Migration policy preferences and forms of trust in contexts of limited state capacity

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Abstract

Why do citizens hold different migration policy preferences? US and European evidence suggests political trust matters by raising support for more open policies, attenuating concerns about costs and strengthening beliefs in governments' implementation abilities. However, this may not hold in countries with limited state capacity. Instead, we argue interpersonal trust placed in policy beneficiaries matters more as citizens circumvent weaker institutions. We test this using conjoint experiments in Colombia and Peru—low-capacity countries experiencing large inflows of forcibly-displaced Venezuelans—that vary aspects of migration policies. Political trust selectively moderates preferences on migrants' employment rights and numerical limits, contributing novel evidence of boundary conditions for this form of trust. By contrast, greater interpersonal trust is linked to more open preferences across all tested domains. Our results cast doubt on the importance of political trust for migration preferences in contexts of limited state capacity, instead highlighting its partial substitution by interpersonal trust.

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1 Introduction

In contexts of large-scale forced migration, governments must balance their moral obligations to protect displaced populations with the need to accommodate public preferences for immigration and asylum policies (Sørensen, 2016; Fumarola, 2021; Grumstrup et al., 2021). This task is particularly critical when external shocks increase the personal and public salience of migration (Lauter, 2009; Hatton, 2021; Hartland, 2023) which, in turn, can alter public demands (Hangartner et al., 2019). Why, then, do citizens prefer some migration policies over others? Studies from the United States and Europe identify how political trust in governments and their institutions relates to stronger preferences for policies that expand the protection and rights granted to immigrants and refugees (MacDonald, 2021; Ruhs, 2022; Jeannet et al., 2023). This is because political trust attenuates citizens' concerns about potential costs, strengthens confidence in governments' abilities to implement policies while mitigating negative consequences, and convinces them of the need for making sacrifices to achieve morally justified ends. Indeed, Angela Merkel's slogan *"Wir schaffen das"* (*"We will make it!"*) that initially mobilized mass solidarity when Germany took in over 1 million refugees in 2015–mainly from Syria–illustrates how politicians can appeal to citizens' trust to justify more open refugee policies (Holzberg, 2021).

Although a large body of work concludes that political trust matters for policy preferences generally (Hetherington, 1998; Cook et al., 2009; Hetherington and Husser, 2012; Rudolph, 2017; Devine et al., 2021, 2023) and on migration specifically (MacDonald, 2021; Macdonald and Cornacchione, 2023; Jeannet et al., 2023), it displays three limitations that impede theorizing how and in what circumstances this form of trust matters for citizens' policy demands.

First, the geographic bias of existing evidence towards high-income receiving countries–mainly the US and in Europe–is empirically problematic because it diverts attention from regions marked by large inflows. Most of the world's refugees and other people in need

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of international protection (76 per cent as of the end of 2022) are in low- and middle-income countries, while least-developed countries provided asylum to 20 per cent of all those considered forcibly displaced (UNHCR United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees, 2023). Furthermore, a large share of people who voluntarily migrate (37 per cent in 2021) do so within the so-called Global South (IOM, 2022).

Second, as a consequence of this bias, scholarly understanding about how political trust relates to migration policy preferences is limited to contexts already characterized by relatively high levels of pre-existing state capacity and trust in government (Mayda, 2006; Jeannet et al., 2021; MacDonald, 2021; Macdonald and Cornacchione, 2023; Jeannet et al., 2023). By contrast, low- and middle-income countries marked by large migration inflows are characterized by limited state capacity (Besley and Persson, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2015; Savoia and Sen, 2015) and lower levels of political trust (Besley and Dray, 2022; OECD, 2022). The focus on high-income countries not only fails to provide understanding of the role of political trust in low-capacity contexts but also elides examination of the influence of interpersonal trust on policy preferences.

Third, most studies examining migration policy preferences as an outcome tend to view "migration policy" as being primarily about setting overall levels (Facchini and Mayda, 2008; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; MacDonald, 2021). While this is clearly an important lever available to politicians, migration comprises multiple dimensions containing several options at the disposal of policymakers, including whether to extend rights for accessing various parts of labor markets and public welfare such as healthcare (Jeannet et al., 2021, 2023). Focusing solely on overall levels impedes understanding how citizens in receiving countries can plausibly hold and express different preferences for constituent components even as legislators present options packaged together in party manifestos or platforms. Moreover, as a result, we know relatively little about whether citizens' willingness to trust their governments' ability to devise and adequately implement policy responses also varies among policy elements (Hetherington and Husser, 2012; Gabriel and Trudinger, 2011; Garritzmann et al., 2023;

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Svallfors, 2002). While recent evidence demonstrates that people with low and high levels of political trust do not systematically differ in their support for fundamental components of climate change mitigation policy (Devine et al., 2023), it also suggests that trust in scientific expertise matters more for preferences in this domain. Yet it is not clear whether this would hold for migration policymaking which is generally characterized by trade-offs (Ruhs, 2013) that lack clear scientific consensuses to the extent that climate change does.

In this paper, we address these limitations in two stages. First, we develop a novel theoretical framework which argues that public support for migration policies in contexts of lower state capacity is more sensitive to the interpersonal trust placed in migrants who are beneficiaries of the proposed policies, rather than political trust placed in formal governance institutions. As we develop later, this type of trust held between receiving communities and migrants–fostered through personal networks and meaningful contact–leads citizens to perceive migrants as less threatening and less likely to take advantage of the benefits afforded by more open migration policy options (Ghosn et al., 2019).

Second, we test this proposition using two conjoint survey experiments fielded in Colombia (N=2,508) and Peru (N=2,538). Both countries have received some of the region's largest shares of displaced Venezuelans, who themselves comprise the second-largest contemporary displacement scenario globally with 23 per cent of the country's 2015 population having left amid multilayered economic, political, and humanitarian crises (R4V, 2023). The treatments involved presenting respondents with packages containing randomly-varied policy options across a variety of domains relevant for the Venezuelan displacement context as well as for migratory settings generally.

We find that, while higher levels of political trust are associated with more open preferences, this only applies selectively to extending employment rights and placing numerical limits on overall inflows. Instead, and in line with our theoretical expectations, greater levels of interpersonal trust placed in Venezuelan migrants relate to more open preferences across all of the migration policy domains measured. This evidence suggests that in contexts of

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lower state capacity, interpersonal trust substitutes for political trust as citizens in receiving countries form their policy preferences on the issue.

Besides contributing empirical evidence of migration policy preferences in one of the world's most highly-impacted regions, our study also makes theoretical contributions through its focus on Latin America. By contrast to Europe and North America where migration and refugee issues have remained highly contentious for decades, Latin America offers an opportunity to examine public demands on migration in a setting where the issue was not previously politicized or salient (Hammoud-Gallego and Freier, 2023). Meanwhile, speaking to our interest in how varieties of trust potentially matter for these preferences, Latin American countries–including our two cases–display some of the lowest levels of interpersonal trust (Scartascini and Luna, 2020; Searing, 2013) and trust in government (Catterberg, 2006; Mattes and Moreno, 2017; Letki, 2017; Bargsted et al., 2017). Therefore, foregrounding these countries' experiences offers lessons and avenues for further work on the relationships between political trust, interpersonal trust, and migration preferences that are relevant to other migration scenarios across low- and middle-income countries.

2 Forms of Trust and Migration Policy Preferences amid Lower State Capacity

Our overall theoretical argument is that the influences of political trust and interpersonal trust on migration policy preferences act as substitutes in the context of lower state capacity. While political trust placed in formal institutions matters for migration policy preferences, it does so in selective domains. By contrast, in contexts of lower state capacity to enforce proposed policies and mitigate any negative consequences, interpersonal trust placed in migrants who would potentially benefit from the proposed policies matters more for public demands. We make this argument in three steps. First, we outline how political trust relates to public demands on migration, while also observing how most existing evidence for this link comes from high-income settings. Second, we advance interpersonal trust in migrants as an al-

ternative factor that matters for public preferences because it reflects how citizens in lower state capacity settings circumvent or compensate for weak formal institutions. Third, we demonstrate how the empirical cases of Colombia and Peru display very low levels of both political and interpersonal trust–both globally as well as within Latin America–and offer lower-capacity situations where interpersonal trust potentially matters more for preferences towards Venezuelan forced migrants.

Political trust and migration policy preferences

Political trust is often defined as confidence in institutional entities (e.g. police, courts) or specific political actors (e.g. presidents, cabinets) (Zmerli and Newton, 2017). In our usage and measurement, we focus on the extent to which individuals believe in the capabilities and performances of their governments (Stokes, 1962; Miller, 1974; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Hetherington, 2005). This kind of trust, based on perceptions of intentions and competence, is relevant in situations when governments seek their citizens' consent to implement policies in areas where failure may have negative implications for the economy and society. Citizens holding greater political trust in their governments should be more likely to believe that politicians are acting in the public interest, capable of dealing with the risk of any negative impacts that may arise from implementation, or calling for appropriate sacrifices despite clear costs in order to take a moral stance (MacDonald, 2021). As a result, they may hold more permissive policy preferences. Indeed, existing cross-national evidence from the United States and Europe bears out this positive association (McLaren, 2012, 2015; Macdonald and Cornacchione, 2023). For instance, Jeannet et al. (2023) find that Europeans who hold greater trust in national institutions tend to prefer more liberal policy options regarding asylum-seekers' abilities to bring family members.

Yet the strength of this relationship may depend on two factors. First, individuals can hold different levels of political trust in their governments across different issues (Hetherington and Husser, 2012). For instance, citizens may trust their government to manage the economy, but not to provide and maintain effective public services. Second, the role of po-

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litical trust may change with the issue's salience (Hetherington, 2005). For example, when foreign policy issues were salient after the September 11 terrorist attacks, political trust mattered for support of national defense issues, but less so for racial policy issues (Hetherington and Husser, 2012).

We use migration as an example of an issue whose salience varies across countries and in which policy failure can have major consequences for hosting societies–which, in turn, implies that public preferences for government interventions may be sensitive to levels of political trust (MacDonald, 2021). Although evidence indicates that migration confers modestly positive impacts on receiving countries' economies (Ortega and Peri, 2014; Artal-Tur et al., 2014), individual citizens are unlikely to perceive direct and tangible benefits of increased migration levels in their daily lives (MacDonald, 2021). At the same time, migration presents risks and costs, both real and imagined, that host country citizens will bear (Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014).[1] Consequently, differences in political trust present divergent possibilities: citizens holding higher levels of trust in government might be more likely to think that its migration policies will be well-managed and beneficial, while those with lower levels of trust in government might be more likely to think that its policies will be wasteful or harmful.

Interpersonal trust: circumventing lower state capacity

Yet theories and evidence about the consequences of political trust for migration policy preference mainly derive from high-income countries (e.g. the United States and Europe), which limits understanding about the scope conditions of this relationship. This is especially relevant in contexts where a government's capacity to deliver on policy may be more limited, and therefore policy failure remains likely even if citizens hold high levels of political trust. In these settings, we argue that interpersonal trust placed in migrant beneficiaries also matters for policy preferences.

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[1]Extending access to public services is an example of a policy that could have direct impacts on service delivery (i.e. how good is your health service provider or the quality of schooling provision) and indirect costs in the form of taxation (i.e. having to pay higher taxes to finance expanded access).

Why would this be the case? First, citizens holding more interpersonal trust in migrants are likely to have more confidence in their good intentions and abilities. They may also believe that migrant outgroup members are honest and deserving (rather than criminals, for example), and that they possess the skills and motivation to positively contribute to the economy and society at large. Second, greater interpersonal trust is likely linked to greater outgroup empathy, which may increase citizens' willingness to accept societal or personal costs arising from policies: indeed, group empathy appears to matter more than party identification, ideology, or racial resentment for immigration attitudes and policy preferences (Sirin et al., 2021).

This form of trust, we argue, is particularly relevant in contexts of lower state capacity. For example, studies on economic governance already document how interpersonal trust substitutes for political trust when when there is a lack of formal contract enforcement institutions such as effective police or judicial systems (Greif, 2005). In these conditions, actors often resort to solutions relying on networks and reciprocal norms (Karlan et al., 2009; Feigenberg and Pande, 2013; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). Meanwhile, work on the moderating effect of social contact between receiving communities and migrants offer further indirect evidence of how interpersonal trust may shape preferences. These studies suggest that increasing *personal*–and implicitly, more positively valenced–contact with an outgroup can lead to more positive attitudes (Ghosn et al., 2019; McLaren, 2003).

How political and interpersonal trust relate to multidimensional migration preferences in lower state capacity settings

While existing theory suggests that higher levels of either political or interpersonal trust should be associated with more open migration policy preferences, we argue that differences will arise in contexts of lower state capacity. Specifically, we expect that political trust will have more circumscribed effects given that states are unlikely to achieve positive outcomes by relying on their own capacities to deliver policy objectives. By contrast, changes in

interpersonal trust should have greater effects as it substitutes for political trust. To explore these dynamics, we treat migration policy as a multidimensional outcome, rather than only focusing on singular aspects such as limiting overall numbers which tends to characterize prior work. We do so by examining preferences in six fields relevant for migration: (1) labor market access, (2) location restrictions, (3) public service access, (4) family reunification, (5) numerical limits, and (6) length of residency.

Labor market access can be an area of great concern for citizens. Although evidence suggests that the labor market impacts of large waves of immigration tend to be small (Bahar et al., 2021), citizens tend to be concerned about competition between hosts and newcomers, wage reductions, and worsened employment conditions (Card, 2001; Peri, 2014). Yet, low- and middle-income countries tend to have large informal economies, which limit government control of this domain. Legal restrictions on labor market access will play a limited role in protecting many of the employment outcomes of citizens as much of the potential competition will take place in the informal sector (Olivieri et al., 2021).

Restricting where migrants can live within receiving countries has been adopted in several contexts, particularly with respect to forced migration. Whether via formal camps or temporary restrictions on migrants' ability to move across administrative boundaries, this policy choice involves concerns about migrants' perceived burdens on economies being concentrated in certain regions (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2015, 2016; Auer, 2018; Bratsberg et al., 2021). Yet in places with lower state capacity, it can be difficult for governments to fully monitor or control internal mobility (Hanson and Sigman, 2021).

Questions about the extent to which migrants should be able to access public services relate to concerns about whether host citizens will experience decreases in service quality (e.g. waiting times for medical treatment) (Giuntella et al., 2018). Yet in states in which public service provision is poor–for instance, where there is weaker public healthcare provision–this is less likely to be a concern related to political trust.

While often discussed as a human rights issue, family reunification is an area in which

policy makers can intervene on grounds of the potential burden that additional dependents may place on public finances (Cholewinski, 2004; Jeannet et al., 2021; Sumption and Vargas-Silva, 2019). Likewise, policies imposing numerical limits on inflows aim to address concerns about migrants, including those forcibly displaced, competing with host communities for employment (Borjas, 2014; Boubtane et al., 2016). Yet in the context of lower state capacity, these issues are less likely to be related to political trust. As explained above, public finances are less affected by immigration given the lower level of state provision and the role of labor market competition largely in the informal sector. Moreover, in a lower state capacity context, borders are often porous and restrictions on individuals, including family members, crossing the border are less likely to be effective.

Finally, return policies and time-limited protection periods are often set in the forced migration context to prevent longer-term stays. Yet in lower state capacity contexts, it is more difficult to remove individuals from the country after their visas have expired (Black and Koser, 1999; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2021).

To summarize, we argue that higher levels of either form of trust should be positively associated with preferences for more liberal migration policies, following evidence from high-income settings (Jeannet et al., 2021, 2023). Yet by virtue of our multidimensional measure of policy preferences detailed later in our experimental design, we expect that interpersonal trust in migrants will matter more across policy domains because its increase will reduce citizens' perceptions of migrants as competitive threats and enhance their willingness to extend concern about migrants' well-being.

3   Colombia and Peru in Context

Low-trust and lower-capacity countries in a low-trust region

State capacity in the Latin American region has historically been considered low compared to that of the United States and European countries. It has also been considered one of the

central political challenges of the region in the twenty-first century (Acemoglu et al., 2015; Mauricio Cárdenas, 2010; Mazzuca and Munck, 2021; Soifer, 2015). Official indices show that Colombia and Peru rank well below the level of high-income countries.[2]


Figure 1: Trust in Government

Note: Variation in levels of trust in government across countries. Refers to the percentage of respondents responding *"A great deal"* or *"Quite a lot"* to the question whether they trust their government. Authors' construction with data from the *World Values Survey* (2017-2020). Red dashed line is the average trust level among countries. Countries in blue (unfilled) squares are Latin American countries. Peru and Colombia are in purple.

Surveys also regularly demonstrate how citizens in Latin American countries hold some of the world's lowest levels of interpersonal trust (Scartascini and Luna, 2020; Searing, 2013) and trust in government (Catterberg, 2006; Mattes and Moreno, 2017; Letki, 2017; Bargsted et al., 2017). This is particularly true for Colombia and Peru. Figure 1 shows how almost 90% of respondents in both countries hold little or no trust in government, lower than all other sampled countries in the region except Guatemala. Similarly, Figure 2a also shows

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[2]Different indexes capture state capacity. One of the most recent and comprehensive examples comes from data from Hanson and Sigman (2021), which aims to capture the extent of the state's control over territory, sustainably raises sufficient resources, and the quality of security forces and public servants. Colombia (0.61) and Peru (0.79) rank well below European countries (1.45) and the United States (1.86).

the low levels of interpersonal trust, with Peru and Colombia registering among the lowest levels. In fact, when extending the concept of interpersonal trust to trust in people from other nationalities, Peru ranks at the bottom of the list (see Figure 2b.)

## Population and policy dynamics

Between 2015 and 2022, the Venezuelan crisis resulted in the outflow of over seven million of its citizens (around 23% of the country's population in 2015), see Figure 3. This makes Venezuelans the world's largest forcibly displaced population as of 2023. By December 2023, over 6.5 million had settled in Latin America and the Caribbean, with Colombia (2.8 million) and Peru (1.5 million) hosting the majority (Inter Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, 2022). Colombia and Peru have managed these inflows through migration rather than asylum policies, notably through special temporary residence permits and regularization programs.

Peru initially established a Temporary Permanence Permit (PTP), which authorized Venezuelans to live and work in the country for one year. Since mid-2018, however, the country gradually adopted more restrictive measures including the introduction of a passport requirement for regular entry, the end of the PTP program in late-2019, and the implementation of a humanitarian visa regime in mid-2019. The requirements of a passport, certificate of criminal records from Venezuela, and the collapse of the visa appointment system collectively created barriers to legal entry for most Venezuelans, which in turn led to an increase in asylum applications and irregular immigration (Freier and Luzes, 2022). Subsequently, Peru's land borders were closed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In early 2021, the government implemented an amnesty program for irregular migrants who arrived before October 2020.

Meanwhile, the Colombian government developed a series of regularization instruments for Venezuelans. The first permit was the Border Mobility Card (Tarjeta de Movilidad Fronteriza, TMF), which dates to February 2017 and was reactivated in December 2019.

(a) Interpersonal Trust
(Other people)

(b) Interpersonal Trust
(in people of other nationalities)

Figure 2: Interpersonal Trust

Note: (a) Refers to the percentage of respondents responding *"Most people can be trusted"* against the alternative of: *"Need to be very careful"* to the question: *can most people be trusted?* (b) Refers to the percentage of respondents responding *"Trust completely"* or *"trust somewhat"* to the question *"Can people from other nationalities be trusted?*. Authors' construction with data from the *World Values Survey* (2017-2020). Red line is the cross-country average. Countries in blue are Latin American countries. Peru and Colombia are in purple.

Figure 3: Number of Venezuelans in Colombia and Peru

Note: Authors' construction with data obtained from UNHCR Refugee Statistics (2022).

Other permits included the Entry and Permanence Permit (Permiso de Ingreso y Permanencia, PIP), the Special Permanence Permit (Permiso Especial de Permanencia, PEP), and the Temporal Transit Permit (Permiso de Tránsito Temporal, PTT). Although Colombian borders were also closed to international travel in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, humanitarian channels remained open for movement between Colombia and Venezuela. Importantly, in January 2021 Colombia announced that it would grant Venezuelans in the country a temporary protection status (Estatus Temporal de Proteccion) that would allow them to remain legally in the country and access work and services for up to 10 years.

Overall, while Peru's policy approach to migration generated more legal barriers over time, Colombia's migration policy generally simplified pathways towards regularization. Regardless, in both countries, Venezuelan migrants have been perceived by the public as financial burdens and security threats (Freier et al., 2020). Moreover, surveys in both countries have shown how public opinion and attitudes towards Venezuelans turned considerably more

negative over time (Alfonzo and Seijas, 2020).

4 Data and Empirical Strategy

Survey sample

We conducted an online pre-registered survey experiment in Colombia and Peru from March 1-13, 2021.[3] The sample comprises 5,046 respondents: 2,508 in Colombia and 2,538 in Peru.[4] Our sampling aimed to be representative of the voting age population in each country (18 years and older) across several dimensions based on the 2018 Colombian and 2017 Peruvian censuses.[5] This includes key demographic variables such as age, gender, region of residence, and socioeconomic status. Since each respondent saw five pairs of policy packages, our analysis comprises 50,460 observations. We also recorded additional sociodemographic and economic variables. Descriptive statistics of respondents' characteristics are included in Table B.2 in the Appendix.[6]

Empirical strategy

The survey design included a fully randomized choice-based conjoint experiment. This approach enables estimation of the causal effects of different treatment components (e.g. policy

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[3]The survey design and main (aggregate) hypotheses were pre-registered (withheld for anonymous reviewing) by the authors with the *As Predicted* platform at: http://aspredicted.org/. The pre-registration information is included in Apendix C.

[4]Power analyses conducted prior to fieldwork informed the sample sizes: the experiments are well-powered to detect AMCEs of 0.03 (Lukac and Stefanelli, 2020; Schuessler and Freitag, 2020).

[5]The survey questionnaire is included in Apendix D, along with the relevant information regarding data collection and compliance with American Political Science Association (APSA) Ethics Guide the and the Principles and Guidance for working with Human Subjects. The survey and research design received IRB approval from the Principal Investigator's academic institution.

[6]Acknowledging concerns about non-probability sampling in Latin America (Castorena et al., 2023), in the supporting information (Table B.2) we compare our achieved sample characteristics with those reported by the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Latin American Public Opinion survey (LAPOP) both of which which use probability sampling methods. The results display close alignment, with the exception of education. Moreover, our experimental approach retains high internal validity for revealing the extent to which preferences are multidimensional and the analysis of the influence of more or less political and interpersonal trust. Nevertheless, we restrict our interpretation to survey respondents.

features) simultaneously in a multidimensional manner (Bansak et al., 2021b; Hainmueller et al., 2014; Rodon and Sanjaume-Calvet, 2020). This is a useful design if the research question of interest involves measuring preferences along several dimensions. Questions about migration and policy preferences can also create issues of social desirability bias. However, conjoint experiments allow for the respondent to justify their choices along any number of the dimensions, which mitigates the risk of this form of bias (Bansak et al., 2021b; Dahl, 2018; Horiuchi et al., 2022; Hainmueller et al., 2015).

We presented respondents with five hypothetical pairs of migration policy packages. Each package contains randomly selected options ("levels") that vary in terms of their restrictiveness from within the six policy dimensions previously discussed (labor market access, numerical limits, length of residency, geographic location, family reunification, and access to healthcare). Table 1 displays these options for each policy dimension. The key differences among each level are displayed in bold text and represent the treatment text for the experiment: this was also apparent in the version that respondents saw.

Respondents were asked to choose which of the two policy packages they preferred.[7] Each respondent completed five trials. We also randomized the order of the policy dimensions between respondents to reduce order effects, where respondents disproportionately focus on items appearing near the beginning of a list, but kept it constant across the five trials to minimize survey fatigue (Rasinski et al., 2012; Stefkovics and Kmetty, 2022). Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix illustrate the online interface that respondents saw in each country. In the analysis, we measure aggregate policy preferences by country and then examine how these preferences vary based on levels of political and interpersonal trust.

To measure public preferences towards each policy option within each dimension, we estimate marginal means (MMs).[8] We report MMs to address concerns about how researchers'

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[7]Respondents were also asked to rate each package on a 1-7 scale, where 1 indicated "absolutely dislike" and 7 indicated "absolutely like". We also use this variable to check for consistency in the responses.

[8]MMs represent the mean outcome across all appearances of a particular feature, averaging across all other features. They are the differences in the outcome of interest caused by the presence of a specific attribute, all other attributes being equal.

Policy dimension	Levels
Labor Markets	-Venezuelans can work in the country **without restrictions**.
	-Venezuelans can work in Colombia **only in in selected occupations**.
	-Venezuelans **cannot** work in the country.
Geographic Location	-Venezuelans are allowed to locate in **their city of preference** in the country
	-Venezuelans are allowed to locate in **certain designated cities** in the country.
Access to Healthcare	-Venezuelans **can** access the subsidized public healthcare system **on an equal basis to Colombians**.
	-Venezuelans **cannot** access the subsidised public health care system in Colombia.
Family Reunification	-Venezuelans **are allowed** to bring their spouse and children.
	-Venezuelans are allowed to bring their spouse and children **if they can pay for their cost of living**.
	-Venezuelans are **not allowed** to bring their spouse and children.
Numerical Limits	-Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia **without numerical limits**.
	-Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia **until an annual limit is reached**.
Protection Period	-Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia for **an indefinite period**.
	-Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia for **a period of ten years, which can be renewed**.
	-Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia for **a period of ten years, which cannot be renewed**.

Table 1: Policy dimensions and levels used in the experiment

choices of reference categories might impact the substantive interpretation of the results —
particularly among subgroups (Leeper, 2020; Leeper et al., 2020; Ratkovic, 2021). In all
estimations, we report robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level since each respondent saw multiple treatments (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Hainmueller et al., 2014).
We further estimate conditional marginal means (CMMs) to measure subgroup preferences
for the policy options based on an interaction with the levels of trust.

Our measure for political trust relies on the respondents' levels of agreement with three

statements that previous work has validated as comprising an effective measure of political trust (Devine et al., 2020; Jennings et al., 2021):

> To what extent do you agree with the following statements, where 1 means *"strongly disagree"* and 5 means *"strongly agree"*? [Ranking 1 to 5]
>
> 1. *The governments understand the needs of my community.*
> 2. *The government usually has good intentions.*
> 3. *The government usually does the right thing.*

These statements were presented pre-treatment and the order was randomized by respondent.[9] For our main analysis, we take the average response for the three-item battery. These results are robust across other specifications.[10]

For interpersonal trust, we first use a question which asks respondents to indicate the number of people of venezuelan origin that they trust. We also considered that and two other questions to create an index measuring self-reported *meaningful* social contact as developed by the work of Clayton et al. (2021). In addition to trust in migrants (number of), the questions - placed after the conjoint experiment -, asked also about daily interactions and social interactions (i.e. gathering for dinner).[11] The order of these questions was also randomized across respondents.

> 1. *Over the past few years, how often if at all do you have everyday relationships with people from Venezuela, such as exchanging a few words, for example, or buying a newspaper at the store, and so on?*[12]
> 2. *This question concerns people you trust, for example good friends, those with whom you discuss important subjects, with whom you keep in touch, or who*

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[9]Figure A.4 shows the distribution of mean responses to the three statements by country and Figure A.3 presents the distribution of each individual component.

[10]Using multiple items to measure trust potentially provides a fuller assessment compared to directly asking about levels of trust ascribed to national governments. In our robustness checks reported later, we demonstrate how setting the boundary between "high" and "low" trust respondents in alternative ways–including use of the scale midpoint, an Item Response Scale (IRT) model built from the three items, and a singular question–do not substantially change the results.

[11]Figure A.5 presents the distribution of each individual question.

[12]This question had been pre-tested by Schmid et al. (2014). The set of possible responses is never, rarely, sometimes, often, every day.

are there for you if you need help. How many people you trust are from Venezuela?[13]

3. *Over the past few years, have you shared a meal in your home with someone from Venezuela?* [Yes, No][14]

Following Clayton et al. (2021), we then also created an index of proximity to stratify the sample in two groups: those who report high levels of *quality* contact, and those who report low levels of *quality* contact. These groups are based on an index of contact with Venezuelans (on a scale of 0-3) using the three questions on contact. [15] We focus the analysis here using only the trust question (question 2) which is the most explicit measure of interpersonal trust in which we are interested in. The results were consistent across specifications. Our main results report the most direct and conservative measure of interpersonal trust (question 2), while sharing alternative estimations in the Appendix.

5 Results

We present our results in three steps. First, we show how policy preferences vary across the six dimensions in each country to establish the existence of multidimensional preferences. Second, we illustrate the limited extent to which levels of political trust in the government moderate these preferences, pooled across the countries. Third, we compare the predicted probabilities for choosing either the most or the least restrictive policy options within each area given changing levels of political and interpersonal trust.

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[13]This is a recurrent question in the General Social Survey, adapted to make is specific about Venezuelans. The set of possible responses is 0, 1, 2-5, 6-10, More than 10.

[14]This is a recurrent question in the General Social Survey, adapted to make is specific about Venezuelans.

[15]Respondents receive one point if they report having everyday interactions with Venezuelans "sometimes," "often," or "everyday;" if they report trusting "2-5," "5-10," or "more than 10" Venezuelans; or if they report having shared a meal in their home with a Venezuelan in the past year. Our high trust dummy is based on having received a score of 2 or more. In our robustness checks, we re-run the analyses using scores of either more than 0 or more than 1 for the "high contact" group. We also look run an alternative specification coding anyone answering "yes" to the shared meal question as having "high" contact. The results remained consistent.

Overall policy preferences

Which types of migration policies do respondents in Colombia and Peru prefer? Figure 4 displays the marginal means (MMs) for Colombia and Peru across the policy dimensions, following our pre-registration plan. Family reunification, access to labor markets, and numerical limits generate the strongest preferences in either direction (as indicated by the wider deviations from the central 50% line). Respondents in both countries prefer allowing conditional family reunification (about 58%), particularly compared to the alternative options of completely barring family members or placing no restrictions on reunification (about 46-47% in both cases). They also prefer placing either some restrictions on Venezuelans' access to the labor market (about 56%) or none at all (about 54%) compared to preventing Venezuelans from working at all (about 41%). Meanwhile, respondents prefer setting annual limits on Venezuelan arrivals, particularly among Peruvians (about 55% compared to 53% of Colombian respondents, a significant difference).[16]

How important are these dimensions for respondents' preferences? Figure 5 displays the importance of levels within each dimension for selecting the policy package. The vertical red dotted line represents the percentage weight of each attribute if they all had equal importance (16.67%). Access to employment, family reunification, and numerical limits are the three most important attributes for respondents. The importance of these attributes will be key when considering the influence of distinct types of trust on the different policy dimensions. Since the differences between Colombia and Peru are minimal, we pool the samples for the remaining analysis.

These results differ from the patterns found in high-income countries in several important ways. Access to publicly-subsidized healthcare is relatively unimportant to respondents in both countries: the variation between policy options in this dimension is much smaller than in other areas. While public debates about immigrants' abilities to access public services have

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[16]The corresponding marginal means for Figure 4 are included in Table B.3 in the Appendix; and Figure A.6 displays formal tests of differences in preferences between the two countries.

Figure 4: Aggregate policy preferences towards Venezuelan migration in Colombia and Peru

Note: Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95 % confidence intervals. The grey line refers to the 0.50 mark (increased likelihood of selection). Corresponding results are in Table B.3 located in the Online Appendix.

dominated discussions in Europe and North America (Geddes, 2003; Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Poppleton et al., 2013; Caviedes, 2015; Alesina et al., 2021), this does not appear to be the case in Colombia and Peru. This may be because of the relative weakness of government public health systems in Latin America and the degree to which different socioeconomic groups opt out of the system, relying on private provision, despite recent historical efforts to strengthen services via inclusive policy reforms (Kapiszewski, 2021).

Figure 5: Importance level by country by attributes

Note: The dashed red line is corresponds to a value of 16.67%, which would be the expected value if all six dimensions contribute equally. Therefore,values above 16.67 indicate levels within that attribute are contributing more to policy preferences.

Does political trust moderate policy preferences?

Do levels of political trust in government moderate respondents' preferences? Figure 6 reports the conditional marginal means (CMMs) by level of trust pooled across countries

and measured by respondents' mean scores for the three-question battery.[17] Our exploratory results, i.e. not pre-registered, indicate that political trust appears to selectively matter for some migration policy domains, but in delimited ways. Low political trust respondents are 2 percentage points more likely than high-trust respondents to prefer completely barring access to employment, and about 2.5 percentage points less likely than high-trust respondents to prefer completely unrestricted access to employment. They are also 2 percentage points more likely to prefer placing an annual limit on arrivals compared to high-trust respondents.[18]

Figure 6: Policy preferences towards Venezuelan migration by levels of political trust

Note: Conditional marginal means by level of political trust (pooled results). Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95 % confidence intervals. The grey line refers to the 0.50 mark (increased likelihood of selection). Corresponding results are in Table B.4 located in Online Appendix.

To better illustrate what these differences mean, Figure 7 shows the marginal plots of

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[17]As a reminder, we set the "high trust" level as being above the median response within each country. The results for each country are in Figure A.7 in the appendix.

[18]The corresponding values for the marginal means in Figure 6 are in Table B.4 located in the Appendix. Figure A.8 displays formal tests for differences between high- and low-trust respondents in each country.

the conditional mean responses when interacting the continuous trust measure across the most liberal and restrictive policy options within each dimension, omitting intermediate options. On the one hand, the only significant interaction was for employment restrictions and numerical limits, with increasing political trust relating to greater preferences for less restrictive employment laws and no restrictions on annual arrival levels. Since these two areas are theoretically linked with labor market competition threats, this suggests that trust in government might alleviate these kinds of concerns. Yet it is important to acknowledge how majorities of respondents with either low or high levels of political trust support a more liberal labour market approach overall: in other words, the difference is a matter of changing relative levels of support rather than changing preferences completely. On the other hand, changes in levels of political trust are not associated either statistically or substantively with shifts in preferences in any of the other domains. The null result for family reunification is particularly striking because this was the second-most important attribute overall for respondents (see Figure 5) and is an area found to be sensitive to levels of political trust in European cases (Jeannet et al., 2023).

Does interpersonal trust moderate policy preferences?

Finally, do levels of interpersonal trust in migrants moderate respondents' preferences? When replacing political trust with different variations of the interpersonal trust measure - from meaningful social contact to reported number of trusted Venezuelan migrants, coded as either a dichotomous (low vs. high) or continuous variable - interpersonal trust generated a statistically significant increase across all domains in preferences for more liberal migration policies.

For the dichotomous measure, when using the most conservative and direct measure of interpersonal trust available (the reported number of Venezuelan migrants the respondent trusts) and setting the threshold at 0 for none and 1 for at least one trusted migrant, the "low interpersonal trust" respondents are 3 percentage points less likely to prefer unrestricted

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
Figure 7: Preferences by levels of trust in government

Note: Marginal means (pooled results) at different levels of trust in government. *** Indicates statistical significance in the interaction term of trust in government with the most restrictive and/or most liberal policies within the policy domain ($p \leq 0.05$). The corresponding results from the OLS regressions with policy preferences as the outcome variable and the marginal means at different levels of trust are located in the online Appendix in Table B.5. For policy domains with more than two levels, the middle-level policy was not included in the graph.

employment access, 2 percentage points more likely to prefer placing annual limits, and 4 percentage points more likely to prefer restricted family reunification.[19]

As for the continuous influence of increasing interpersonal trust, Figure 8 shows the marginal plots for the interaction of the continuous level of interpersonal trust pooled across countries across policy dimensions. Likewise, the results shown use the question on the number of migrants that the respondent knows and trusts, which is our most explicit measure of interpersonal trust. However, results using the continuous version of the meaningful contact measure do not differ. Overall, higher levels of interpersonal trust have a statistically significant association with stronger preferences for less restrictive policy options within each domain. The greatest effect is found for access to employment, which is the most important of attributes for the results in general. On average, moving from the lowest (1) to highest (5) level of interpersonal trust is associated with a 16 percentage point increase in the distribution of preferences for more open *vs.* less restrictive employment policies (from an estimated 52% vs. 42% to 60% vs. 34%). These results support our theoretical expectations and establish the key role of interpersonal trust for migration policy preferences in lower state capacity settings.[20]

6 Robustness Checks

We test whether our results are robust to different assumptions and specifications. First, we explore the role of other potential moderating variables and rule out the possibility that the role of trust in government and interpersonal trust in migrants (in the formation of policy preferences) is driven by other individual-level characteristics. We run nested models interacting policy dimensions with a battery of socioeconomic, political variables (political

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[19]Figures A.9, A.10, A.11 in the appendix share the conditional marginal means (CMMs) by level of interpersonal trust for the different variations of the interpersonal trust variable across all domains.

[20]We further examined whether there was a positive correlation between political and interpersonal trust. While statistically significant, given the sample size, the correlation coefficient was relatively low at 0.0735. This suggests that the respective influence of the two types of trust are mostly independent of one another, although estimation of the precise relationship between the two types of trust (complements vs. substitutes) could be explored in future studies.

Figure 8: Preferences by levels of interpersonal trust in migrants

Note: Marginal means (pooled results) at different levels of interpersonal trust in migrants. ***
Indicates statistical significance in the interaction term of interpersonal trust with the most restrictive
and/or most liberal policies within the policy domain ($p \leq 0.05$). The corresponding results from the
OLS regressions with policy preferences as the outcome variable and the marginal means at different
levels of trust are located in the online Appendix in Table B.6. For policy domains with more than two
levels, the middle-level policy was not included in the graph.

ideology), and attitudes to migration. This allows us to understand the extent to which trust drives our results (or whether it is a product of omitted variables). The results, presented in Table B.7 show that the introduction of interactions with additional covariates do not alter the robustness of the results. The estimates remain significant for the areas discussed and in the same direction.

Second, we test for consistency of respondent's choice by using an additional dependent variable. Throughout the analysis, we used the forced choice (selection of policy bundle) as our main dependent variable. However, in addition to the forced choice, we also asked respondents to rate (from 1 to 7) each of policy bundles. Our results were consistent when using both approaches (see Figure A.12 in the appendix).

We also acknowledge how our trust indices may be susceptible to content and construct validity issues. To address this, we replicated the analysis by applying Item Response Theory (IRT) modeling to the political trust battery of questions, which measured a latent trust trait assumed to fall on a continuous scale.[21] The results, displayed in Figure A.14, remain similar to our main findings. When applying the IRT model to the contact questions, while we found two dimensions, our results did not change when using the main construct.

As for the construction of the political and interpersonal trust dichotomous variables, we examined sensitivity to changing thresholds and results remained consistent. In fact, for the dichotomous interpersonal trust variable, we reported the most conservative construction, with the results from other variations indicating even larger effects.

Finally, since survey fatigue after multiple trials potentially impacts data quality, we checked the results by task number.[22] We find that the estimates by task number have a high degree of consistency (see Figure A.13).

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[21]Valid IRT models need to meet three conditions: unidimensionality (i.e. the scale items tap into only one underlying trait), local independence (i.e. the items are uncorrelated after conditioning on the measured trait), and good model fit (De Ayala, 2008; Ackerman, 2010). Inspection of empirical plot and diagnostics calculated using the *mirt* package in R confirmed that our IRT model met these criteria.

[22]The number of tasks that we included (five) is well within what benchmarking studies have indicated are the bounds of what respondents typically complete without losses in quality Bansak et al. (2021a)

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7 Conclusion

Despite significant scholarly attention to the forms and drivers of attitudes towards migrants, little previous work has empirically measured such preferences in contexts of lower state capacity in recognition of the multidimensional character of migration policy. Consequently, explanations that foreground political trust may overstate the scale and scope of its importance when the capacity of core institutions to deliver complex policies on behalf of citizens is limited, which differs from high-income destination countries (i.e. Europe: see Jeannet et al. 2021 and Jeannet et al. 2023).

Our conjoint study from Colombia and Peru–the two countries that have received the majority of the world's displaced Venezuelans–breaks new ground by contributing three sets of findings. First, in terms of aggregate preferences, respondents in both countries do not support complete restriction on Venezuelans' access to employment, but do favor limits on overall inflows as well as the conditions of residency and family reunification. These are the three aspects to which respondents attach the most weight when determining which policy packages they prefer.

Second, by considering multiple dimensions of migration policy, we show that prior theorization about the relationship between political trust and preferences–specifically that greater trust is linked to more open preferences–requires more circumspection. Besides making substantively small differences to preferences overall, political trust does not appear to moderate preferences towards family reunification in particular. On the one hand, this starkly contrasts with findings from the only similar conjoint experiment on migration preferences conducted to date in Europe (Jeannet et al., 2023). On the other hand, our delimited results for political trust across the board fits with evidence from other complex policy domains such as climate change (Devine et al., 2023). Not only does this lend further support for the argument for cautioning against overstating the case for political trust moderating preferences, but it also highlights the importance of further comparative work

beyond high-income countries where state capacity–and citizens' relationships with government institutions tasked with implementing policies–may differ.

Third, we show that interpersonal trust in migrant beneficiaries of proposed interventions matters more for policy preferences. Unlike political trust, which moderated preferences in a limited manner, higher levels of interpersonal trust had global associations with stronger preferences for more open policy options in every dimension we tested. Recalling that these dimensions had theoretical as well as policy relevance, we interpret this set of findings as providing further weight to calls for considering interpersonal trust between citizens and targeted beneficiaries as a factor contributing to successful implementation efforts–especially when those efforts involve targeting ethnically diverse or minority groups. In fact, the focus on political trust in high-income countries may even have elided exploration of the role of interpersonal trust in migrants for policy dimensions in high state capacity contexts. Such additional study is needed to further specify the boundary conditions of political and interpersonal trust as well as understanding of the relationship (complement or substitute) between them.

Taken together, our study provides novel empirical evidence of the kinds of migration policies that citizens want in low- and middle-income countries which continue to experience the world's largest migration flows, as well as the extent to which they may be driven by forms of trust that are both theoretically and practically important. As such, it extends theorization about the consequences of these trust types to contexts of lower state capacity and to new domains of migration policymaking. This opens avenues for further investigation into the extent to which theories of migration attitudes and preferences travel among cases, and to highlight where empirical variation challenges theoretical expectations.

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Supplementary Information

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Appendix A. Figures

	Paquete A	Paquete B
Localización geográfica	A los venezolanos solo se les permite residir en **ciertas ciudades** designadas en Colombia.	A los venezolanos solo se les permite residir en **ciertas ciudades** designadas en Colombia.
Acceso al mercado laboral	Los venezolanos **no pueden trabajar** en Colombia.	Los venezolanos **no pueden trabajar** en Colombia.
Limites numéricos	**No existe un límite** al número de venezolanos que tienen permitido ingresar a Colombia cada año.	**No existe un límite** al número de venezolanos que tienen permitido ingresar a Colombia cada año.
Permiso de estadía	Los venezolanos pueden permanecer en Colombia solo por un periodo de **diez años, <u>el cual no</u> puede** ser extendido.	Los venezolanos pueden permanecer en Colombia por un periodo de **tiempo indefinido**.
Acceso al régimen subsidiado de salud	Los venezolanos **tienen acceso** al régimen subsidiado de salud en igualdad de condiciones a los colombianos.	Los venezolanos **tienen acceso** al régimen subsidiado de salud en igualdad de condiciones a los colombianos.
Reunificación familiar	Los venezolanos en Colombia **pueden traer** a sus familias (pareja y/o hijos) desde Venezuela.	Los venezolanos en Colombia **pueden traer** a sus familias (pareja y/o hijos) desde Venezuela.

En una escala del 1 al 7, dónde 1 significa que a usted **Definitivamente no le gusta** este paquete, y 7 significa que **Definitivamente le gusta** este paquete; ¿cómo calificaría cada paquete?

	Definitivamente no le gusta 1	2	3	4	5	6	Definitivamente le gusta 7
Paquete de medidas A	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Paquete de medidas B	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Figure A.1: Online interface for Colombia

Note: Snapshot of the online interface seen by the respondents in Colombia. This corresponds to the third trial. Text in bold highlights the specific stance on that policy dimension.

¿Si tuviera que escoger, cuál de estos paquetes de medidas sería el de su mayor preferencia?

Pregunta: 5/5

	Paquete A	Paquete B
Localización geográfica	A los venezolanos se les permite residir en **solo ciertas ciudades** designadas en Perú.	A los venezolanos se les permite residir en **cualquier ciudad** de Perú, según sus preferencias.
Reunificación familiar	Los venezolanos en Perú **no pueden traer** a sus familias (pareja y/o hijos) desde Venezuela.	Los venezolanos en Perú **pueden traer** a sus familias (pareja y/o hijos) desde Venezuela.
Límites numéricos	**Solo un número limitado** de venezolanos tiene permitido ingresar a Perú cada año.	**Solo un número limitado** de venezolanos tiene permitido ingresar a Perú cada año.
Permiso de estadía	Los venezolanos pueden permanecer en Perú solo por un periodo de **diez años, el cual no puede ser extendido.**	Los venezolanos pueden permanecer en Perú solo por un periodo de **diez años, el cual no puede ser extendido.**
Acceso al mercado laboral	Los venezolanos **no pueden trabajar** en Perú.	Los venezolanos pueden trabajar en Perú **sin ninguna restricción.**
Acceso al régimen subsidiado de salud	Los venezolanos **no tienen acceso** al régimen subsidiado de salud.	Los venezolanos **no tienen acceso** al régimen subsidiado de salud.
	☐	☐

En una escala del 1 al 7, dónde 1 significa que a usted **Definitivamente no le gusta** este paquete, y 7 significa que **Definitivamente le gusta** este paquete; ¿cómo calificaría cada paquete?

	Definitivamente no le gusta 1	2	3	4	5	6	Definitivamente le gusta 7
Paquete de medidas A	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Paquete de medidas B	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Figure A.2: Online interface for Peru

Note: Snapshot of the online interface seen by the respondents in Peru. This corresponds to the fifth trial. Text in bold highlights the specific stance on that policy dimension.

Figure A.3: Distribution of responses to trust in government items (pooled)

Note: Distribution of responses for each of the three trust in government questions (likert responses where 1 means *"strongly disagree"* and 5 means *"strongly agree"*. Pooled responses for a total sample of 5046 respondents.

Figure A.4: Distribution of mean responses to the trust in government question battery by country

Note: Distribution of mean response for the the battery of three questions. Responses for a total sample of 2508 respondetns for Colombia and 2538 respondents for Peru.

Figure A.5: Distribution of responses to trust in migrants and other contact questions (pooled)

Note: Distribution of responses for each of the three contact with people of other nationality (i.e. Venezuelans) questions (likert responses where 1 means "*strongly disagree*" and 5 means "*strongly agree*". Pooled responses for a total sample of 5046 respondents.

Figure A.6: Differences in aggregate preferences by country

Note: Coefficients on the differences in marginal means between Colombia and Peru (aggregate preferences). Values of marginal means and estimated differences are included in Table B.3 in Appendix B

Figure A.7: Peru and Colombia results by trust in government

Note: Conditional marginal means by level of political trust (trust in government). The grey line refers to the 0.50 mark (likelihood of selection). The results are included in Table B.4 in Appendix B

Figure A.8: Differences in preferences by trust in government levels (pooled)

Note: Differences in marginal means between **high** and **low** trust individual's policy preferences (by trust in government)

Figure A.9: Results by Interpersonal Trust (question 2)

Note: Results using a 0-1 dummy variable using question 2 of the contact questions (number of Venezuelans trusted) where trusting more than 1 was given a value of 1. Results included for robustness and illustrative purposes. Results are in line with the main results presented in the text.

Figure A.10: Results by Interpersonal Trust (Contact Index)

Note: Conditional marginal means by level of interpersonal trust in migrants. Results using the contact index. The index followed the Clayton et al. (2021) approach where respondents receive one point if they report having everyday interactions with Venezuelans "sometimes," "often," or "everyday;" if they report trusting "2-5," "5-10," or "more than 10" Venezuelans; or if they report having shared a meal in their home with a Venezuelan in the past year. The high trust dummy is based on having received a score of 1 or more for the "high contact" group.

Figure A.11: Results by Interpersonal Trust (Contact Index -higher threshold)

Note: Conditional marginal means by level of interpersonal trust in migrants. Results using the contact index. The index followed the Clayton et al. (2021) approach where respondents receive one point if they report having everyday interactions with Venezuelans "sometimes," "often," or "everyday;" if they report trusting "2-5," "5-10," or "more than 10" Venezuelans; or if they report having shared a meal in their home with a Venezuelan in the past year. Our high trust dummy is based on having received a score of 2 or more.

Figure A.12: Robustness: Forced choice vs Rating

Note: Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95% confidence intervals. Single points without horizontal bars denote the reference category used for that dimension. The scaled variable in (b) is a dichotomised version of the rating outcome coded 1 for profiles rated higher than 4, 0 otherwise. Based on the following question: On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means "you absolutely dislike" and 7 means "you absolutely like", how would you rate each of these packages?"

Figure A.13: Robustness: Results by task

Note: Marginal means by trial. The grey line refers to the 0.50 mark (likelihood of selection). Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.14: Policy Preferences: IRT Modelling

Note: Conditional marginal means using the IRT modeling for trust in government. The grey line refers to the 0.50 mark (likelihood of selection). Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95% confidence intervals.

Appendix B. Tables

Table B.1: Socio-demographic and other covariates

Variable	Definition
Age	Self-reported age in years. Responded coded as "old" if above the median age in the sample or "young" otherwise.
Education	Self-reported highest level of education. The scale contains the following categories: Primary education, Secondary education, technical education, University (professional) degree.
Employment	Self-reported employment status. Respondents answer the following question: *"Which of the following applies to you?"* Answer options included: Currently working as self-employed; Currently working as employed; Full time student, Retired/pension, Unemployed, Not working, Have never worked, Other.
Gender	Self-reported gender.
Impact COVID	The following questions were asked to those that were either employed or unemployed: "Many people have been affected financially by the coronavirus. We'd like to know how you have been affected, and how you and your household are coping."

Variable	Definition
Political ideology	Self-reported ideological leaning. The question used was: *"Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?* [Ranking 1 to 10]". Three ideological categories are defined: Left (0-4), Centre (5) and Right (6-10).
Region of residence Colombia	Region of residence of the respondent. Region 1 – Bogota Region 2 – North/Caribbean Region 3 – East Center Region 4 – Antioquia and coffee growing area Region 5 – West - South
Region of residence Peru	Region of residence of the respondent. Region 1 – Lima Region 2 - Rest of the country
Contact	Based on the following three questions: (i) Over the past few years, how often if at all do you have everyday relationships with people from Venezuela, such as exchanging a few words, for example, or buying a newspaper at the store, and so on? [never, rarely, sometimes, often, every day] (ii) This question concerns people you trust, for example good friends, those with whom you discuss important subjects, with whom you keep in touch, or who are there for you if you need help. How many people you trust are from Venezuela? [0, 1, 2-5, 6-10, More than 10] (iii) Over the past few years, have you shared a meal in your home with someone from Venezuela? [Yes, No]

Variable	Definition
Trust in government	To what extent do you agree with the following statements, where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 5 means "strongly agree"? [Ranking 1 to 5]: (i) The governments understand the needs of my community., (ii) The government usually has good intentions., (iii) The government usually does the right thing.
Socioeconomic strata	Self-reported social strata [1 to 6]. Social strata (estrato socioeconomico) is considered low for those living in 1, 2 and 3 – which is where residents receive subsidies for their utilities (water, gas, electricity). 5 and 6 are the highest and pay higher rates to subsidize those in lower strata.

Sample	Colombia			Peru		
	Survey	WVS	LAPOP	Survey	WVS	LAPOP
Gender						
Female	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Age Groups						
18-24	0.17	0.24	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.20
25-34	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.23	0.25
35-44	0.19	0.17	0.19	0.22	0.21	0.22
45-54	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17
+ 55	0.26	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.20	0.15
Martial Status						
Married	0.28	0.20	0.25	0.33	0.31	0.28
Labour Market						
In the labour force	0.78	0.64	0.64	0.86	0.70	0.70
Employed	0.66	0.53	0.41	0.76	0.65	0.5
Education						
Less than University	0.49	0.76	0.77	0.77	0.76	0.67
Political ideoloy						
Left	0.26	0.20	0.28	0.12	0.15	0.35
Center	0.50	0.42	0.36	0.48	0.50	0.34
Right	0.24	0.38	0.36	0.40	0.35	0.31
Region of Residence						
Bogota	0.17	0.18	0.18	N/A	N/A	N/A
Norte/Caribe	0.22	0.20	0.18	N/A	N/A	N/A
Centro Oriental	0.19	0.24	0.23	N/A	N/A	N/A
Antioquia/Eje Cafetero	0.16	0.19	0.19	N/A	N/A	N/A
Sur Occidental	0.20	0.16	0.13	N/A	N/A	N/A
Lima	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.37	0.25	0.25
Resto of Lima	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.63	0.75	0.75
Observations	2500	1520	1663	2500	1400	2647

Note: WVS: *World Values Survey*, LAPOP: *Latin American Public Opinion Survey*. Colombia is compared to Census (2018), WVS(2018), LAPOP(2018). Peru is compared to Census (2017), WVS(2018), LAPOP(2017).

Table B.2: Descriptive statistics of respondents

	Peru		Colombia		Both		
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(3)
Labour							
Unrestricted access		0.530*		0.532*		0.535*	0.005
		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.003)	(0.006)
Restricted access	0.0192*	0.558*	0.023*	0.556*	0.021*	0.557*	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Not access	-0.138*	0.401*	-0.118*	0.415*	-0.127*	0.408*	-0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Location							
No restriction		0.503*		0.514*		0.509*	-0.013*
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.004)
Restricted	-0.007	0.496*	-0.029*	0.486*	-0.018*	0.491*	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Health							
Access		0.459*		0.519*		0.512*	-0.015*
		(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.002)	(0.005)
No access	-0.013	0.493*	-0.038*	0.481*	-0.025*	0.487*	0.010*
	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Family							
Unrestricted		0.459*		0.471*		0.465*	-0.014*
		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.003)	(0.006)
Conditional	0.122*	0.580*	0.104*	0.575*	0.113*	0.578*	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Not allowed	0.001	0.459*	-0.017*	0.454*	-0.008*	0.456*	0.003
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.0045)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Limits							
No limit		0.450*		0.469*		0.459*	-0.020*
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.004)
Annual limit	0.098*	0.549*	0.0633*	0.531*	0.080*	0.540*	0.015*
	(0.007)*	(0.003)*	(0.007)*	(0.003)*	(0.005)*	(0.002)*	(0.004)*
Protection							
Indefinite period		0.475*		0.467*		0.470*	0.005
		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.003)	(0.006)
Ten years - renewed	0.047*	0.522*	0.051*	0.518*	0.049*	0.520*	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Ten years -not renewed	0.028*	0.502*	0.048*	0.515*	0.037*	0.508*	-0.014*
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Observations	25,370	25,370	25,080	25,080	50,470	50,470	50,470

Table B.3: Marginal means for aggregate policy preferences

Note:(1) Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors with 95 % confidence intervals. (2) Marginal means (likelihood of selection). $*p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parenthesis

	Peru		Colombia		Both	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Labour						
Allowed to work	0.556*	0.527*	0.545*	0.521*	0.550*	0.524*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Restricted work	0.557*	0.560*	0.553*	(0.557)*	0.555*	0.558*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Not allowed to work	0.387*	0.413*	0.405*	0.422*	0.396*	0.417*
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Location						
No restriction	0.512*	0.497*	0.516*	0.512*	0.513*	0.504*
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Restricted	0.488*	0.503*	0.484*	0.487*	(0.486*	0.495*
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	0.004	(0.003)	(0.003)
Health						
Access to subsidised health	0.506*	0.507*	0.520*	0.518*	0.513*	0.512*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
No access	0.494*	0.493*	0.480*	0.482*	0.487*	0.487*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	0.003
Family						
Allowed to bring family	0.451*	0.464*	0.470*	0.471*	0.461*	0.467*
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Only if can support it	0.587*	0.575*	0.567*	0.582*	0.577*	0.578*
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Not allowed to bring family	0.460*	0.460*	0.463*	0.446*	0.461*	0.453*
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Limits						
No limit	0.459*	0.443*	0.482*	0.456*	0.471*	0.449*
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Annual limit	0.540*	0.555*	0.518*	0.546*	0.529*	0.549*
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Protection						
Indefinite period	0.477*	0.474*	0.462*	0.470*	0.469*	0.472*
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Ten years - renewed	0.528*	0.520*	0.519*	0.518*	(0.522*	0.518*
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Ten years -not renewed	0.498*	0.510*	0.518*	0.512*	0.508*	0.509*
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Observations	11,230	14,140	11,890	13,190	23,120	27,230

Table B.4: Marginal means for policy preferences by levels of trust

Table B.7: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) Interacted with Individual Level Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Labour (baseline: allowed to work)					
Restricted work	0.020*	0.033*	0.053*	0.054*	0.049*
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Not allowed to work	-0.0129*	-0.108	-0.101*	-0.099*	-0.127*
	(0.006)*	(0.009)*	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Trust index		0.025*	0.025*	0.025*	0.026*
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Trust*Restricted		-0.028*	-0.024*	-0.024*	-0.024*
		(-0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Trust*Not allowed		-0.045*	-0.047*	-0.046*	-0.050*
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Location (baseline: not restricted)					
Restricted location	-0.017*	-0.009	-0.031*	0.030	-0.043*
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Trust index		0.009*	0.008	0.008*	0.008*
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	0.004
Trust*Restricted location		-0.019*	-0.016*	-0.016*	-0.017*
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(-0.009)
Health (baseline: access)					
Restricted Access	-0.026*	-0.025*	-0.031*	-0.029*	0.054*
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Trust		0.001	0.002	0.002	0.003
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Trust*restrictions		-0.002	-0.003	-0.004	-0.006
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Family (baseline: allowed to bring family					
Only if can support	0.113*	0.112*	0.069*	0.074*	0.079*
	(0.006)	(-0.007)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Not allowed	-0.007	-0.014*	-0.021	-0.016	-0.015
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(-0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Trust		-0.005	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Trust* only if can support		0.002	0.005	0.005	0.004
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Trust* not allowed		0.013	0.018	0.018	0.017
		(0.011	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Limits (baseline: no limits)					
Annual limits	0.081*	0.100*	0.087*	0.090*	0.090*
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Trust		0.022*	0.021*	0.021*	0.021*
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
					Continued on next page

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Trust*Annual Limits		-0.042*	-0.041*	-0.041*	-0.041*
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Protection (baseline: indefinite stay)					
10Y renewed	0.049*	0.045*	0.026	0.030*	0.030
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.019)
10Y not renewed	0.040*	0.037*	0.034*	0.036*	0.032
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.019)
Trust		-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Trust*10Y renewed		0.008	0.006	0.006	0.005
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Trust*10Y not renewed		0.005	0.003	0.003	0.003
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Observations	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450
Interaction: age, gender, skill	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Interact: migration attitude	N	N	N	Y	Y
Interaction: political ideology	N	N	N	N	Y

	Labour (1)	Labour (2)	Family (1)	Family (2)	Limits (1)	Limits (2)	Protection (1)	Protection (2)	Health (1)	Health (2)	Location (1)	Location (2)
One	0.520*	0.423*	0.462*	0.454*	0.450*	0.549*	0.473*	0.508*	0.509*	0.489*	0.502*	0.496*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Two	0.533*	0.410*	0.464*	0.456*	0.457*	0.542*	0.472*	0.508*	0.512*	0.487*	0.508*	0.492*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Three	0.546*	0.397*	0.466*	0.459*	0.468*	0.532*	0.469*	0.508*	0.515*	0.485*	0.513*	0.487*
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Four	0.559*	0.383*	0.468*	0.462*	0.479*	0.522*	0.466*	0.509*	0.521*	0.483*	0.519*	0.483*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Five	0.572*	0.370*	0.470*	0.465*	0.491*	0.511*	0.463*	0.509*	0.518*	0.481*	0.524*	0.478*
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Interaction	-0.011*	-0.027*	-0.006	0.001	X	-0.0213*	0.007	0.003	X	-0.005	X	-0.010
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	X	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	X	(0.005)	X	(0.004)
Observations	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450

Table B.5: Marginal means and interaction term (Trust in government and policy)

Note: * Indicates statistical difference ($p \leq 0.05$). One to Five refers to the Marginal Mean at the given level of trust. Interaction is the coefficient of the interaction of political trust with the most liberal (1) and most restrictive (2) policies within the policy domain. Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors.

	Labour (1)	Labour (2)	Family (1)	Family (2)	Limits (1)	Limits (2)	Protection (1)	Protection (2)	Health (1)	Health (2)	Location (1)	Location (2)
One	0.528*	0.417*	0.457*	0.463*	0.456*	0.544*	0.467*	0.512*	0.507*	0.493*	0.505*	0.495*
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Two	0.541*	0.403*	0.469*	0.453*	0.463*	0.538*	0.473*	0.508*	0.516*	0.484*	0.511*	0.489*
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Three	0.558*	0.383*	0.487*	0.436*	0.473*	0.527*	0.483*	0.502*	0.529*	0.471*	0.520*	0.479*
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Four	0.577*	0.363*	0.505*	0.421*	0.483*	0.517*	0.493*	0.496*	0.543*	0.458*	0.529*	0.471*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Five	0.596*	0.343*	0.524*	0.404*	0.493*	0.506*	0.502*	0.489*	0.556*	0.444*	0.539*	0.461*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Interaction	-0.016*	-0.039*	-0.020*	-0.035*	X	-0.0211*	-0.014*	-0.0158*	X	-0.027*	X	-0.019*
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	X	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	X	(0.004)	X	(0.004)
Observations	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450	50,450

Table B.6: Marginal means and interaction term (Interpersonal trust and policy)

Note: * Indicates statistical difference ($p \leq 0.05$). One to Five refers to the Marginal Mean at the given level of trust. Interaction is the coefficient of the interaction of interpersonal trust with the most liberal (1) and most restrictive (2) policies within the policy domain. Estimates based on linear probability models with clustered and robust standard errors.

Appendix C. Pre-Registration

AsPredicted Pre-Registration

Date or pre-registration: 23 February 2021 (public link to be be made public upon publication of the paper)

1. Have any data been collected for this study already?

   No, no data have been collected for this study yet.

2. What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?

   H1: Respondents will prefer more restrictive policies related to labour market access and location restrictions.

   H2: Respondents will prefer less restrictive policies related to access to health services and allowing for family reunification.

3. Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.

   We will use three outcome variables:

   - The likelihood of choosing the policy package (generated by a binary forced choice question)
   - The level of preference for the policy package (on a 1-7 scale where 1 = "absolutely dislike" and 7 = "absolutely like"
   - A binarized form of the level of preference for the policy package, where ratings of 1 to 4 are recoded as "0," and ratings of 5 to 7 are recoded as "1."

4. How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?

   We will randomly generate packages of policies comprising six dimensions as follows:

   - Numerical limit (No numerical limits; Until an annual limit is reached)
   - Geographic location (Migrants are allowed to locate in their city of preference; allowed to locate in only in certain designated cities)
   - Access to healthcare (Venezuelans can access the subsidised public healthcare system on an equal basis to Colombians; Venezuelans cannot access the subsidised public health care system in Colombia)
   - Access to labor markets (Venezuelans can work in Colombia without restrictions; Venezuelans can work in Colombia only in in selected occupations; Venezuelans cannot work in Colombia)

- Family reunification (Venezuelans are allowed to bring their spouse and children; Venezuelans are allowed to bring their spouse and children if they can pay for their cost of living; Venezuelans are not allowed to bring their spouse and children)

- Protection period (Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia for an indefinite period; Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia for a period of ten years, which can be renewed; Venezuelans are allowed into Colombia for a period of ten years, which cannot be renewed)

5. Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.

We will fit three linear models: The likelihood of choosing a policy package (forced choice), level of preference for a policy package (scale), and preference for a policy package (binarized). The main statistical outputs will be conditional marginal means which do not require a reference category. Collectively, these models will address H1 and H2.

6. Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.

Respondents who fail an attention check question immediately before the experimental component will be excluded.

7. How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be determined.

The target sample is 2,500 online respondents (in each country) 18 years of age or older.

8. Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)

The demographic and geographic distributions from Colombia's 2018 and Peru's 2017 census will be used to create post-stratification weights. We will also include batteries of questions that collect demographic, political, and attitudinal questions, some of which feature in the pre-registered hypotheses, but others will be used for exploratory analysis of mechanisms that may explain any treatment effects observed: age, gender, highest level of education, occupational status, occupational sector, personal economic impact of COVID-19, contact with Venezuelans, estimate of Venezuelans currently living in Colombia, partisanship, previous votes in the first and second rounds of the Presidential elections, and trust in government.

Appendix D. Survey Questionnaire

D.1 Survey Questionnaire

Note: Q1, Q25, Q26, Q28, Q29, Q30 were not used in the paper.

Introductory Statement:

You have been selected to take part in a survey about what your thought on current affairs. Your participation is completely voluntary and you can stop at any moment. Your answers will remain anonymous and will only be used for the purpose of research. The survey should take approximately 10 to 12 minutes to complete.

Q1. ¿To what extent do you agree with the following statements, where 1 means **"strongly disagree"** and 5 means **"strongly agree"**?

- The government should spend more on the poor.

    Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 **Strongly agree**

- The government should ensure that everyone can meet basic human needs such as food and shelter.

    Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 **Strongly agree**

- Protecting the most vulnerable should be given priority even if that reduces economic growth.

    Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 **Strongly agree**

- People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves.

    Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 **Strongly agree**

- When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to citizens of their own country over foreign residents.

    Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 **Strongly agree**

[Note: Order of the statement was randomized per respondent]

Q2. Here is a 1-10 scale, where 1 indicates "left" and 10 indicates "right." Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?

Left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 **Right**

Q3. ¿To what extent do you agree with the following statements, where 1 means **"strongly disagree"** and 5 means **"strongly agree"**?

- The government understands the needs of my community.
  Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 **Strongly agree**

- The government usually has good intentions.
  Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 **Strongly agree**

- In general, the government does the right thing.
  Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 **Strongly agree**

[Note: Order of the statement is randomized per respondent]

Q4. ¿Which of these applies to you?
- Currently working as self-employed
- Currently working as employee
- Full time student
- Retired/Pension
- Unemployed
- Not working
- Have never worked
- Other (disabled, caring for family or kids)

Note: Attention test included at this point before the experimental instruction statement

Experimental Instruction Statement:

Imagine that the Colombian government is considering various packages of measures to address migration from Venezuela. Next we will show you two possible options of packages, A and B. Read their descriptions carefully."

[Note: This text only included in the first trial]

	Policy Package A	Policy Package B
Labor Markets		
Geographic Location		
Access to Healthcare		
Family Reunification		
Numerical Limits		
Protection Period		
	☐	☐

Note: [for information only]

- The levels presented in each table are be randomly varied, with randomization occurring independently across respondents, across tables, and across attributes. Each respondent had 5 trials (compared 10 packages). In order to preserve a smooth survey-taking, the order in which attributes is presented was fixed across trials for each individual respondent (though the order randomized across respondents).

- The full design of the experimental treatment is included in Table 1 in the main text

Q5. If you had to choose, which package is closest to what you would prefer?

- Package A

- Package B

Q6. On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means "completely dislike" and 7 means "completely like," to what extent would you support each of the policy packages?

- Package A:

  Completely dislike 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 **Completely like**

- Package B:

  Completely dislike 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 **Completely like**

Q7-8 Second set of policy packages

Q9-10 Third set of policy packages

Q11-12 Fourth set of policy packages

Q13-14 Fifth set of policy packages

Q15. Age

Q16. Gender

Q17. Income

Q18. Region

Q19. Marital Status

Q20. Education

Q20. Education

Q21. Over the past few years, how often if at all do you have everyday relationships with people from Venezuela, such as exchanging a few words, for example, or buying a newspaper at the store, and so on?

- Never

- Rarely

- Sometimes

- Often

- Every day

Q22. This question concerns people you trust, for example good friends, those with whom you discuss important subjects, with whom you keep in touch, or who are there for you if you need help. How many people you trust are from Venezuela?

- 0

- 1

- 2-5

- 6-10

- More than 10

Q23. Over the past few years, have you shared a meal in your home with someone from Venezuela?

- Yes

- No

Q24. What is your best guess as to about how many Venezuelans currently live in Colombia? Please give your best guess without looking up the answers or asking others for help.

[Note: Answers included in a wheel screen with options that list with values up to 4 million in increments of 100K]

Q25. Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

- The situation in Venezuela is mainly an economic problem.

- The situation in Venezuelan is mainly a humanitarian problem.

[Note: Order of the statement is randomized per respondent]

Q26. ¿Did you vote in the 2018 elections?

- Yes [Continue]

- No [Stop]

Q27. ¿Who did you vote for in the first round in 2018?

[Note: List of candidates presented and names were randomized per respondent]

Q28. ¿Did you vote in the second round of the 2018 election?

- Yes [Continue]

- No [Stop]

Q29. Who did you vote for in the second round in 2018?

[Note: List of candidates presented and names were randomized per respondent]

Q30. ¿To what extent do you agree with the following statements, where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 5 means "strongly agree"?

- If there are vaccines available for COVID-19 in the country, ¿would you take it?
    Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 **Strongly agree**

- ¿Should Venezuelans be able to get access to COVID-19 vaccines as Colombians?
    Strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 **Strongly agree**

Many people have been affected financially by the coronavirus. We'd like to know how you have been affected, and how you and your household are coping.

Q31. [Only to those unemployed] Have you been unemployed since before the pandemic started or did you become unemployed during the pandemic?

- Since it started? Yes / No

- Before it started? Yes / No

Q32. [Only to those currently working] Think about the last week compared to your life in February. Due to the coronavirus outbreak, did you ... [tick yes/no]

- work fewer hours than usual? Yes / No

- earn less money than usual? Yes / No

- had trouble paying your usual bills or expenses? Yes / No

Debriefing Statement:

Thank you for participating in this study which is being conducted by a team of researchers at [removed for blind review] on the topic of attitudes towards immigration and preferences for migration policies. Some respondents will have seen different policy packages than the ones you saw. All your responses will be anonymous and analysed as part of larger groups. The findings of this project will be disseminated through academic conferences, research reports, and publications.

This work was approved by [removed for blind review]. For more information, you may contact the Principal Investigator of the research project: [removed]. The Principal Investigator will endeavour to acknowledge your concern within 10 working days. If you have any complaints about this research or your participation in it, please email the chairperson at [removed].

D.2 Authors Declaration

This project adheres to professional guidelines set out by the American Political Science Association (APSA), located at: APSA-Ethics Guide. In particular, the APSA guidelines include best practice around data protection, transparency, and reproducibility. All new data generated from this project will be made available in line with these guidelines.

The project also adheres to the principles and guidance for human subjects research as set by APSA (and found here: APSA - Human Subject Research.

D.3 Data Collection and Informed Consent

Data collection and related identification and recruitment of research participants was subcontracted with Invamer Colombia and Datum Peru both using the Netquest platform. The survey companies carried the actual identification and recruitment based on the proposed sampling methods and they aimed to achieve representativeness of the adult population in Colombia and in Peru.

We instructed the survey company that in their selection, respondents must be age 18 or older at the time of survey. The companies drew from their existing panel of respondents and ensured rates of survey completion across different demographic groups to achieve the goal of a representative sample of adult population in both countries.

The data collection involved the use of online, web-based interviewing. The polling firms maintain panels of potential survey respondents who agree to be invited into and to participate in survey data collection. Participants are therefore recruited from their regularly updated panel of potential survey respondents. The firms contacts this panel members via the web and the surveys are completed on their own proprietary web-based platform (each respondent activates a unique URL sent to them via e-mail).

The researchers in the project had no access to identifiable information regarding individuals in the panel. The data was fully anonymised and informed consent was obtained by requiring participants to read a text about the voluntary and confidential nature of their participation and their rights with respect to the data. Participants also saw a short introductory statement explaining the task, and a debriefing statement at the end of the study explaining the purpose of the work.

By completing the survey, as well as being part of the Invamer and Datum panels in the first place, respondents had given already their consent, including the possibility of withdrawing their responses or stopping at any time. This notion of implied consent has been developed in current guidelines for online survey research.[23]

D.4 Compensation Procedures

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[23]See section 4.2 of Online Surveys

This project did not directly compensate any research subjects for their participation in the survey. However, as it is the norm across reputable polling companies around the world, members of their panels often receive an incentive rate (points based) for the completion of surveys.[24]

Since respondents collect points by participating in a range of surveys hosted by firms that vary in length, their actual hourly equivalent will likely be different across respondents. However, in line with increasingly accepted good practice surrounding ethical compensation (MacKay, 2022), we do not think the survey context represented a situation where (a) participants' vulnerabilities were exploited, and (b) some participants potentially benefited more from an intervention than others.

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[24]Both Invamer and Datum haves many years of experience (50 and 40 years respectively) and their panel of respondents has been used by reputable international Poll surveys.