

TOP SECRET

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THE
SECRET INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE

REPORT OF ENQUIRY BY
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JUNE, 1952

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TOP SECRET

Enquiry into the Secret Intelligence Service

TERMS OF REFERENCE

I was asked by the Secretary of State to make a full review of the role and position of the Secret Service; of its administration, with special reference to its relations with the Foreign Office and the Foreign Service; of the means of exercising the Secretary of State's responsibility for it; and of its relations with the other main recipients of the intelligence which it produces.

2. I have examined the problem under the following four main headings:—

A.—The efficiency of "C's" organisation, with particular regard to recruitment, personnel and establishment policy, and the load placed upon very senior members of the S.I.S.

B.—The requirements of the consumer Departments, the most important of which are the three Service Departments, the Foreign Office, the J.I.B., and the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence; the quantity and quality of the intelligence produced for these consumers; and the difficulties in obtaining that intelligence.

C.—The scope for and the present efficiency of Foreign Office control of the S.I.S., and the arrangements made for liaison between the Foreign Office and the S.I.S.

D.—The cover problem.

3. My formal Terms of Reference are attached as an Appendix to this Report.

GENERAL

4. Since the Bland Report on the Future Organisation of the S.I.S. was published in October, 1944, there have been very considerable developments both in the S.I.S. and in the nature of the targets which have been set by the consumer Departments. The Bland Report took as its first assumption the necessity to have a highly efficient British Secret Service in peace-time. Steps were taken to reorganise the S.I.S., and to ensure the continuance of the close relations with consumer Departments that had resulted from war-time collaboration.

5. The reorganisation has produced some results which were probably not entirely expected. The S.I.S. has now reached the proportions of a Government Department of respectable size, with pensionable officers who enter in hopes of a steady career resembling that which might be hoped for by officers of the Home Civil or Foreign Services. The Service serves numerous customers most of whom, while expressing dissatisfaction, continue to ask for intelligence on more and more subjects. In addition, the war planning and special operations which have recently been allotted to the S.I.S. have increased the burden upon it and are likely to do so still more for the next year or two. It is against this background that the organisation, recruitment, &c., of the Service has to be considered.

S.I.S. ORGANISATION

(a) Composition of the S.I.S.


6. The number of persons employed by the S.I.S. has increased in recent years and an adequate administrative machine is necessary. In 1946-47 "C's" portion of the Secret Vote was £1,539,831. It is now £3,250,000 (estimate for the

9. The effort of the S.I.S. may be divided under the headings:
- (a) production of intelligence, which includes running agents abroad;
 - (b) editing of that intelligence and forwarding it to consumer Departments;
 - (c) current "special operations";
 - (d) war planning;
 - (e) overall planning and policy; and
 - (f) administration of the Service.

The number of officers employed in the Head Office is approximately 385 out of a total of about 700 in the S.I.S. as a whole. This includes about 40 under training or awaiting appointments, 38 conducting training courses or employed in research, and about 50 engaged on purely administrative work. The proportion engaged on administration does not seem excessive.

(b) Load on very senior S.I.S. Officers

10. When the present "C" retires and his successor takes over, the upper hierarchy of the S.I.S., as now constituted, will be as shown in the following diagram:—




11. Under this arrangement an unduly heavy, and probably increasing, load is placed upon the C.S.S. and the V.C.S.S., who would have to be in constant and direct contact with day-to-day problems concerned with requirements, production, war planning, technical and research problems, administration, finance and personnel. In order that the C.S.S. and the V.C.S.S. should be less burdened with day-to-day problems and have more time for planning and policy, I recommend that three new posts should be created under the V.C.S.S. The holder of the first post would be styled A.C.S.S. (Requirements). He would act as a co-ordinator of all the Requirements Sections, would be responsible for maintaining smoothness of relations between the S.I.S. and consumer Departments, and would supervise directly the work of the Heads of the Requirements Sections. The holder of the second post would be styled A.C.S.S. (War Planning and Technical) and would supervise war planning, training, research and development, and all technical problems. The holder of the third post would be styled A.C.S.S. (Personnel and Administration). He would have under him a Director of Finance and Administration, a Director of Personnel, and an Inspector of Security. He would be responsible for the co-ordination of all problems regarding recruitment, personnel, security, finance and administration. His position in the S.I.S. would correspond closely to that of the Chief Clerk in the Foreign Office. It is not, in my opinion, necessary or desirable that the C.S.S. and V.C.S.S. should be burdened with any but the most important matters of administration. The Chief Controllers and Controllers in charge of production, would continue, as now, to be directly under the supervision of the V.C.S.S. and "C".

12. The post of A.C.S.S. (Personnel and Administration) would be a new creation, to which I attach considerable importance. The other two posts existed before, though not exactly in their present form. It may later be found that they can be amalgamated. My suggestions are of course designed to suit the present needs of the S.I.S. A chart of the organisation showing the new posts which I

This doesn't help unless it all broken down through V.C.S.S.

would recommend, including other posts with which I shall deal later, would look as follows:—



- NOTE.—1. One F.S. officer, grade 6 will be in charge of R.1, assisted by one F.S. officer, grade 8 in R.1 and one F.S. officer, grade 7 or 8 in O/Prop.
 2. The F.O.A. will supervise R.1, R.5 and R.6, for Foreign Office requirements only.
 3. The title "Director" is used to indicate the Head of a Department and does not necessarily mean that the person concerned gets the rank and emoluments of a director in the S.I.S.

(c) Personnel Administration

13. The arrangements within S.I.S. Headquarters for the recruitment, appointment and promotion of officers might be better co-ordinated. At present the Adviser on Officers' Appointments (A.O.A.) is responsible for making suggestions regarding the postings and appointments of officers at home and abroad. He is the chief personality around which the whole personnel machine revolves. He has a direct responsibility to "C" in an advisory capacity. At the same time the Deputy Director of Administration also plays a considerable part in the appointments of officers. He has directly under his control an officer who is Secretary of the Selection Boards which make the final appointment. He is also Chairman of Selection Board B which appoints and posts the more junior officers and is a member of Selection Board A for senior officers, as well as being Chairman of the New Entry Selection Board which recruits officers. There is in addition a Recruiting Officer responsible to the Deputy Director of Administration and having little contact with the Adviser on Officers' Appointments. A third Selection Board—C—deals with the posting of Secretaries.

14. I have formed the impression that there is a clearly defined need for a Personnel Department inside S.I.S. Head Office. I recommend that such a Department should be supervised by a Director of Personnel. Under the Director of Personnel there should be a Personnel Department containing a Recruitment Section in charge of a Recruiting Officer, a section dealing with S.I.S. officers in charge of a career S.I.S. officer, a mobilisation section and a section dealing with the recruitment and posting of female Secretaries.

15. The Director of Personnel should, I suggest, be the Secretary of Selection Board A (which corresponds to the full Senior Promotions Board in the Foreign

Office). He should be the Chairman of Selection Board B (at present the Deputy Director of Administration is the Chairman of this Board). He should also be *ex officio* Chairman of the New Entry Selection Board (at present the Deputy Director of Administration is also the Chairman of this Board). Immediately in charge of the Personnel Department and under the direct supervision of the Director of Personnel there should, I suggest, be an Assistant Director of Personnel, whose qualifications should be similar to those required of the Director of Personnel and who should be chosen with a view to his succeeding to the Director of Personnel upon the latter's retirement. The Assistant Director of Personnel should be a member of Selection Boards A, B and C and of the New Entry Selection Board. These boards seem to work well and should be retained.

16. Parallel with the Director of Personnel there would be a Director of Finance and Administration, as at present. I suggest that it will not be necessary to have in the future an officer of the seniority of the present Director of Finance and Administration who was brought into the S.I.S. after the war in order to reorganise its administrative machine. His successor should be chosen to act as a co-ordinator of the sections at present styled E (establishment, pay, allowances and conditions of service), Q (stores, equipment, transport, research, &c.), and F (finance and audit). Co-ordination of matters affecting jointly the Director of Finance and Administration and the Director of Personnel should be dealt with by the A.C.S.S. (Personnel and Administration).

(d) Recruitment of Officers

17. The S.I.S. maintains a small recruiting staff in an office separate from its main Headquarters. The method of recruitment in the first instance is by recommendation, either by past or present members of the S.I.S., through officers in the Service Departments, or through the Civil Service Commission, the University Appointments Boards, the Ministry of Labour and certain large commercial organisations. With all of these the S.I.S. maintains liaison on a personal basis for recruiting purposes.

18. The Civil Service Commission in recent years has passed on to the Recruiting Officer of the S.I.S. an average of about 80 names each year of candidates who have appeared at the Civil Service Selection Boards and who have seemed suitable for employment in the S.I.S. Most of these candidates have failed, in many cases by a very narrow margin, to enter the Foreign Service. It is estimated that the S.I.S. takes between 10 and 20 per cent. of them. The other main source, and, I am informed, the best source of recruits is through recommendations made by past and present members of the S.I.S. Wherever possible, and in almost all cases where the candidate is under thirty years of age, the S.I.S. makes use of the C.S.S.B. for the purpose of vetting candidates who come before them as a result of recommendations and wish to make a career of the Service. Over the past four years the number of candidates who have entered the Service either as a career or for short-term service based on contract is as follows:—

				Career	Contract
1948	55	33
1949	30	38
1950	23	31
1951	33	50
				141	152
	Total		

19. In any one year the number of candidates offering themselves for entry on a career basis may amount to about 200. The Secretary of the C.S.S.B. considered that of the candidates seen by the C.S.S.B. there were a few who would have succeeded in entering the Foreign Service if they had tried and that those who entered the S.I.S. were probably very little below the standard of those who had succeeded only by a narrow margin in entering the Foreign Service. The candidates who failed for the Foreign Service but were successful in entering the S.I.S. were only recommended if they appeared capable of showing initiative and taking responsibility in situations where they would have to act on their own judgment. He thought that the standard of recruit admitted to the S.I.S. was higher than the standard of the young men recruited from the Universities by business organisations.

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20. As a very rough generalisation it might be true to say that of 30 career officers recruited by the S.I.S. in any one year perhaps two or three would have finished high in the Foreign Service examination, about 15 would have gone very close to passing that examination and that the remainder were entrants of a high standard even if, for various reasons, they appeared unsuitable for the Foreign Service. The successful entrant will usually be about 25-26 years of age, have done his two years' National Service, have a Second-Class University Honours Degree (probably from Oxford or Cambridge) and in some cases will have obtained an Exhibition to the University.

21. The S.I.S. labours under considerable difficulties in this matter of recruiting. It cannot advertise for candidates nor can it advertise the conditions of service which it is offering. The cover title of Intelligence Co-ordination Staff does not inspire confidence or enthusiasm in many parents. And, finally, the S.I.S. is competing in a field where the Foreign Service is in a strong position to take first pick. One remedy for this state of affairs is to be found, I suggest, in widening the field of contacts which the S.I.S. has at the Universities, particularly Oxford and Cambridge, and in increasing the financial inducement to join the S.I.S. rather than the Foreign Service. At present on joining the S.I.S. a recruit aged about 25 is given a starting salary of £550-750 a year, depending on his previous experience. Although this is more than the salary offered by the Foreign Office, it hardly seems enough to attract the first-class young man with a bent for intelligence. As I mention in the following paragraphs, I consider that the financial prospects of officers entering the S.I.S. as a career should be improved by an increase in the allowance which they are paid abroad, and by instituting the payment of allowances for service at Head Office on return from posts abroad.

22. This method of recruiting is still in the experimental stage and has, I suggest, certain dangers. It is hoped that the officers of the permanent Service will prove their merits, but for the most part this still remains to be seen. In the meantime a Service with an awkward age-structure is being produced and in the future a jam in promotion and a heavy pensions bill must be expected. It is said to be very difficult in present conditions to attract adventurous candidates who would be prepared to serve with S.I.S. for a period of a few years only. I cannot help feeling that it would be very advantageous and might save much future trouble if it should prove possible in the next few years to engage fewer officers on a permanent basis and proportionately more on contract.

(e) Conditions of Service

23. A career in the S.I.S. has necessarily certain drawbacks, even to those most strongly attracted to intelligence work. The career is in most cases a short one; senior posts are few, and the average member of the Service has little reason to hope for high promotion, still less for any public recognition of his work. In 1952 it would perhaps be wrong to examine the future with too curious an eye, but it cannot be ignored.

24. Although the General Intelligence Officers (G.I.O.'s) who have been recruited in the past few years have entered a permanent and pensionable Service most of them cannot expect a career of more than 20-25 years, after which they will have to retire on a pension of less than half (in most cases about three-eighths) of their final salary. Of the 100 officers who have entered the Service as a career in the last four years only 10 can expect to achieve in 25-30 years' time positions of responsibility corresponding to their age and experience. Beneath these 10 senior appointments, there are about 15 posts in London of considerable responsibility (e.g., Deputy Controllers and Heads of R. Sections) and abroad perhaps three or four posts requiring a comparatively senior S.I.S. officer. This means that there will be only about 30 first-class jobs for the 100 officers recruited during the last four years. The remaining 70 officers will either have to make do with less responsible jobs, or retire on a pension. It must be admitted that the Winnifrith Committee's recommendation that the Foreign Service and other Departments of Her Majesty's Government should assist in finding other employment for S.I.S. officers is, though helpful, only a palliative.

25. The question must therefore arise whether all these drawbacks inherent in the S.I.S. as a career are compensated by the pay during Service or by the

pension on retirement. I do not think that they are. There is a danger, therefore, that the S.I.S. will be weakened in the future:—

- (a) By some of the most able officers retiring early in search of better jobs;
- (b) By officers doing less satisfactory work because they feel that their efforts are not being fully rewarded; and
- (c) By a failure to recruit first-class entrants caused by the feeling that the terms of service are not remunerative.

26. There are two possible ways of remedying this situation, by increasing either the basic salaries or the allowances. Since my concern is primarily with the core of the S.I.S. formed by the G.I.O.'s, since the basic salaries of the latter are on the whole adequate, and since the financial hardships are caused mainly by reason of alternating home and foreign service, I recommend that the financial improvement should be sought by means of an increase in allowances both at home and abroad.

27. In London, S.I.S. officers who have served overseas should on their return to Head Office receive a home allowance which should act as a cushion against the extra expenditure necessarily incurred by an officer posted for a short time to London. Abroad, S.I.S. officers should receive total emoluments much more in line with those given to Foreign Service officers of approximately the same age. Although they do not have the same representational functions, S.I.S. officers enjoying local diplomatic rank have to engage in some social activities and behave as if they were members of the staff of an Embassy. In addition, I suggest also that consideration should be given to the possibility of according officers on retirement a lump sum payment on a more attractive scale than at present. The receipt of a small amount of capital would be some help towards starting a new life at an age between 40 and 50.

(f) Secretaries

28. About 1,000 Secretaries are employed by the S.I.S.; about 100 are recruited annually to take the place of 100 who leave the S.I.S. each year. This obviously raises a security problem, of which the Head Office authorities are fully conscious. The Secretaries are recruited with great care, and with a special view to their political reliability. On the whole, their conditions of service are adequate, although, considering the highly secret material which they handle, their salaries are by no means high.

29. During my tour of S.I.S. stations abroad, I did not find the number of secretarial staff to be excessive. If the output of the S.I.S. stations is to be maintained, the numbers of secretaries at present overseas will have to be maintained. They are used not only for shorthand-typing, &c., but also for keeping card indices up-to-date, for cyphering, for supervising accounts and other administrative duties, the performance of which saves the time of the S.I.S. officers and enables them to devote themselves to their more important work.

(g) Security

30. The usual security checks are carried out on all candidates before they are admitted to the S.I.S. Thereafter no further specific security check is made, although personal reports are made on the officer at various stages in his career and special attention is paid to the question whether he should be considered "blown" or not. All members of the S.I.S. are positively "vetted" and sign a declaration that they have never been members of or influenced by the Communist Party, Communism or Fascism. An Inspector of Security, an officer drawn from the ranks of the S.I.S., is responsible to "C" for all aspects of security.

31. Personnel security can only be adequately safe-guarded by the closest co-operation between the Personnel and Security Departments of an organisation. I therefore recommend that the officer appointed to the post of A.C.S.S. (Personnel and Administration) should be given an over-riding responsibility for security and should use the Inspector of Security and the Director of Personnel in order to discharge this most important function. Special attention should be paid by senior officers of the S.I.S., when reporting on their juniors, to the security and

integrity of the officer concerned. Since there is such a large turnover in secretarial staff it would be advisable, I suggest, for secretaries to have a further security check made upon them after two years' service.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONSUMER DEPARTMENTS

(a) The Present State of British Intelligence

32. In their report of 7th January, 1952, the Joint Intelligence Committee gave a discouraging account of the present state of British intelligence on the Soviet Union and the European Satellites. As regards the Far East too, although the S.I.S. has numerous stations in the area, results have been disappointing. Almost no intelligence can be obtained on China and, although the station at Rangoon has been of great value, the difficulties of securing worthwhile intelligence in this area have not yet been overcome. Apart from atomic intelligence, very little is known about the top grade secrets of the Soviet Union. The measures suggested by the J.I.C. for improving our intelligence do not carry much hope of early success. SIGINT is the J.I.C.'s primary hope, but the S.I.S. can contribute:—

- (a) By directly helping the SIGINT authorities;
- (b) By encouraging high-grade defectors and deserters; and
- (c) By continuing its efforts to penetrate the Iron Curtain by every possible means.

33. The difficulties confronting the S.I.S. are often forgotten. The security measures imposed by the Soviet and Satellite authorities are such as have never previously been seen. All movement into and out of their territories is strictly controlled. None of their nationals can travel abroad unless he is on official business. If he does so travel, steps are taken to see that members of his family can if necessary be held as hostages for his good behaviour whilst absent from the country. No foreigner can enter the Soviet Union without his every step being watched, and the population of the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent of the Satellite countries are indoctrinated to regard all foreigners with acute suspicion. Moreover, the recruiting of agents for penetration of the Soviet Union and the Satellite countries is becoming increasingly difficult for a variety of reasons. One of the most powerful motives which actuate an agent is the hope of participating in or actively assisting a successful rebellion against the authorities in power in his own native country. For obvious reasons, such hopes can hardly be entertained by agents returning on behalf of the S.I.S. to the Soviet Union or the Satellites. The motive of patriotism having been removed, there remains the lesser motive of monetary gain. As each year goes by the number of potential agents who are in touch with the local conditions in their country of origin becomes less, and the chances of any particular agent's survival diminishes.

34. In such circumstances it is no reflection on the ability and zeal of the S.I.S. and its officers that they have been unable to uncover the highly-guarded secrets of the Soviet Union. No other secret service has, so far as is known, managed to do so. Every means of penetrating the Russian security system has been, and is being, constantly examined. In peace-time the physical difficulties confronting the S.I.S.'s efforts to send agents beyond the Iron Curtain are very formidable. The important centres of the Soviet Union are extremely inaccessible. The S.I.S. has had some success in penetrating the periphery of the Soviet Orbit. It has also had some success in piecing together information about Soviet atomic developments, partly because the raw materials necessary for that development were located in areas near to Western Europe. But in every field of intelligence the S.I.S. is confronted with very difficult problems. It is possible that traditional methods of penetrating the Soviet Union and the Satellites are now no longer suitable. The exploitation of special technical methods is another avenue of approach which is being actively studied. The collaboration of the scientists in the perfection of special listening, recording, and other detecting devices has been sought. By combining the use of SIGINT and the information produced by the S.I.S., which is in many instances of vital importance to the SIGINT authorities, some improvement may be secured, but, unless there is some unexpected stroke of luck, it is hard to foresee any rapid change.

(b) The Requirements of the Foreign Office

35. Liaison is good but could be improved by the appointment of:—

- (1) a Foreign Service officer, grade 6 (Counsellor) in charge of R.1, when this post becomes vacant;
- (2) one Foreign Service officer, grade 8 to work, as at present, in R.1;
- (3) the appointment of a Foreign Service officer, grade 7 or 8 to the Section of the S.I.S. Head Office (O/Prop.) which collaborates with I.R.D.

These proposals and suggestions for cross-posting from S.I.S. to the appropriate sections of other Departments will be considered later in more detail.

(c) The Requirements of the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence

36. The difficulties of obtaining scientific intelligence of any kind are no less great than those attending the procurement of intelligence about military matters. Russia is a huge landmass, and laboratories and testing areas can be placed in virtually inaccessible regions. Inaccessibility combined with the existing Russian security system, which makes the infiltration of an agent on to Russian soil very hazardous and difficult, effectively protect Russian technical secrets. It is also obvious that the ordinary agent can hardly be expected to secure scientific intelligence of much value.

37. Relations between the S.I.S. and D.S.I. have not been good. An arrangement has now been reached under which the new D.S.I. will act also as Scientific Adviser to "C". It is hoped that this arrangement, which is to come into effect in August, will make for smoother working, but immediate results can hardly be expected.

(d) The Requirements of the Joint Intelligence Bureau

38. Relations and liaison between the J.I.B. and the S.I.S. are good. The value of material provided by the S.I.S. to the J.I.B. varies very considerably. In the majority of cases for any given subject and area S.I.S. material does not contribute more than 5 per cent. of the total. But for certain areas, as would be expected, S.I.S. material is of great importance. For example, for the Satellites it provides about 30 per cent. of J.I.B.'s. total useful information, and nearly 50 per cent. of all J.I.B.'s. information on East-West trade comes from S.I.S. sources. These are encouraging figures.

(e) Requirements of the Service Departments

39. Like all other consumers, the Service Departments are not satisfied with the material supplied by the S.I.S. about Russia, China and the Satellites. Apart from this general criticism the War Office seem to be satisfied with the way their requirements are handled.

40. With the Air Ministry, and more especially with the Admiralty, contact is less satisfactory. It may be noted that the Admiralty have no recently retired senior officer in the upper levels of the S.I.S. hierarchy.

41. As a remedy, I suggest that, at any rate experimentally, a senior officer from one of the three Services should be seconded to, or should join on retirement, S.I.S. Head Office to become Director of R.2, R.3 and R.4. He would act as a high-level liaison officer between the Service Departments and the S.I.S. and would ensure that important requirements received their due attention. The first officer to hold this post might be a naval Captain or Rear-Admiral. Thereafter the post, which should be for three or four years, should be held by an officer appointed by the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee on the recommendation of the three Directors of Intelligence. As a further means of maintaining contact between the Service Departments and the S.I.S. it might be useful if the Services' Representative to "C" had the power to call meetings, at which representatives of the Service Directorates of Intelligence could discuss their requirements directly with the Controllers of the Production Sections. Such meetings should not be too frequent, but might well serve a useful purpose in enabling the Service Departments to keep informed of the progress made in meeting their requirements and to realise any special difficulties which may have been found in securing any particular type of intelligence.

(f) Requirements of the Treasury and the Board of Trade

42. I found that the Treasury and the Board of Trade were on the whole satisfied with the material which they received from the S.I.S. Both Departments considered that only a small proportion of this material could be rated as being of immediate and practical use, but they thought that the bulk of it provided helpful background information, most of which could not be obtained from any other source. The liaison arrangements between these Departments and the S.I.S. are good. The main need seems to be that they should devote more attention to guiding the S.I.S. in the work which they require to be done. It is important, in this connexion, that the "Crit" sheets (*i.e.*, notes written by the consumer departments indicating the value which they attach to any particular secret report, and other comments) should be carefully filled in. This applies to all consumer departments.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SERVICE AND THE S.I.S.

(a) The Problem

43. The Foreign Secretary is responsible in peace and in war for the S.I.S. This is a basic principle which was emphasised by the Bland Report and which should without doubt be maintained. This overall responsibility of the Foreign Office, and the fact that the S.I.S. cannot function abroad without the cover provided by the Foreign Service, necessitates that the relations between the Foreign Service and the S.I.S. should be closer than the relations of the S.I.S. with any other Department in Whitehall.

44. There are three main problems:—

- (1) the degree of control to be exercised by the Secretary of State, acting through the Permanent Under-Secretary, over the appointments and organisation of the S.I.S., in particular the appointment of "C", the V.C.S.S., the A.C.S.S. (one or more), and the Chief Controllers and Directors;
- (2) the degree of control to be exercised by the Foreign Service over the activities of the S.I.S. in the field abroad;
- (3) the liaison arrangements that will most satisfactorily assist both the S.I.S. and the Foreign Service to function quickly and efficiently.

(b) The Present Position

45. The Bland Report made recommendations regarding the liaison arrangements between the Foreign Service and the S.I.S. which have in the main been carried out. The present position is as follows. The Permanent Under-Secretary is responsible for exercising such supervision of the S.I.S. as is considered essential to Foreign Office requirements. He delegates the responsibility for day-to-day affairs to an Under-Secretary, at present Mr. Reilly. Correspondence with Foreign Office posts abroad is carried out by this Under-Secretary or the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department. To assist him and the P.U.S. Department there is a Foreign Office Adviser (F.O.A.) to "C", a Foreign Service officer, grade 7, whose office is in S.I.S. Head Office. The F.O.A. in practice assists the S.I.S. in the posting of S.I.S. officers to Missions and Consulates abroad, deals with the administrative problems that arise from that arrangement, and in general gives advice and acts as an intermediary between the S.I.S. and the Foreign Office on a variety of problems. There is in addition direct liaison between the Overseas Planning Section of the Foreign Office and the S.I.S. on current Special Operations (S.O.), between the P.U.S. Department and the S.I.S. on preparations for S.O. and Secret Intelligence (S.I.) in war-time, and between Information Research Department and the S.I.S. on "cold war" propaganda and S.O. (*e.g.*, dropping of leaflets and suborning members of Russian and Satellite armed forces). There is also direct liaison between R.1, the Requirements Section in S.I.S. Head Office responsible for secret political intelligence, and all the Political Departments of the Foreign Office and between R.6, responsible for all secret economic intelligence in S.I.S. Headquarters, and the Political and Economic Departments of the Foreign Office. The F.O.A. is kept more or less currently informed by the S.I.S. of some of the details involved in these direct liaison arrangements, but it is in practice impossible for him to do more than maintain a cursory supervision

of what is going on between the S.I.S. and the O.P.S., I.R.D., and the Political and Economic Departments of the Foreign Office.

46. I have no doubt that it is essential that one Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office should have a broad mandate from the Permanent Under-Secretary to keep in touch with the activities of the S.I.S. in all its aspects. At present, although the Under-Secretary, P.U.S.D., concerts and controls a great deal of the liaison between the Foreign Office and the S.I.S., there are two other Under-Secretaries intervening in this field, one supervising the work of the O.P.S. and another supervising I.R.D. This arrangement is not entirely satisfactory. If the proposal which I have to make regarding the appointment of a senior officer from the Foreign Service within S.I.S. Head Office is found to be useful and satisfactory, I would suggest that the Under-Secretary, P.U.S.D., should resume supervision of the Overseas Planning Section. The liaison between Information Research Department and the S.I.S. should continue to be supervised by another Under-Secretary, since the Under-Secretary, P.U.S.D., would be able through the senior representative of the Foreign Service inside Broadway (who would be directly responsible to him) to keep himself fully informed about S.I.S. activities on behalf of I.R.D.

(c) Recommendations to improve Liaison Arrangements between the S.I.S. and the Foreign Office

47. I have examined a suggestion that a Foreign Service officer should be put in charge of the three Sections in the S.I.S., R.1, R.5 and R.6, responsible respectively for political, economic, and Communist and counter-espionage intelligence. I have already recommended that R.1 should be supervised, in due course, by a Foreign Service officer, grade 6. There would not be, in my opinion, enough work to justify the appointment of a further Foreign Service officer of any seniority merely to supervise R.1, R.5 and R.6. On the other hand, there is no doubt of the usefulness of a Foreign Office Adviser to "C". At present that post is held by an A.7 Foreign Service officer. I recommend that the F.O.A. should be an officer of grade 5 in the Foreign Service, paid from the Foreign Office vote and shown on the list of the P.U.S.D. He should be assisted by an Assistant F.O.A. of grade 8. The officer of grade 5 seniority would act as adviser to "C" and to the S.I.S. on all matters concerning the Foreign Office. He would be directly responsible to the Under-Secretary, P.U.S.D. He should, I suggest, supervise the work of R.1, R.5 and R.6 only insofar as it affected the Foreign Office. In this task he would later be assisted by the Foreign Service officer grade 6 in charge of R.1, who would also maintain much closer liaison than hitherto with the S.I.S. officers in charge of R.5 and R.6. He should also concern himself closely with the liaison between the S.I.S. and the Overseas Planning Section and Information Research Department in the Foreign Office, as well as with S.I.S. appointments to Missions and Consulates overseas, for which purpose he would be assisted by an Assistant F.O.A. of grade 8 in the Foreign Service. He and the Assistant F.O.A. should be *ex officio* members of all the S.I.S. Selection Boards. To keep himself informed about the details of work carried out by the S.I.S. in conjunction with I.R.D., the F.O.A. would also have the assistance of a Foreign Service officer, grade 7 or 8 serving inside that Section of S.I.S. Head Office (O/Prop.) dealing with cold war propaganda and Special Operations. It would be essential that the F.O.A. should have undisputed control, subject to the final approval of the Under-Secretary, P.U.S.D., of all the Foreign Service officers working within S.I.S. Head Office. All these officers should regard it as their duty to keep the F.O.A. fully informed upon all aspects of their work. If this arrangement was put into practice I think that there should be a very considerable easing of the continually increasing burden which at present falls upon the shoulders of the Under-Secretary, P.U.S.D., and there would also be a quicker despatch of business between the S.I.S. and the Foreign Service. An F.O.A. with the seniority of a grade 5 Foreign Service officer would carry suitable weight with the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department, O.P.S. and I.R. Department. That should facilitate business between those Departments and the S.I.S., whilst at the same time it leaves ultimate responsibility with the Under-Secretary, P.U.S.D., and the Under Secretary supervising I.R. Department.

48. The number of subjects on which intelligence is now sought is continually increasing, while the number of officers seeking it cannot in practice be increased.

Saturation point has already been reached in the S.I.S. staffs attached to Foreign Service posts and more work can hardly be taken on. I should hope that, if the Foreign Office Adviser and the Representative of the Service Departments are employed in the capacities suggested, part of their function would be to try to decrease, instead of increase, the flow of intelligence on non-essential subjects.

49. As the reverse of these appointments from outside to the S.I.S., I suggest that S.I.S. officers of suitable grades should be seconded for service with the appropriate Departments of the customer Ministries. I understand that staff for such postings is not at present available, but when staff can be found it appears to be in everybody's interest that officers should acquire by interchange a better understanding of the problems of the Departments with which they deal.

(d) Foreign Service control over the Activities of the S.I.S. abroad

50. Since the Foreign Secretary is responsible for the S.I.S. and since the Foreign Service provides cover for the representatives of the S.I.S. in foreign countries the Foreign Office and the Heads of Missions abroad must know, though not necessarily in detail, about any activity or operation planned by the S.I.S. which might jeopardise the standing of the Foreign Service abroad and, in the event of failure or leakage, cause a serious incident with a foreign Government.

51. Under existing arrangements the S.I.S. inform the Foreign Office in advance about operations planned within Satellite countries, and the S.I.S. representative within Satellite countries keeps the Head of the Mission informed about S.I.S. activities and about any particular operation which he is asked by S.I.S. Head Office to mount. This is satisfactory. It is, however, illogical not to extend this arrangement in principle to cover all countries where the S.I.S. operate under diplomatic cover. In these countries the Head of the Mission should know that he has the power, if he so wishes, to be kept informed about the activities planned by the S.I.S. representative. Some Heads of Missions may and in fact do prefer not to know what the S.I.S. is doing. I am inclined to think that this is a mistake and that all Heads of Missions should keep themselves informed, if only in general terms, about the nature of the operations planned and the intelligence gathered by the S.I.S. There is these days a positive duty upon both the S.I.S. and the Foreign Service to co-operate within a Mission abroad.

(e) Foreign Office concurrence in S.I.S. appointments

52. It is not possible for the Foreign Secretary to take responsibility for the S.I.S. unless he has a sufficient measure of control over the appointments of the very senior members of that organisation. The present arrangement is that "C" will seek the approval of the Permanent Under-Secretary for appointments to the post of V.C.S.S. and will consult the Permanent Under-Secretary over the appointment to the posts of A.C.S.S. and the three Chief Controllers. The appointment of "C" himself is subject to the direct approval of the Secretary of State. There are two interests involved. On the one hand, it is important that the S.I.S. as a Service should feel that the very highest posts in it are open to and in large measure reserved for the officers of the Service and that "C" should have the major say in making the appointments. On the other hand, unless the appointment of any particular S.I.S. officer to the posts of Chief Controller or A.C.S.S. is made with Foreign Office concurrence, the Secretary of State will be much hampered in controlling the appointments to the posts of "C" and V.C.S.S., to which in the normal course of events the A.C.S.S. or one of the Chief Controllers will be appointed. I consider, therefore, that the Permanent Under-Secretary should be consulted over the appointment of the three Chief Controllers and should have the right, in case of disagreement over the appointments to the posts of V.C.S.S. and A.C.S.S., to refer the matter to the Secretary of State for final decision. The Secretary of State takes responsibility for the S.I.S. and must, therefore, have the final word in the selection of the chief officers for whom he is responsible.

THE COVER PROBLEM

(a) The Problem and the Present Position

53. The objective of the S.I.S. must be to maintain the anonymity of its officers and agents and the secrecy of its organisation. The S.I.S. must operate and have stations abroad; there is no doubt that it could not do so nowadays

without the assistance afforded by Foreign Service cover. To the S.I.S. the cover problem consists in the fact that the Foreign Service, whilst giving to the S.I.S. invaluable facilities without which the latter could not work, does not and cannot subordinate the prior claims of the Foreign Service to the needs of the S.I.S. in the matter of accommodation, diplomatic and consular ranks, notional sections of the Foreign Office and of Embassies, and the restriction of publications (e.g., the Foreign Office Annual List) which assist hostile intelligence services to pinpoint members of the S.I.S. To the Foreign Service the problem of cover lies more in the embarrassment caused to itself, both at home and abroad, by the presence of a considerable number of officers and secretaries claiming to be members of the Foreign Office or of Missions and Consulates abroad, whose activities are in fact secret and unavowable. A further problem for the Foreign Service abroad has been posed by the increasing numbers of S.I.S. officers and secretaries, whose needs for accommodation and for cover ranks have inevitably been the source of some difficulty and embarrassment to Heads of Missions.

54. It is not easy to say to what extent the S.I.S. can now be regarded as really secret. The location of the Head Office in London is generally known. The senior officers of the Service and others from Head Office are obliged to have contacts with a number of friendly foreign intelligence services. Abroad, I believe in many cases, and certainly in the four countries which I have visited, some officers are in close contact with the local intelligence services, military and police forces. There is therefore a considerable and increasing number of officers whose identity and occupation are known to numerous foreign officials. It seems to me too much to hope that in the course of years, the names of these officers will not become known to agencies beyond those in whom the knowledge is unobjectionable. On the other hand, a system developed by years of experience is applied to the protection of agents and the liaison between officers and foreign authorities should not endanger those agents' anonymity. Whilst many of the senior and some of the middle ranks of S.I.S. officers must be known to potentially hostile intelligence authorities there is good reason to think that up to date the anonymity of most of the younger officers has been preserved. No efforts should be spared to maintain that anonymity in the future.

55. The present position is that the S.I.S. abroad is based almost everywhere on Foreign Service cover. No other cover would be possible for the S.I.S. in the Soviet Union, the Satellite countries or China. In these countries and in almost all other foreign countries the S.I.S. requires cover and accommodation in Her Majesty's Missions or Consulates in order to keep its archives, cyphers, &c., securely and to enjoy freedom of communication with the Head Office. I have examined the possibility of making alternative arrangements (e.g., the use of business cover) abroad and am satisfied that with very few exceptions it is not feasible for the S.I.S. to use anything other than diplomatic or consular cover.

(b) Some Suggestions

56. The Winnifrith Committee have already studied and made recommendations upon the cover problem, and I find myself in agreement with their Report. I would, however, like to draw attention once again to the information about the composition of the S.I.S. which is given to potentially hostile Governments by the annual red Foreign Office List. As a result of recent cuts in unestablished officers at Missions abroad there are in most places very few unestablished members of the diplomatic staff, and often none at all. It is the easiest possible task, which I have myself performed, to take the Foreign Office List, to eliminate by reference to the "Statement of Services" genuine British Diplomatic and Consular officers, and to find a residue of a few so-called diplomatic officers who readily identify themselves as probable members of the S.I.S. Since about 100 S.I.S. officers enjoy diplomatic or consular rank abroad the Foreign Office List will enable potentially hostile counter-espionage authorities to identify with very little margin of error about 300 or more S.I.S. officers over the course of the next eight or nine years. This danger to the anonymity of those members of the S.I.S. who otherwise might have hoped to escape the attention of hostile intelligence organisations was not, I think, adequately pointed out by the Winnifrith Committee.

57. The latter considered that it would be impracticable to make the annual Foreign Office List and the monthly white Foreign Office List restricted documents. This may be so, but the dangers to the S.I.S. of continuing the present practice should be fully appreciated.

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58. There are various minor ways in which the cover for the S.I.S. could be improved. It is, I suggest, useless to attempt to conceal the identity of the S.I.S. representatives from the United Kingdom-based staff (including Attachés, &c.) of a Mission abroad. The S.I.S. representatives, both those who figure on the local diplomatic list and those who pose as secretarial staff, &c., have a cover story. It is important that all the United Kingdom-based staff of a Mission should know what that cover story is and should support it on all occasions. To achieve this it is necessary that the Head of the Mission should delegate to a member of his staff, preferably the Head of Chancery, the duty of ensuring periodically that every United Kingdom-based member of the staff of that Mission is made sufficiently aware of the identity and cover story of the S.I.S. representatives, of the necessity for supporting that cover story, and of the need for the utmost secrecy regarding the true nature of the S.I.S. representatives' functions. There is, I suggest, no half-way house on this. I recommend that instructions to this effect should be issued and that a reminder should be sent every two years to every Head of Mission. Similarly Branch A members of the Foreign Service serving in the Foreign Office should be warned by the Head of their department that members of the S.I.S. serving in London claim to be working for the Foreign Office.

59. Relations between the S.I.S. and the Foreign Service abroad are, with few exceptions, excellent. Unless there is the maximum of co-operation between the members of both Services there is little hope that in the future the S.I.S. cover problem can be effectively solved. Amongst the duties of the Head of Chancery liaison with the S.I.S. and constant efforts to ensure the integration of S.I.S. representatives into the Mission must rank high. As a corollary of this it is of the utmost importance that S.I.S. officers abroad should be instructed by their Head Office before going overseas to collaborate to the maximum with the Foreign Service members of the Mission. I hope that Heads of Missions will feel progressively readier to give every encouragement to the S.I.S. in their work abroad. At the more difficult posts (*e.g.*, Iron Curtain posts and certain posts in the Middle East and Far East) I recommend that in selecting Heads of Missions due importance should be attached to finding men who are likely to give "C's" officers the right kind of encouragement and guidance.

60. No cover story can be fully effective unless it is thoroughly "worked". The necessity for an S.I.S. officer to spend a large amount of his time working his cover depends to a great extent on the nature of the job he is doing and the country in which he is operating. In the Soviet Union, the Satellites and China, the need for perfect cover does not require to be emphasised; in certain countries of the Middle East, South-East Asia and the Far East it is important that those members of the S.I.S. engaged in covert activities should be given effective cover and should work that cover carefully. It is important that S.I.S. officers engaged in covert activities in any country should go to considerable pains to dissociate their activities from those of their S.I.S. colleagues who may be engaged in overt liaison with the intelligence or security authorities of that particular country. There might be some advantage now in discontinuing the use of Passport Control cover and using instead ordinary local diplomatic or consular cover for the S.I.S. liaison officer. It seems wrong to attach a label, such as Passport Control Officer, to any S.I.S. officer, when his anonymity might otherwise be rather better preserved. S.I.S. liaison officers, moreover, should not have their offices adjacent to that of an S.I.S. officer engaged in clandestine activities. Often accommodation presents a problem in this field, and it is here that the Head of a Mission and Head of Chancery can be of considerable assistance in seeing that office space is allocated in such a way as to assist the S.I.S. officers both to work their cover and minimise the administrative inconvenience caused by widely separated offices.

61. In recent months Foreign Office Inspectors have included in their reports on posts abroad a section concerned with the S.I.S. insofar as the latter affected the accommodation and other arrangements of the post. This practice should be continued, and the Inspectors should make a point of getting the Head of the Missions' opinion about the cover problem at his particular post and the relations between the S.I.S. and the Foreign Service members of the post. The Inspectors should also, I suggest, make sure that the financial arrangements for providing the S.I.S. with money are secure. The Chief Controllers should also bear all the above points in mind when they inspect the stations under their control.

H. SEYMOUR.

26th June, 1952.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

- (a) The load on "C" and the V.C.S.S. is excessive and increasing. Three new posts of A.C.S.S. (Requirements), A.C.S.S. (Personnel and Administration) and A.C.S.S. (War Planning and Technical) should be created. The A.C.S.S. (Requirements) should be responsible for liaison between the S.I.S. and Whitehall Departments, and within the S.I.S. would supervise all major problems affecting the Requirements Sections (paragraph 11.)
- (b) The A.C.S.S. (War Planning and Technical) would supervise all technical and research problems, and plans for operations in time of war (paragraph 11.)
- (c) The A.C.S.S. (Personnel and Administration) should co-ordinate all problems of recruitment, personnel, security, finance and administration (paragraphs 11 and 12.)
- (d) A Personnel Department should be created supervised by a Director of Personnel and an Assistant Director of Personnel (paragraphs 14 and 15.)
- (e) To assist recruitment the financial prospects of officers entering the S.I.S. as a career should be improved (paragraph 21.)
- (f) To improve the emoluments of S.I.S. officers increased allowances should be paid abroad, and home allowances should be paid to S.I.S. officers returning to Head Office after service abroad (paragraph 27.)
- (g) Consideration should be given to the possibility of giving career S.I.S. officers on retirement a larger lump sum payment than is given at present (paragraph 27.)
- (h) In the next few years fewer officers should be engaged by the S.I.S. on a career basis and proportionately more on contract (paragraph 22.)
- (i) Responsibility for personnel security should lie with the A.C.S.S. (Personnel and Administration) (paragraph 31.)
- (j) Since there is such a large turn-over in secretarial staff secretaries should undergo a further security check after two years' service (paragraph 31.)
- (k) To improve liaison with the Service Departments a senior officer from one of the three Services should be appointed by the Chairman of the J.I.C. on the recommendation of the three Directors of Intelligence to act as Services Representative to "C" with supervision of R.2, R.3 and R.4. The first officer to hold this post might be a naval Captain or Rear-Admiral (paragraph 41.)
- (l) The Services Representative to "C" should have the power to call meetings attended by representatives of the Services Directorates of Intelligence and the Controllers of the Production Sections (paragraph 41.)
- (m) All user Departments should devote more attention to guiding the S.I.S. in the work they require to be done, particularly when completing the "Crit" sheets (paragraph 42.)
- (n) A Foreign Service officer, grade 5, should be appointed as Foreign Office Adviser to "C", and should be directly responsible to the Under-Secretary, P.U.S.D. He should be assisted by an Assistant F.O.A. who should be a Foreign Service Officer, grade 8 (paragraph 47.)
- (o) A Foreign Service officer, grade 6, should be put in charge of R.1 when the latter post becomes vacant, and a Foreign Service officer, grade 8, instead of a grade 7 officer, should continue to work in R.1 (paragraphs 35 and 47.)
- (p) A Foreign Service officer, grade 7 or 8 should serve inside the Section of S.I.S. Head Office (O/Prop) which deals with cold war propaganda, &c. (paragraphs 35 and 47.)
- (q) S.I.S. officers of suitable grades should be seconded for service with the appropriate departments of the customer Ministries, especially the Foreign Office and the three Service Ministries (paragraph 49.)
- (r) It should be part of the function of the F.O.A. and the Service Representative to try to decrease, instead of increase, the requirements of intelligence on less essential subjects (paragraph 48.)
- (s) All Heads of Missions abroad should know that they have the power, if they so wish, to be kept informed, either in detail or in general terms, about the activities planned by the S.I.S. (paragraph 51.)

- (t) Since the Foreign Service takes responsibility for the S.I.S. the appointment to the post of V.C.S.S. and A.C.S.S. should be made with Foreign Office concurrence and the Foreign Office should be consulted over the appointment of the three Chief Controllers. In case of disagreement over the appointments to the post of V.C.S.S. and A.C.S.S. the Permanent Under-Secretary should have the right to refer the matter to the Secretary of State for final decision (paragraph 52.)
- (u) The S.I.S. must continue to use Foreign Service cover for their representatives abroad. The Head of Chancery at Missions abroad should ensure that all United Kingdom-based members of the staff do not reveal the true identity of the S.I.S. representatives. Instructions to this effect should be issued and a reminder should be sent every two years (paragraph 58.)
- (v) Similarly Branch A members of the Foreign Office should be warned that members of the S.I.S. in London claim to work for the Foreign Office (paragraph 58.)
- (w) It is the responsibility of the Head of the Mission, and particularly of the Head of Chancery, to assist S.I.S. representatives abroad. In selecting Heads of Missions for Iron Curtain posts due importance should be attached to finding men likely to encourage and guide S.I.S. officers on their staff (paragraph 59.)
- (x) The annual red Foreign Office List gives considerable information about the S.I.S. to potentially hostile Governments. Further attention should be given to the question of making the annual Foreign Office List and the monthly white Foreign Office List restricted documents (paragraphs 56 and 57.)
- (y) S.I.S. officers engaged in overt liaison abroad should not work in offices adjacent to those of their S.I.S. colleagues engaged in clandestine activities. The label of Passport Control Officer should no longer be used by any S.I.S. officer (paragraph 60.)
- (z) Foreign Office Inspectors should include in their report on all posts a section dealing with the S.I.S., with particular reference to the problem of cover and relations with the Foreign Service (paragraph 61.)

APPENDIX

SIR HORACE SEYMOUR,

The post-war Secret Service was formed in 1945 by the amalgamation of S.I.S. and the war-time S.O.E. into one Service. Since then that Service has been responsible to the Foreign Secretary for obtaining secret intelligence and carrying out special operations in foreign countries, and to the Chiefs of Staff for preparations for war for both these activities, subject to Foreign Office approval of preparations in foreign territory.

2. As a result of the world situation the Secret Service, in order to carry out these tasks, has been forced to expand to a far greater size than was ever contemplated by the pre-war S.I.S. and to use Foreign Service cover abroad on a large scale. These developments, and the exacting tasks laid on S.I.S., have given rise to a number of difficult problems. The Foreign Office is now much more concerned with the administration of the Secret Service than was the case before the war. A major difficulty is that of reconciling the size of the Service, and the extent of its activities, with the fact that its existence and work cannot be acknowledged.

3. The Foreign Secretary has therefore decided that a full review shall be made of the role and position of the Secret Service: of its administration, with special reference to its relations with the Foreign Office and Foreign Service: of the means of exercising the Secretary of State's responsibility for it: and of its relations with the other main recipients of the intelligence which it produces.

4. You have been appointed to carry out this review, to report and make recommendations. You will be assisted by:—

Mr. Martin Watson of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, who will advise you generally on matters concerning Intelligence requirements and the Intelligence organisation;

Mr. A. J. D. Winniffrith of the Treasury, who will advise you on organisational and establishment matters; and

Mr. P. W. Scarlett, Foreign Service Inspector, who will advise you on questions concerning the cover of "C's" staff in Foreign Service posts abroad.

Mr. L. M. Minford, Foreign Office, will act as Secretary.

W. STRANG.

Foreign Office,
3rd April, 1952.