

DRAFT

C0/1009

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

TO BE RETURNED TO THE

It is issued for the personal use of W. S. Sanders**TOP SECRET****SECRET BY**Copy No. 11**SECRET PLANNING STAFF**

J.P.(47)118 (S) (Draft)

10th December, 1947.LIMITED CIRCULATION

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING STAFF

SPECIAL OPERATIONSDraft Report by the Joint Planning Staff

As instructed^o we have examined the questions of whether the limitations imposed on Special Operations should be relaxed and of what types of activity might be carried out in present circumstances. We have taken into account the views of Special Operations.

2. Below we consider the military arguments in favour of permitting Special Operations. At Annex A we have considered, in broad terms, the nature of Special Operations in peace, the general lines of action open to us and the part which could be played by Special Operations. At Annex B we have set out the types of activities which we consider Special Operations could undertake in individual countries or geographical areas.

MILITARY ARGUMENTS FOR PERMITTING SPECIAL OPERATIONS

3. In their examinations of Commonwealth strategic problems the Chiefs of Staff have repeatedly stressed the need to halt the spread of Communism. Failure to do this would result in the undermining of our world wide strategic position.

The Foreign Office have agreed that our policy should be directed towards reducing Soviet infiltration and influence, but for fear of political repercussions they have considered it necessary to limit the use of Special Operations which might have assisted in the implimentation of this policy; this fear can only be alleyed by an agreed appreciation of the nature, scope and limitations of Special Operations in peace.

4. It has been appreciated[≠] by the J.I.C. that, in pursuit of their fundamental aims of eliminating capitalism and ensuring the security of the Soviet Union, present Russian policy is designed to attain the following main objectives:-

"First, the reconstruction of Soviet economy and its development to a point where it will rival and eventually outstrip that of the United States.

o C.O.S.(47)11th Meeting
≠ J.I.C.(47) 7/1

Secondly, the establishment of a protective belt of subservient countries round the frontiers of the Union.

Thirdly, the avoidance of a major war, at least until circumstances are judged to be sufficiently favourable to the Soviet Union.

Fourthly, the continued aggressive promotion of communism throughout the world under Moscow's direction.

Fifthly, the disintegration and weakening of the capitalist world wherever possible, both by political infiltration and the promotion of unrest at home and in colonial territories, and by the prevention of any move towards closer association among the various capitalist states".

To achieve their ends the Russian leaders are using all possible means from judicial murder and the instigation and support of armed revolution to the more legitimate forms of political and diplomatic action. They are not bound by ethics or scruples, but solely by expediency and what is in fact possible in particular sets of circumstances. Their main weapons are Communist infiltration and propaganda in all its forms, and it is against these that we should particularly direct our attack.

5. During the post-war period our strategic position in relation to Russia has deteriorated. In Poland and most of the Balkan states the Communist grip has tightened to such an extent that it will be very difficult to loosen; in Germany, France, Italy and Greece the Russian inspired Communist campaign, designed to bring these countries into line with Eastern Europe, already threatens our strategic interests in Western Europe and the Mediterranean.

6. Apart from this major consideration other factors, such as our financial and manpower difficulties and our withdrawal from Palestine and Egypt, support the argument for lifting the ban on Special Operations.

In Germany, for instance, we would prefer to have considerably larger occupational forces since it cannot be guaranteed that the forces at present available could retain control of the British Zone in the event of a major disturbance. We have therefore had to take special measures to ensure no such disturbance takes place. It is in such situations that Special Operations could be of particular assistance.

The obvious interest Russia is showing in the Middle East and our impending evacuation of Egypt and Palestine makes it more than ever essential to combat by every possible means her attempts to dominate the area by Communist infiltration.. In addition, it is essential that our interests in the Persian and Iraq oilfields and installations should be preserved in peace. Special Operations could, we consider, play a considerable part in preventing the spread of Communist doctrine and in guiding public opinion in these areas into pro-British channels.

7. In view of the above considerations we consider that to counteract Russian activities we cannot afford to forego any means of redressing the balance including the increased use of Special Operations.

8. Special Operations, however, are essentially a complimentary and a subsidiary means of action; they are unlikely to achieve much unless they form part of some overall plan adopted by His Majesty's Government and they can rarely, if ever, achieve major results when employed alone. They are most effective when used to supplement and support overt action whether this is carried out by diplomatic, economic, cultural and social or military means.

We must point out that considerable time is required to organise and develop Special Operations and that, if effective use is to be made of them in peace, a start should be made at once. In addition the need for a trained number of Special Operations personnel at the outbreak of war also requires that we should begin recruiting and training as early as possible. Moreover, if Special Operations are undertaken with inadequate organisation and preparation security may be endangered. The sooner action is taken to counter Russian infiltration the more economically and effectively will results be achieved.

9. Whilst fully realising the political difficulties involved we consider that the Foreign Office should be asked to review their policy with the object of lifting the present restrictions on Special Operations.

CO-OPERATION AND CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN CLANDESTINE ORGANISATIONS

10. There is always the risk, which will be increased if Special Operations are expanded, that the activities of our various clandestine organisations will overlap or even counteract each other. We realise that some provision is already being made for both co-operation and co-ordination but we consider that an examination should be made to determine the extent of the co-ordination required and the body best suited to ensure and control a common policy.

In addition to co-ordination of British effort we consider that we should take all possible steps to ensure that our operations do not clash with those of other friendly Powers. For instance, we do not know what steps the Americans are taking in this direction, nor whether they are prepared to inform us of their activities.

CONCLUSIONS

11. We conclude that:-

- (a) From a military point of view there is every advantage in lifting, as soon as possible, the present restrictions on Special Operations.
- (b) There are three main ways in which Special Operations can be used to further our strategy, namely:-

Covert propaganda
Political Action
Economic Action

Special Operations must form part of an overall plan and should be used in support of overt action (Annex A).

- (c) The areas where the need for Special Operations by us is most apparent at present and on which we should therefore concentrate our limited resources as soon as possible, (Annex B), are:-

Germany and Austria
Middle East
Russia's Eastern European Satellites,
particularly Poland.

- (d) There are many areas where Special Operations cannot be undertaken at present but in which developments must be kept under observation with a view to future action, (Annex B).
- (e) As soon as any decision has been taken to raise the restrictions on Special Operations an examination should be made to determine the extent of co-operation and co-ordination necessary between clandestine organisations.

Recommendation.

12. We recommend that the Foreign Office should be asked to review their present policy of restricting the activities of Special Operations and that this paper be used in support of this request.

Ministry of Defence, S.W.1.

10th December, 1947.