hypothesis 2b, we also estimate the following model within Norms treatment to identify whether norms or own-values/attitudes better explain policy support to combat VAW. That is:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 Order_{it} + \beta_2 V_{it} + \beta_3 Norm_{it} + \beta_4 Order_{it} * V_{it} + \beta_5 + Order_{it} * Norm_{it} + \gamma M_i + \delta X_{it} + \upsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

Here, the 'treatment' is the (randomly assigned) *Order* with which subjects saw the social norm or the own-values/attitudes elicitation exercises (see section C.2 for value statements and C.3 for norm statements).

4 Analysis and Results

We present our main results below, in an order that follows that used in formulating our hypotheses above. Our first result follows.

RESULT 1: Attitudes towards IPV and VAW (e.g. victim-blaming) are better predicted by (patriarchal) values compared to norms –in fact the latter are very poor predictors. This is because such attitudes are hinged on patriarchy values which, in turn, are pretty stable.

Table 1 compares the effect that norms (identified by assignment to T2) versus patriarchal values have on values/attitudes towards IPV and VAW (e.g. victim-blaming).[5] While social norms (T2) only seems to increase support for Value 6 by 4.7 percentage points[6], patriarchy index predicts all values/attitudes towards IPV. The latter is also supported by a simple between groups comparison using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. Figure 1 displays visually this test where we test the effect of assignment on attitudes/values towards IPV and VAW. We fail to reject the null hypothesis for all values except for Value 6. Figure 2 demonstrates patriarchal values (PCA) across assignment groups. Because those values were elicited post-scenario presentation in T1 and T2, it is reassuring to see that they do not differ statistically from those elicited in the placebo group.

Overall, Result 1 rejects our first hypothesis (H1) –the predictive potency of norms– but strongly confirms the first part of our second hypothesis H2.(i) that suggests respondents who harbor patriarchal values are more likely to reveal attitudes that are ambivalent (and possibly more tolerant) towards IPV.

[5]Recall for this test, we restrict attention to comparison between T1 and T2 as we did not elicit values in the placebo group. Nevertheless, to make sure that our WVS-inspired patriarchal value elicitation is not 'contaminated' in our treatments (because of the IPV-related scenario we present to respondents), we conduct a balance test in Table 9 in Appendix (section F). There, it is obvious that there is no difference in elicited patriarchal values between T1 and placebo groups.

[6]We use the pre-info update elicitation exercise in T2, thus the *only* difference between T1 and T2 is the mere presence of social norms.

Table 1: Patriarchal values (WVS) and attitudes/values towards IPV (across experimental groups T1 and T2)

	Value1	Value2	Value3	Value4	Value5	Value6	Value PCA
T2 (Norms)	0.019	−0.008	−0.006	0.006	0.005	0.047***	0.003
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Patriarchy_pca	0.044***	0.043***	0.001	0.047***	0.056***	−0.019***	0.038***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Age21-29	0.029	0.023	−0.030	0.023	−0.016	0.013	0.006
	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.014)
Age30-39	0.068**	0.024	0.006	0.051*	0.058*	0.040·	0.041**
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.015)
Age40-49	0.086***	0.073*	−0.002	0.068**	0.063*	0.062*	0.059***
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.016)
Age50-59	0.103***	0.082*	−0.006	0.065*	0.048	0.037	0.061***
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.018)
Age60 üzeri	0.139**	0.161**	−0.019	0.152**	0.117*	0.006	0.110**
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.041)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.033)
GenderOther	−0.009	−0.066	0.019	−0.047	−0.114	−0.106	−0.042
	(0.119)	(0.153)	(0.067)	(0.079)	(0.105)	(0.126)	(0.082)
GenderWomen	−0.062***	−0.043**	−0.008	0.064***	−0.075***	0.001	−0.036***
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.009)
EducationLiterate	−0.156	−0.209	−0.058	−0.064	−0.140	0.162***	−0.137
	(0.341)	(0.317)	(0.156)	(0.365)	(0.326)	(0.035)	(0.281)
EducationMiddle	−0.039	−0.060*	−0.033	0.008	0.005	0.013	−0.030·
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.017)
EducationPrimary	−0.035	−0.067·	−0.006	−0.015	−0.027	−0.052	−0.033
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.021)
EducationUni	−0.016	−0.017	0.014	−0.028·	−0.043**	0.000	−0.017·
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.009)
R^2	0.108	0.076	0.009	0.083	0.148	0.029	0.163
Adj. R^2	0.101	0.068	0.001	0.076	0.141	0.021	0.156
Num. obs.	2454	2454	2454	2454	2454	2454	2454
RMSE	0.326	0.358	0.251	0.338	0.346	0.302	0.205

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Notes: This table compares value statements in the two experimental groups: T1 and T2. Since the Placebo group has not seen the scenario, the value statements regarding the scenario were only asked to these two groups. Value PCA excludes Value 6 as it is the only statement that does not include victim-blaming values. Patriarchy PCA is an index of patriarchal attitudes created using six WVS patriarchal attitudes. All the outcome variables are normalized to vary between 0 and 1.

Figure 1: Wilcoxon signed rank test between experimental groups (T1 and T2) for victim-blaming attitudes



Figure 2: Wilcoxon signed rank test between experimental groups (T1 and T2) for patriarchal values



RESULT 2: In contrast with Result 1, norms can predict policy preferences (to combat VAW) very well; values and attitudes not so much –if at all.

Table 2 demonstrates this result where we show the impact of assignment on policy support to combat VAW. Respondents in the norm treatment group (T2) are more likely to support all the six policy measures compared to the control group by 3 to 4 percentage points –a change that roughly corresponds to 1/6 of a standard deviation. To test the differences in means, we use a Kruskal-Wallis test. Figure 4 displays this test visually. All policies differ across norm treatment (T2) and control groups with $p<0.05$. Pairwise Dunn test also shows that policy support is higher in norm treatment (T2) than no norm treatment (T1) (see Figure 4). We further demonstrate this (in Table 8 in Appendix section F) by restricting attention to a between T1-T2 analysis, which allows us to include a values polychoric PCA index. Results are strikingly similar.Result 2 confirms Hypothesis 2B that suggests respondents' policy preferences are influenced more by what is perceived to be a social norm than own-values.

We then perform a relative comparison restricting our analysis within T2. There we had asked participants questions about their own attitudes/values regarding the scenario they read and how others would react this scenario in random order. Table 7 looks into the interaction effect of the order of norm and value questions and values on policy support to combat IPV. The outcome variable is the policy support index (PCA). In this table, we subset the group of people who saw the norms questions first and who saw the value questions first.[7] The two consecutive models are identical except for the subgroup of people who saw norm elicitation questions first and those who instead saw value questions first.[8]

[7]Due to sub-setting the sample, the model presented in Table 7 is not exactly identical to the interaction one specified in equation 3. We do this here for reasons of greater exposition clarity, but very similar results are obtained if one were to run the interaction model specified in eq. 3 instead.

[8]For a similar comparison on the relative importance of values versus norms, see also Table 10 in Appendix, where we do not limit our attention to T2 but also include T1 and the placebo groups in the analysis.

Table 2: Support for policies to combat IPV and VAW across groups (Placebo, T1 and T2)

	Policy1	Policy2	Policy3	Policy4	Policy5	Policy6	Policy PCA
T1	0.000	−0.007	0.001	0.008	0.008	0.002	0.002
	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.009)
T2 (Norms)	0.030*	0.018·	0.021*	0.042***	0.037**	0.036**	0.030***
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.008)
Age21-29	−0.048*	−0.009	−0.021	−0.016	−0.018	0.007	−0.017
	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.012)
Age30-39	−0.082***	−0.018	−0.041**	−0.003	−0.026	0.018	−0.026*
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.013)
Age40-49	−0.089***	0.004	−0.023	−0.011	−0.036·	0.004	−0.023·
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.014)
Age50-59	−0.003	0.022	0.017	0.031	0.021	0.061*	0.024
	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.015)
Age60 over	−0.014	0.002	−0.014	0.018	0.010	0.067·	0.008
	(0.045)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.028)
GenderOther	0.164*	0.018	−0.001	0.021	0.036	−0.003	0.033
	(0.083)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.093)	(0.060)
GenderWomen	0.119***	0.072***	0.081***	0.105***	0.115***	0.066***	0.092***
	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.007)
EducationLiterate	−0.090	0.044	0.063	0.080	0.119·	0.202·	0.070
	(0.182)	(0.073)	(0.045)	(0.094)	(0.063)	(0.111)	(0.074)
EducationMiddle	0.001	0.000	−0.003	−0.005	−0.009	−0.052*	−0.009
	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.013)
EducationPrimary	0.006	−0.035	−0.004	0.028	0.009	0.026	0.002
	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.017)
EducationUni	0.008	0.001	0.012	0.016	0.003	0.049***	0.013
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.008)
R^2	0.049	0.032	0.044	0.044	0.055	0.039	0.068
Adj. R^2	0.044	0.027	0.039	0.038	0.050	0.034	0.063
Num. obs.	3554	3554	3554	3554	3554	3554	3554
RMSE	0.348	0.245	0.220	0.299	0.277	0.341	0.207

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Notes: This table compares policy support to combat IPV in the three experimental groups: Placebo, T1 and T2. For ease of interpretation, outcomes variables are normalized to vary between 0 and 1.

What is worth noting is the following: in the case of the more ambivalent statement (3) regarding victim-blaming attitudes towards IPV victims, making respondents think about the social norm first (that is, before being asked about own attitudes) substantially increases support for policies to tackle VAW; the reverse is not true. Similarly, in the case of the unambiguous statement (6), which leaves no room for victim-blaming, those who were asked about the norm first exhibit support for policy change that is twice as strong –and statistically distinguishable– compared to those who were first asked to reveal own attitudes. In other words, 'priming' respondents to think about the social norm before expressing own views, causes a great policy preference shift in the direction of supporting measures to tackle VAW.

RESULT 3: A similar pattern does not appear when we consider quasi-behavioral outcomes and individual actions (i.e. neither norms nor values/attitudes can predict actions).

Appendix Table 11 presents the results. These are in fact null results. In other words, elicited (and incentivized) intentions to act appear to be more sticky than policy preferences. This comes as no surprise given past experimental findings. Thus, Result 3 fails to confirm the elicited behavior part of H2 (and 2B). Studied together, our results so far give rise to the following corollary.

Corollary: You can affect policy preferences (and to a lesser extend behavior) even if patriarchal values and/or attitudes persist (or are not amenable to change), simply by invoking (or changing) social norms.

But how can we shift perceptions about norms, if at all possible? Our final result provides some insights on the role of information provision (beliefs update) regarding the prevailing social norm.

RESULT 4: Information updating regarding prevailing social norms shifts policy preferences.

Figure 3 exhibit this result using a Kruskal-Wallis test. In this figure, we compare policy measures in Placebo, T1 and T2 (post-update). We find significant differences across treatment and control groups and reject the null hypothesis in all policy measures ($p<0.05$). The

Dunn test in this figure also contributes to this point by showing the significant differences in pairwise comparison. Result 4 confirms H3 that suggests respondents are more likely to support policies tackling IPV after receiving information about others' values/attitudes.

5 Conclusion

Evidence from this well-powered survey experiment (on a representative sample of Turkish residents) showed that attitudes towards IPV and VAW –victim-blaming attitudes in particular– are hinged on patriarchal values which are pretty stable. However, even in the absence of change in these values, social norms can increase policy support to tackle IPV in two ways. First, we show that even a very 'soft' invocation of social norms –by making respondents aware that other members of the society are also simultaneously considering the same scenario and by probing their beliefs about others' attitudes and reactions– is, in fact, sufficient to cause a change in their policy preferences. That is, the very thought of how society would react to an IPV incident –i.e. the presence of a social norm– is sufficient to generate policy support to combat IPV and VAW. Second, information update about actual norms can also increase policy support. Therefore, our work makes an important contribution to our understanding of the role of social norms in understanding the persistence of victim-blaming norms and the lack of support for policy action to tackle gender-based violence. Our paper provides a causal identification of the role of social norms and own values on actions and policy preferences towards VAW and IPV.

Contributing to the growing literature on social norms, this paper shows how the mere thought of others and provision of information on others' values can significantly change policy support while not necessarily changing individual action of bystanders. While thought of and information about others' victim-blaming attitudes cannot change by itself individual action/involvement to tackle IPV and VAW, it shows that individuals are willing to support policies that combat IPV/VAW when they think of others or learn how others think.

Figure 3: Wilcoxon signed rank test between experimental groups for policy measures to combat IPV post-information update (for T2)



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A Details to the experimental design

Summary of the survey experiment:

1. Placebo group
   (a) Pre-treatment demographics
   (b) Placebo: A text on bees and honey
   (c) Quasi-behavioral outcomes and policy questions
   (d) Attitudes
   (e) Demographics
2. Treatment 1 group
   (a) Pre-treatment demographics
   (b) Treatment 1: Scenario
   (c) Attitudes/values elicitation
   (d) Quasi-behavioral outcomes and policy questions
   (e) Attitudes
   (f) Demographics
3. Treatment 2 group
   (a) Pre-treatment demographics
   (b) Treatment 2: Scenario
   (c) Attitudes/values and incentivized norm (belief) elicitation (*in random order*)
   (d) Quasi-behavioral outcomes and policy preferences
   (e) Dynamic information update on prevailing norms (elicited in previous stage)
   (f) Repeat of scenario
   (g) Preference/values elicitation
   (h) Quasi-behavioral outcomes and policy preferences
   (i) Attitudes
   (j) Demographics

B Ethics

Our study is about a sensitive topic: gender-based violence. All of the survey questions are either attitudinal (asks attitudes about patriarchy norms) or hypothetical (gives a hypothetical scenario of gender-based violence and asks how they would react if they were bystanders in such a case). We do not explicitly prime or invite participants to recall these experiences. We also do not ask them to reflect on their own experiences. There is still a slight risk that some of the questions might trigger some respondents due to their own past experiences, if they have any. We have the following safeguards in place to avoid these risks:

1. We advertise the survey on a completely voluntary basis.
2. Participants have the option to withdraw from the survey at any point with no consequences whatsoever.
3. Participants have the option to remove their complete or incomplete data entirely.

We have received ethical approval from our institutions' Research Ethics Committee.

C Details to the Survey Instrument

C.1 The Scenario

Last week, a story appeared on the news. Asli and Kerem were dating for some time. The couple was on holiday in Antalya, and they were on their way to visit an ancient site. The man was driving, and the woman criticised him harshly for missing the turn several times. They started arguing, the woman left the car. The woman yelled at the man that she wanted to leave him. The man got very angry and started slapping and hitting the woman. After the violent dispute, the man pushed her off the cliff and she died.

C.2 Value/Attitudinal Statements

VALUES: After reflecting on the above situation, on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), how likely is that you agree with the following statements?

1. She should have kept silent and stayed in the car.
2. She should not have threatened to leave him.
3. Both parties could have been more understanding.
4. She should not have gone on holiday with him in the first place.
5. Killing her is not acceptable, but his mind was blurred by her insults.
6. He killed the woman with inhuman motivations, and this is never acceptable.

C.3 Norm Statements

NORM: We have surveyed a representative sample of the Turkish population. We would like to ask you to think about the views of other participants in relation to this incident. What percentage of them do you think would be likely/very likely to agree with each of the following statements?

1. She should have kept silent and stayed in the car.
2. She should not have threatened to leave him.
3. Both parties could have been more understanding.
4. She should not have gone on holiday with him in the first place.
5. Killing her is not acceptable, but his mind was blurred by her insults.
6. He killed the woman with inhuman motivations, and this is never acceptable.

C.4 Policies to Combat IPV

1. The government should re-introduce the Istanbul agreement (This international convention aims to prevent violence and discrimination against women with legal sanctions and to protect the victims.)
2. The government should introduce harsher legal punishment for the perpetrators of gender-based violence
3. Police and courts should enforce existing rules more strictly and put more effort to protect women against gender-based violence
4. The Ministry of Education should introduce a course on mandatory sex education in the national curriculum of all high schools in Turkey
5. The government should allocate more resources and funding to state institutions that address issues of gender-based violence
6. The government should allocate more resources and funding to non-governmental organisations that help victims of gender-based violence

C.5 Patriarchal Attitudes

1. Men make better political leaders.
2. Education is more important for boys.
3. Divorce is justified.
4. Dowry is acceptable.
5. Women should agree with their man's opinion after all those things he provides her with.
6. It is fine for a woman to earn more than her husband/partner.

D Descriptive Summary Statistics

Table 3: Summary Statistics - Attitudes/Values

	T1 (N=1108)	T2 (N=1346)	Total (N=2454)	p value
Value1				0.137
Mean (SD)	2.493 (1.346)	2.576 (1.400)	2.538 (1.376)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	
Value2				0.542
Mean (SD)	3.153 (1.486)	3.117 (1.485)	3.133 (1.486)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	
Value3				0.464
Mean (SD)	4.526 (0.991)	4.496 (1.017)	4.510 (1.005)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	
Value4				0.530
Mean (SD)	2.213 (1.410)	2.249 (1.408)	2.233 (1.409)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	
Value5				0.581
Mean (SD)	2.383 (1.492)	2.416 (1.491)	2.401 (1.491)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	
Value6				$< .001$
Mean (SD)	4.292 (1.327)	4.489 (1.120)	4.400 (1.221)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	

Notes: Note that these variables are normalized to vary between 0 and 1 when they are used as outcome variables in the analysis section of the paper.

Table 4: Summary Statistics - Policy Measures to Combat IPV

	Placebo (N=1100)	T1 (N=1108)	T2 (N=1346)	Total (N=3554)	p value
Pol1					0.025
Mean (SD)	3.834 (1.441)	3.868 (1.451)	3.981 (1.385)	3.900 (1.424)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	
Pol2					0.018
Mean (SD)	4.429 (1.023)	4.421 (1.039)	4.522 (0.929)	4.462 (0.994)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	
Pol3					0.016
Mean (SD)	4.498 (0.923)	4.529 (0.906)	4.600 (0.870)	4.546 (0.899)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	
Pol4					$< .001$
Mean (SD)	3.948 (1.231)	4.007 (1.260)	4.141 (1.172)	4.040 (1.221)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	
Pol5					$< .001$
Mean (SD)	4.082 (1.175)	4.144 (1.169)	4.256 (1.074)	4.167 (1.138)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	
Pol6					0.011
Mean (SD)	3.649 (1.379)	3.675 (1.435)	3.805 (1.353)	3.716 (1.389)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	

Notes: Note that these variables are normalized to vary between 0 and 1 when they are used as outcome variables in the analysis section of the paper.

Table 5: Summary Statistics - Quasi-behavioral Outcomes

	Placebo (N=1100)	T1 (N=1108)	T2 (N=1346)	Total (N=3554)	p value
Action					0.875
Mean (SD)	2.214 (0.456)	2.207 (0.443)	2.204 (0.463)	2.208 (0.455)	
Range	1.000 - 3.000	1.000 - 3.000	1.000 - 3.000	1.000 - 3.000	
Trust in Police					0.275
Mean (SD)	3.342 (1.143)	3.310 (1.164)	3.383 (1.087)	3.347 (1.129)	
Range	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	1.000 - 5.000	
Donation					0.326
Mean (SD)	0.295 (0.456)	0.301 (0.459)	0.275 (0.447)	0.289 (0.453)	
Range	0.000 - 1.000	0.000 - 1.000	0.000 - 1.000	0.000 - 1.000	

Notes: Note that these variables are normalized to vary between 0 and 1 when they are used as outcome variables in the analysis section of the paper.

Table 6: Balance Test

	T2	Treatment
RegionDOGU ANADOLU	0.040	−0.032
	(0.055)	(0.042)
RegionIC ANADOLU	0.019	0.036
	(0.044)	(0.033)
RegionGUNEYDOGU ANADOLU	−0.021	−0.036
	(0.048)	(0.037)
RegionMARMARA	0.098*	0.041
	(0.041)	(0.031)
RegionEGE	0.050	0.006
	(0.047)	(0.036)
RegionAKDENIZ	0.038	−0.031
	(0.046)	(0.036)
Male	−0.013	−0.057**
	(0.025)	(0.019)
Age21-29	0.055	−0.008
	(0.044)	(0.033)
Age30-39	0.086·	−0.046
	(0.049)	(0.037)
Age40-49	0.036	−0.047
	(0.051)	(0.039)
Age50-59	−0.012	−0.130**
	(0.062)	(0.047)
Age60+	−0.050	−0.158*
	(0.097)	(0.075)
Income	0.003	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.006)
EducationMiddle	−0.030	−0.093·
	(0.066)	(0.050)
EducationHigh	0.007	−0.025
	(0.056)	(0.043)
EducationUni	−0.047	−0.048
	(0.057)	(0.044)
EducationLiterate	−0.249	−0.238
	(0.326)	(0.214)
EmploymentFull time	−0.056	0.162
	(0.212)	(0.150)
EmploymentHalf time	−0.055	0.201
	(0.217)	(0.154)
EmploymentHousewife	−0.059	0.167
	(0.213)	(0.151)
EmploymentRetired	−0.125	0.241
	(0.219)	(0.156)
EmploymentUnemployed looking	−0.099	0.139
	(0.215)	(0.153)
EmploymentUnemployed not looking	−0.046	0.137
	(0.218)	(0.156)
Num. obs.	2161	3145

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Notes: This table shows the balance between experimental groups across covariates. The first column compares the two treatment groups. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is in T2, 0 if in T1. The second column compares the two treatment groups with the control group. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is in one of the treatment groups, 0 otherwise.

E Group Means Tests

Figure 4: Wilcoxon signed rank test between experimental groups for policy measures to combat IPV



F Policy Support to Combat IPV: The Effect of Norms vs. Values

Table 7: The order of norms vs. values questions in T2 and policy support to combat IPV

	PCA	PCA	PCA	PCA	PCA	PCA	PCA	PCA	PCA	PCA	PCA	PCA
Statement1	−0.002	0.000										
	(0.006)	(0.005)										
Statement2			−0.000	0.005								
				(0.005)								
Statement3					0.036***	0.014·						
					(0.010)	(0.008)						
Statement4							0.005	−0.006				
							(0.005)	(0.005)				
Statement5									−0.010·	−0.012*		
									(0.006)	(0.005)		
Statement6											0.060***	0.028***
											(0.011)	(0.008)
Subgroup by order seen first	Norm	Value	Norm	Value	Norm	Value	Norm	Value	Norm	Value	Norm	Value
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.080	0.083	0.080	0.084	0.110	0.087	0.081	0.085	0.085	0.090	0.164	0.109
Adj. R^2	0.053	0.059	0.053	0.060	0.084	0.063	0.054	0.061	0.058	0.066	0.139	0.085
Num. obs.	629	668	629	668	629	668	629	668	629	668	629	668
RMSE	0.203	0.195	0.203	0.195	0.200	0.194	0.203	0.194	0.203	0.194	0.194	0.192

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Notes: This table tests a slight variation of Equation 3. In the assignment group T2, we show the questions about (i) respondents' own values regarding the scenario and (ii) what respondents believe of how others would react to this scenario in random order. This table compares subgroups of people in T2 who have been asked social norms first and people who have been asked their own values first. The outcome variable is policy support PCA and is normalized to vary between 0 and 1. Controls include age, gender and education.

G Robustness Checks

Table 8: Norms vs. values and support for policies to combat IPV (experimental groups)

	Policy1	Policy2	Policy3	Policy4	Policy5	Policy6	Policy PCA
T2 (Norms)	0.031*	0.026*	0.020*	0.034**	0.029**	0.035*	0.028***
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.008)
Value_pca	−0.006·	0.002	0.001	−0.003	−0.002	−0.008*	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Age21-29	−0.065**	−0.023	−0.025	−0.029	−0.016	0.007	−0.025·
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.014)
Age30-39	−0.092***	−0.028	−0.042*	−0.014	−0.026	0.018	−0.031*
	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.015)
Age40-49	−0.121***	−0.019	−0.033·	−0.027	−0.042·	0.003	−0.038*
	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.016)
Age50-59	−0.013	0.023	0.017	0.022	0.022	0.063*	0.021
	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.017)
Age60 over	−0.069	−0.011	−0.021	−0.003	−0.029	0.057	−0.014
	(0.059)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.036)
GenderOther	0.194·	0.124**	0.030	0.031	0.048	−0.033	0.065
	(0.107)	(0.038)	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.086)	(0.125)	(0.069)
GenderWomen	0.116***	0.073***	0.081***	0.102***	0.105***	0.071***	0.090***
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.009)
EducationLiterate	−0.199	−0.017	0.044	0.100	0.075	0.263*	0.042
	(0.330)	(0.157)	(0.079)	(0.169)	(0.140)	(0.128)	(0.146)
EducationMiddle	0.020	−0.008	0.001	0.004	−0.013	−0.040	−0.005
	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.016)
EducationPrimary	0.011	−0.048·	−0.005	0.029	0.015	0.014	0.000
	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.020)
EducationUni	0.017	0.002	0.015	0.023·	0.007	0.058***	0.018·
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.010)
R^2	0.057	0.034	0.044	0.045	0.052	0.044	0.070
Adj. R^2	0.050	0.026	0.037	0.037	0.045	0.036	0.063
Num. obs.	2454	2454	2454	2454	2454	2454	2454
RMSE	0.345	0.242	0.218	0.298	0.273	0.342	0.205

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Notes: This table is a robustness check to Table 2. It checks the policy support when model includes value statements index. Since the control group has not seen the scenario, they were not asked the value statements. Outcome variables are normalized to vary between 0 and 1 for ease of interpretation.

Table 9: Balance test: Patriarchal attitudes (WVS) across (T1, T2, and Placebo) groups

	Patr1	Patr2	Patr3	Patr4	Patr5	Patr6	Patr PCA
T1	−0.006	−0.014	0.019	0.028*	−0.004	−0.004	−0.002
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.008)
T2 (Norms)	−0.005	−0.014	0.032*	0.046***	−0.018	−0.002	−0.004
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.008)
Age21-29	0.068***	0.074***	−0.056**	0.044*	0.064**	−0.019	0.056***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.011)
Age30-39	0.118***	0.185***	−0.083***	0.094***	0.105***	−0.062***	0.111***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.012)
Age40-49	0.118***	0.141***	−0.069**	0.104***	0.079***	−0.055**	0.097***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.012)
Age50-59	0.079***	0.154***	−0.039	0.105***	0.037	−0.036·	0.077***
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.014)
Age60 over	0.103*	0.098*	−0.079·	0.061	0.057	−0.108**	0.085***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.023)
GenderOther	−0.190*	−0.166**	0.101	0.027	−0.172*	0.113	−0.127*
	(0.081)	(0.063)	(0.072)	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.069)	(0.056)
GenderWomen	−0.161***	−0.079***	0.185***	−0.023*	−0.132***	0.122***	−0.118***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.006)
EducationLiterate	0.270*	0.078	−0.059	0.000	0.104	−0.109	0.114
	(0.130)	(0.139)	(0.127)	(0.129)	(0.165)	(0.166)	(0.077)
EducationMiddle	0.072***	0.083***	−0.072***	0.068**	0.104***	−0.060**	0.077***
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.012)
EducationPrimary	0.055*	0.045	−0.079**	−0.001	0.109***	−0.045·	0.056***
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.016)
EducationUni	−0.047***	−0.068***	0.041***	−0.059***	−0.101***	0.028**	−0.059***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.007)
R^2	0.091	0.053	0.094	0.030	0.083	0.061	0.157
Adj. R^2	0.086	0.048	0.089	0.025	0.078	0.055	0.152
Num. obs.	3554	3554	3554	3554	3554	3554	3554
RMSE	0.317	0.349	0.321	0.328	0.343	0.286	0.185

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Notes: This table shows the balance of patriarchal attitudes between experimental groups. The outcome variables are patriarchal values and are normalized to vary between 0 and 1 for ease of interpretation.

Table 10: Support for policies to tackle VAW/IPV across the three groups (Placebo, T1 and T2): Including patriarchal values

	Policy1	Policy2	Policy3	Policy4	Policy5	Policy6	Policy PCA
T1	−0.001	−0.008	0.000	0.008	0.007	0.002	0.001
	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.009)
T2 (Norm)	0.029*	0.018·	0.020*	0.041***	0.036**	0.035*	0.029***
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.008)
Patriarchy_pca	−0.036***	−0.022***	−0.025***	−0.026***	−0.025***	−0.035***	−0.027***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Age21-29	−0.028	0.003	−0.007	−0.001	−0.004	0.026	−0.002
	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.012)
Age30-39	−0.042·	0.005	−0.013	0.026	0.002	0.057**	0.004
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.013)
Age40-49	−0.054*	0.025	0.001	0.015	−0.012	0.038·	0.003
	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.013)
Age50-59	0.025	0.039*	0.036*	0.052*	0.041*	0.087***	0.045**
	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.014)
Age60 üzeri	0.017	0.020	0.007	0.041	0.031	0.097*	0.031
	(0.044)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.027)
GenderOther	0.118	−0.009	−0.032	−0.012	0.004	−0.048	−0.001
	(0.077)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.081)	(0.054)
GenderWomen	0.077***	0.047***	0.052***	0.074***	0.085***	0.025*	0.060***
	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.007)
EducationLiterate	−0.049	0.069	0.091·	0.110	0.148*	0.242*	0.100
	(0.193)	(0.077)	(0.053)	(0.086)	(0.070)	(0.118)	(0.079)
EducationMiddle	0.029	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.010	−0.025	0.012
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.013)
EducationPrimary	0.026	−0.023	0.010	0.043·	0.023	0.046	0.017
	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.017)
EducationUni	−0.013	−0.012	−0.002	0.001	−0.012	0.029*	−0.003
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.008)
R^2	0.084	0.058	0.086	0.069	0.082	0.074	0.123
Adj. R^2	0.079	0.052	0.080	0.064	0.077	0.068	0.118
Num. obs.	3554	3554	3554	3554	3554	3554	3554
RMSE	0.342	0.242	0.215	0.295	0.273	0.335	0.201

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Notes: This table compares policy support to combat IPV in the three experimental groups: Placebo, T1 and T2. Policy outcome variables are normalized to vary between 0 and 1 for ease of interpretation.

Table 11: The experimental group (Placebo, T1 and T2) and quasi-behavioral outcomes

	Action	Trust in Police	Donation
T1	−0.006	−0.003	0.003
	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.019)
T2 (Norm)	−0.007	0.013	−0.020
	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Age21-29	−0.068*	0.034*	−0.035
	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.028)
Age30-39	−0.128***	0.057**	−0.032
	(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.029)
Age40-49	−0.153***	0.039*	0.042
	(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.031)
Age50-59	−0.136***	0.046*	0.036
	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.036)
Age60 üzeri	−0.179**	0.006	−0.033
	(0.059)	(0.036)	(0.056)
GenderOther	0.054	−0.165·	0.135
	(0.106)	(0.087)	(0.125)
GenderWomen	−0.077***	−0.031**	0.005
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.016)
EducationLiterate	−0.196	0.043	−0.141
	(0.212)	(0.124)	(0.134)
EducationMiddle	0.040	0.058***	−0.057*
	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.027)
EducationPrimary	−0.042	0.072**	−0.080*
	(0.040)	(0.022)	(0.036)
EducationUni	−0.025	−0.040***	0.025
	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.017)
R^2	0.026	0.021	0.011
Adj. R^2	0.021	0.016	0.006
Num. obs.	3554	3554	3554
RMSE	0.450	0.280	0.452

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\cdot}p < 0.1$

Notes: This table compares quasi-behavioral outcomes in the three experimental groups: Placebo, T1 and T2. *Action* is a binary variable combining the three action items and taking the value 1 if subjects gave at least one positive reply to one of the three questions. Trust in Police is normalized to vary between 0 and 1 for ease of interpretation. Donation is a binary variable taking the value 1 if participants donated, and 0 otherwise.