CeDEx
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics

CeDEx workshop - Abhijit Ramalingam (University of East Anglia)

Date(s)
Wednesday 1st February 2012 (14:00-15:00)
Description

Broken Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence

 

Abstract: Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through

self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of

decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents who are

linked through alternative punishment networks. We find that the structure of the punishment network

significantly impacts contributions to the public good, but not overall efficiencies. Contributions collapse

over decision rounds in groups with limited punishment opportunities, even if the absolute punishment

capacity corresponds to the complete punishment network where all agents are allowed to punish each

other. However, after allowing for the costs of sanctions, efficiencies are similar across the different

networks that allow for punishment and the no-punishment network.

 

Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics

Sir Clive Granger Building
University of Nottingham
University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD

telephone: +44 (0)115 951 5458
Enquiries: jose.guinotsaporta@nottingham.ac.uk
Experiments: cedex@nottingham.ac.uk