CeDEx 2021-06: An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games

Summary

This paper presents a simple adaptive model of demand adjustment in cooperative games, and analyzes this model in weighted majority games. In the model, a randomly chosen player sets his demand to the highest possible value subject to the demands of other coalitions members being satisfied. This basic process converges to the aspiration set. By introducing some perturbations into the process, we show that the set of separating aspirations, i.e. demand vectors in which no player is indispensable in order for other players to achieve their demands, is the one most resistant to mutations. We then apply the process to weighted majority games. We show that in symmetric majority games and in apex games the unique separating aspiration is the unique stochastically stable one.

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Now published in Games 2022, 13(1), 5.

Authors

Maria Montero and Alex Possajennikov

 

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