CeDEx
Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics

CeDEx workshop - Ariel Rubinstein (Tel Aviv and New York University)

Date(s)
Wednesday 10th December 2014 (15:00-16:30)
Description

 Joint with Senior Academic Seminar Series.

Complex Questionnaires

Rubinstein presented a principal-agent model based on propositional logic rather than game theory. The principal designs a questionnaire in order to decide whether or not to grant the agent a certain request. The key assumption is that the agent is boundedly rational in his ability to understand the principal’s decision rule. Rubinstein explained why a principal who can construct a sufficiently complex questionnaire would be able to respond optimally to agents who tell the truth and at the same time to almost eliminate the probability that a dishonest agent will succeed in cheating. Rubinstein concluded his talk by laying out his view on what can be learned from economic models.

Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics

Sir Clive Granger Building
University of Nottingham
University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD

telephone: +44 (0)115 951 5458
Enquiries: jose.guinotsaporta@nottingham.ac.uk
Experiments: cedex@nottingham.ac.uk