
TOP SECRET Annex to JP(62)94(D)(Flimsy) COUNTER-SUBVERSION A Counter Subversion Committee has recently been set up "... to initiate and co-ordinate plans for projects in territories overseas designed to counter hostile propaganda, subversion and penetration There has for some time been a need to co-ordinate clandestine and overt counter subversion operations and the CSC provides a means of achieving this. "Subversion" means activities intended to weaken or destroy Western influence or strength in any country, with the object of gaining the support of that country for the policies of the Communist Bloc and eventually bringing it under the control of the Bloc. The CSC is, however, empowered to consider similar le hatismalism etc. threats from quarters other than the Communist Bloc. 3. The CSC does not make policy but is the organization in Cau (H.M.G's) hillary which policy or requirements for counter subversion are to be discussed with other interested Government Departments with a view to obtaining approval for, and the initiation of, counter subversion action. In this the woodstory can make their Conhibution. In the light of the increasing need for economy in defence expenditure and the resultant reductions of our military resources and strength, the value of counter-subversion action assumes even greater importance than hitherto. Successful action would not only reduce the likelihood of having to commit forces in certain areas but would also facilitate their deployment should this become necessary. We consider, therefore, that we should provide the CSC with a paper giving in outline our military requirements for counter-subversion. Counter-Subversion Committee -Terms of Reference.



Annex (Continued)

AIM

building teasons (meluding prophylactic) action (active or prophylactic) action (should be conducted in the interests of our strategy.

SCOPE OF THE PAPER

6. This paper is related to our requirements for "Strategy in the Sixties" and we do not therefore look further ahead than 1970. We also consider that it would be inappropriate to include the area of Allied Command Europe in our present study.

METHOD OF CLASSIFICATION OF AREAS

- 7. We divide the overseas territories concerned into three main categories:-
 - (a) Category I. Those areas in which the loss of rights and/or facilities would seriously endanger our military ability to meet one or more of our commitments.
 - (b) Category II. Those areas in which the loss of rights and/or facilities would make the military task more difficult, but which would not prevent us from meeting our remaining commitments.
 - (c) Category III. Those areas not included in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, in which we may
 require to take military action, either as a moral
 or treaty obligation, or to safeguard our
 interests from Communist or other unfriendly
 domination.
- 8. In Category I and II the areas are placed under two main headings, although a particular territory may qualify for inclusion under both headings:-
 - + COS(62)1

UK EYES ONLY

Annex (Continued)

- (a) Those places where we have military bases or facilities which we wish to retain as long as possible for the following purposes:-
 - (i) To support the country in which the bases are located.
 - (ii) To provide a stabilising presence in the whole area.
 - (iii) To provide timely support to other Allied or friendly countries in the area.
 - (b) Those territories where we wish to retain, for as long as possible, staging, transit and naval facilities in order to:-
 - (i) Be able to reinforce overseas bases.
 - (ii) Be able to go to the assistance of dependent,
 Allied or friendly countries.

ORDER OF PRIORITY

9. The seriousness of the threat is likely to vary between territories from time to time. We consider that the Communist Bloc is likely to switch its direction of attack and we should be prepared to concentrate our counter subversion effort wherever the threat appears strongest in the light of current intelligence. We do not therefore attempt to lay down priorities within the three categories, nor indeed do we attempt to compare the relative priorities of the areas included in the first two categories and Category III. We do, however, consider that the areas in Category I merit a higher priority than those in Category II.

TERRITORIES BY CATEGORY

10. Category I. Loss of rights and/or facilities in the following would seriously endanger our ability to meet our remaining commitments:-

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Annex (Continued)

- Military Bases and Facilities
 - Aden
 - (ii) Singapore
 - (iii) Cyprus (for CENTO)
 - (iv) Bahrein
- Staging, Transit and Naval Facilities
 - Gan (Maldives)
 - Libya (including El Adem)
 - ((iii) Sudan (including airfield at Khartoum)
 - Turkey
 Iran
 - - (vi) Republic of South Africa
 - (vii) Gibraltar
 - (viii) Sal
 - Ascension (ix)
 - Mauritius
 - Greater Malaysia
 - Thailand
- 11. Category II. Loss of the following areas would make the military task more difficult, but would not prevent us from meeting our remaining commitments:-
 - (a) Military Bases
 - Malta
 - Staging, Transit and Naval Facilities
 - Embakasi (Kenya)
 - (ii) Kano (Nigeria)
 - (iii) Bathurst (Gambia)
 - (iv) Masirah
 - Suez Canal
 - Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
 - Bermuda (vii)
 - (viii) Trinidad
 - (ix) Jamaica

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UK EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

UK EYES ONLY

Annex (Concluded)

- 12. Category III. In addition to the areas listed in paragraphs 10 and 11 above there are certain areas in which we may be required to take military action, but in which successful counter subversion would make the necessity for military action less likely. We consider these to be as follows:-
 - (a) Kuwait
 - (b) Persian Gulf Sheikdoms
 - (c) Greater Malaysia
 - (d) Laos
 - (e) Thailand
 - (f) Libya
 - (g) Lebanon
 - (h) Jordan
 - (j) Yemen
 - (k) Remaining dependent territories.